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
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I D E A L I S M :

AN ESSAY,

METAPHYSICAL AND CRITICAL.

BY

WILLIAM GRAHAM, M. A.,

OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN.

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 — 30, line 5, *after* Hegel *read* is.

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P R E F A C E .

THE following Essay is chiefly an attempt to elucidate, and to show the connexion between, two great conceptions of the universe, the one emanating from Berkeley and the other from Hegel. It tries also to show the general meaning of Idealism, about which in the British Islands there is still, although Berkeley wrote a century and a half ago, the strangest confusion of thought. The want of comprehension of Berkeley's Idealism in particular, even by very distinguished men, is still more surprising; but that such is the case I hope to establish clearly in the last chapter against a number of Critics, including Hamilton and Mansel, the latest and best exponents of the Scotch school of Philosophy. I have also tried to maintain Berkeley's position against the adverse attitude of some German thinkers, in particular against that of Kant.

The Table of Contents will show more clearly what the work attempts, much of which, I believe, has not been done before. The most hoped for or aimed at is, that the leading thoughts of two great thinkers will be somewhat more clearly apprehended than before, and the nullity of some of the adverse Criticisms, especially those against Berkeley, clearly shown. As regards Hegel, it is only the real result which is offered, and in part defended; not the logical evolution of his system, which is extremely abstract, hard to be understood, and is already given in Stirling's "Secret of Hegel;" while the real result is both more important and more intelligible. The arguments here employed, though mostly taken from the principles, are seldom to be found directly in the words of the thinkers whose thoughts are chiefly here illustrated, and in such case I will accept whatever praise or blame may attach to them, as being shaped by myself from principles involved in the Idealisms of Berkeley and Hegel, considered as general systems of Thought. But the seed-thought belongs mostly to Berkeley or to Hegel, and only the shaping of the argument for their defence against their Critics is original, just as

a pleader's speech may be so regarded. The last chapter is entirely devoted to a refutation of Berkeley's Critics, and as this was the work in which Hamilton and Mansel—the creators and chief advocates of Natural Realism, the system now opposed to Berkeley's Idealism—most delighted, it is hoped that it may be considered fair to render to them again the measure they meted out so often to others.

The doctrines of several great thinkers are here attacked, but it is generally in defence of what I consider deposited and fully established Truth, which cannot be considered as on its trial for ever. I do not indeed consider refutation but criticism, i. e.—the elimination of truth from blended error, the filiation of the grown thought to its germinal form, the reconciliation of two aspects of the One Truth—the proper work of Philosophy to-day, but yet it is quite necessary to refute the refuters. I am tempted to say to these refuters that no great thinker has ever been really refuted—not Spinoza, nor Locke, nor Berkeley, nor Hume, nor Hegel—for the immortal features of Truth were

shown to each of these seekers, but unveiled successively more and more, while the full glory of her face is reserved for the stronger and clearer eyes of her future followers. And besides, her various aspects arose partly from refraction through different mental atmospheres, and partly from different individual positions; while to see free from distortion, and to see from a common centre supposes the best Reason of the race to be what it only tends to become, one and perfect, like to Truth, its own proper object, which is also one.

As regards the style of writing in the following pages, I am aware of a well-founded objection, which might fairly be made, and for which some apology may seem to be needed. It is, that there are signs of haste and want of care in selection and finish of phrase and sentence, and to this I must plead guilty; my excuse being that in addition to such general reasons as may urge any one to lay their ideas before the public, there happened here to be a special one, compelling instant haste, during the composition of the greater part of the Essay, and permitting no hesitation in the choice

of the vesture for the thought. There is, perhaps, one slightly counterbalancing advantage to style hence resulting, and that is, when there is no time to put on carefully a formal dress, and what comes readiest to hand must be taken, we will probably be presented with an appearance, if less dignified, yet more easy, true, and natural. I state this not to deprecate fair criticism, but because it was a fact; no excuse is offered on ground of haste for the thoughts which have been meditated over sufficiently long, but only for the manner in which they are put, which may not show them in their best light. It may also be thought that the imaginative element occupies too prominent a place in this Essay, and that it is more highly coloured than suits the severity of the subject. My answer is, first, that writers are divided in opinion and practice on this point of Philosophical style—on the one side we have Locke, Butler, and Hume, who all unite in condemning Imagination as misleading, and an intruder in the Philosophical field; on the other we have such distinguished writers as the late Professor Maurice, Mr. Martineau, Dr. Stirling, and Dr. Newman, who all write for the Imagination as well as for the

Intellect; and we have the opinion of the latter, that this faculty is rather the source of truth, than as with Butler, the “froward delusive faculty, of some use for apprehension, but the author of all error.” And Mr. Tennyson, a deep Metaphysical thinker, supposes it is rather this faculty which sees “through life and death, through good and ill.” Hume and Mr. Mill are perfect masters of a philosophical style, but Hume, though rightly condemning the “flights of imagination,” is not remarkable for dispensing with metaphor in delivering his thoughts; nor is Mr. Mill, even in his Economical and Metaphysical writings, always in the passionless state peculiar to the purely abstract thinker, while in his immortal treatise *On Liberty* the strength of his feeling is manifest, and is indeed the partly-concealed, but real source of the power of this, the noblest and manliest piece of prose writing in English since the time of Milton.

But secondly, the style, though also affected by the individuality of the writer, naturally selects the expression most suited to the subject, and the subject, Idealism, has two sides, one Ethical, re-

lating to conduct, where the language naturally waxes warm; the other Metaphysical, and that the more frequently treated of in these pages, where it as naturally adopts for expression the coldest abstractions of the reason, as well as the most unsuggestive and symbolic language, like to the algebraic. If these were interchanged it would be a grave charge against style; but I hope there will be found no attempt of this sort, and in particular none to establish a point of Reason by an appeal to Rhetoric. And I also hope it will be found that, in most places, only intelligence, and in some, only the most abstract thought can breathe freely, and that these will prove a perfect cold bath for the emotional Imagination. To attempt indeed to establish Euclid's Elements by persuasion, and by expatiating on the multitudes of facts they account for and embrace, or even to ask us to accept them as convenient though but provisional hypotheses to tie together the facts, would be, doubtless, extremely original, if not very scientific modes of establishing the theorems, when there is reasoning, direct and deductive, to appeal to: and it would be not less absurd to maintain that the Law of Contradiction

must be vindicated, at all hazards, against the Absolute, and all else, on the ground that if its authority be once impugned, it is, so to speak, all over with us in the world of thought. This appeal to consequences is not either the German or the French way of dealing with the most abstract question in Metaphysics, though I believe something remarkably like this line of argument and mode of defence is adopted by several English writers in favour of the Law of Contradiction as against the Absolute of Hegel, when it is supposed by them that two such "mighty opposites" are arrayed against each other in Hegel's system. (See chap. ii., § 8.)

I may state that the last chapter was chronologically my first thought, and was that from which the others naturally grew; for in thinking of Berkeley's Idealism one is compelled to ask how far his thought reaches. And as my chief object was to defend Berkeley, I shall be satisfied if I find myself generally correct in my defence of Berkeley's positions (though not necessarily of his precise arguments) against his numerous and, in some cases, very distinguished assailants. I had also

intended to connect with this Essay another on Scepticism, a subject to which this and every writing on Philosophy refers, and on which some opinion is pre-supposed. But the great importance of the subject, and the want of sufficient time for a more prolonged consideration, render it advisable for me to abandon the design for the present.

One word to my own countrymen—the countrymen of Berkeley Since Berkeley wrote, there has been here little attempt made to go back to first principles. Without asking the cause of this, which certainly is not want of native intellectual fibre in the country which has produced Berkeley, Swift, Burke, Goldsmith, and Hamilton,¹ I will just state the interpretation to be put upon this habit, if continued, of silence on subjects fundamentally important. It means the isolation of Ireland from the general intellectual movement in Europe, an isolation by-and-bye as complete as that of Portugal or Turkey; and a nation without any interest in ideas will soon be with-

¹ I mean Sir Wm. Rowan Hamilton, the creator of the Method of Quaternions in Mathematics.

out anything else worth living for. It means leaving to other nations the world's work; when great thoughts, which may become future facts, are, cloudlike, slowly shadowing and shaping themselves; but not passively shaping themselves, for they take configuration and color according to the thought and will of men. It means the shrinking from the field of battle when the air of Europe is hot from the collision of principles, and the ground trembling from the shock of new and great ideas. And it will mean, finally, the fatal ostrich security, which comes from closing the eye and covering the head—a security which will be no security—though purchased at the terrible price of the gradual paralysis of the brain and deadening of the soul of a once intellectual and impassioned nation.

28, TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN,
December, 1872.

INTRODUCTION.

(1.) THE substance of the following pages is Metaphysical and not Psychological; it is also mainly Critical, and offers no new Metaphysical Theory, which is as rare a phenomenon in the History of Philosophy, as the discovery of new planets or continents in the history of the material universe. Besides it is from criticism that a new theory, or as it should be more properly regarded, a further development of Philosophy, comes. Criticism tries to see the past thought clearly, its strength and weakness, and such Criticism, speaking generally, and not in the Kantian sense, may itself be not only the condition (which it surely is) of any further advance, but may constitute an actual step. The function of Philosophy has been mostly Critical at all times, and is particularly so at present, after the prodigal creations of the speculative spirit for the half-century succeeding the Kantian revolution. After great efforts, Metaphysical speculation has stopped creating, and is now chiefly bent on considering more intently her accumulated wealth. The great conceptions which have

been rayed forth are to be focused into fuller clearness for the future. The comprehensive and sometimes crossing thoughts of so many great minds are to be generalized by elimination, and harmonized so far as they may be different aspects of truth, which, though one and eternal, is yet many-sided ; so that from these thoughts, pregnant with a further meaning, after a careful scrutiny and sorting, what is greatest and truest may be gathered as the seed-thoughts of further Philosophical fruit. Criticism I believe to be the function of Philosophy at present, but with sympathetic, not iconoclastic spirit—appreciating but not refuting those whom History has finally and surely consecrated and crowned,

“The dead but sceptred sovereigns, who still rule
Our spirits from their urns.”

What appears in the following pages then is chiefly a criticism and an elucidation, from my own standpoint, of two great and comprehensive conceptions of the world, one shaped by our illustrious countryman, Berkeley, a century and a half ago ; the other an extension of it, but both extensively and intensively conceived and applied by the great German and European thinker, Hegel, about a century later : Berkeley's conception being that the External Universe is made up of sensations—is a web woven by us, in spider fashion, from materials we find in ourselves, these raw materials being perpetually re-

produced, and the weaving power superadded by the Deity; and Hegel's, that not only is the External Universe Sensations, but that the entire Universe, External and Internal, present and past, is Thought.

That a writing deals with Metaphysics at all, in the opinion of many highly intellectual persons, constitutes a fatal objection to it. From the prevalence of the Positivist spirit many, even thoughtful persons, consider Metaphysics as no legitimate subject for thought, because conversant with fictitious entities which science is exploding, as it has by its potent spell disposed of ghosts and fairies; or it considers the Metaphysician as following phantoms, or mirages of the mind, which habit, though once general, and still, unhappily, to be found, the triumphant march of all-conquering positive Science is gradually but surely effacing from the mental constitution of the race. These ingrained and deep delusions it thinks are to be completely and to the last trace rubbed out, and then man can turn and attend to his proper work—the Positive—the Natural—the tabulated facts of Experience; and give up his vain quest of the Ideal, the Super-sensual, the Unknown, which has so long charmed his thought and soul with a singular but fatal fascination.

This I consider a most mischievous and mistaken view, proceeding from a false and shallow estimate of Human Nature; and this Essay is a protest against this Positivist Spirit, no less than against

the closely connected Spirit of Materialism, whether the Speculative Materialism of Modern Science or the practical Materialism involved in the modern conception of life, as a furious contest for material goods, though at the expense of all the Ideals which have been believed in by men from the days of Plato, but which, as well as Metaphysics, it now seems, to those views were delusive dreams. Now, I say that Metaphysics cannot die out of the world, or only when Religion, and Art, and Science die; that is, when all that elevates man above the brute, from which, according to Science, he has come by a continuous process of development, is, by a reverse process of degradation, gradually withdrawn from his soul.

I affirm, too, that it is Metaphysics in its advance which is destroying fictitious entities, and of this we have a notable and memorable instance in Berkeley's destruction of the supposed entity called Matter, of the Philosophers and men of Science of his day; as in like manner Idealistic Metaphysics will equally set itself against the conception of Force to-day, if it be regarded as an entity *per se*, or as anything but a manifestation of Thought or Will; and it seems to me that it is Positivism which is re-introducing a similar class of fictions, in the shape of abstractions turned into realities, as in the example of an abstraction, Humanity, offered as an object for our religious regard, and an abstraction, Law—a name

for a set of similar appearances—being offered as a cause for any one of them.*

And if anything can originate the deflecting force necessary for the return journey from the perihelion point in our orbit, where man almost touched at the angel, back to and beneath the ape, into the utter darkness and nothingness of the inane, it would be this very spirit of Positivism and its kindred Materialism; and if aught is to hold this in check it is Philosophy, and the Philosophy of Idealism defended in these pages. I believe with both Berkeley and Hegel that the only hope for men

* The popular notion that Physical Science is destroying Metaphysics is curiously negated by our most eminent scientific inquirers, as Professors Huxley and Tyndall, who, almost in spite of themselves, are being constantly led into what they must thus consider the Maelstrom of Metaphysics. And the metaphysical disquisitions of these scientific men, and particularly of Professor Huxley, as shown in various articles in Magazines and Reviews, manifest likewise a strong tendency in the direction of Idealism, no less than do the subjects with which science deals. For it deals chiefly with Force and its transmutations, as the most advanced generalisation of modern science, the doctrine of the 'Conservation of Forces' shows. Now, this Force is a phenomenal effect, and the only attempt at explanation, beyond the observations of its various forms, must be borrowed from our own consciousness and knowledge, as the result of energising will intelligently directed; in other words, any attempt at explanation must lead to Thought and Purpose, as the Central Force underlying, sustaining, and directing the Cosmos.

against Materialism and Scepticism, Philosophical and practical, is from Idealism in its two sides, Ethical and Metaphysical. Nay more, there are now three systems of thought, of menacing mien, for all the higher and spiritual interests of Humanity; but all of seducing aspect to different orders of mind in modern life at the present moment, which must be opposed to the death, for the better life of man, and Philosophy and Idealism alone can oppose them. The first system is the Materialism of Science, which makes thought a function of the brain and man a more highly elaborated organism—a singular but splendid accident—which Nature, in the course of ages, has thrown up in her endless kaleidoscope. The second is the Positivism of Comte, which puts its ban on the higher Philosophy, which will feed man's Thought only on perishing phenomena, and bids his Soul dream only of material comforts; and the third is the consequent Pessimism of Schopenhauer, which regards Individuality as an episode and an error in being—a system the rank out-growth from, although it is also the deep and determined revolt against, both Positivism and Materialism. It appears in the higher spirits, who refuse to be fed on these "husks that feed the swine," and, being offered nothing better, and finding much pain in life, come to the consequent conclusion that "life is a cheat." The spiritual war never ceases, and Materialism and Scepticism have only, like serpents, changed skin

and colour with time and clime, but we find them now with even more deadly meaning for all that is highest in humanity than in Berkeley's day; and if these systems are not resolutely met, it bodes ill for man's further progress—ill even for the Positivist's own peculiar dream of a Heaven upon Earth.

Happily, effort in an erring direction calls up from Nature's powers of compensation corresponding intensity of opposed effort; so strange are the spiritual processes going on, and so resolute is Nature not to retrograde; and accordingly, the very Metaphysical spirit so abjured by Comte, has never (in these countries, at least), been more deeply labouring under the "pale cast of thought," than at the present time.

(2.) Besides the Positivists, who think Metaphysics mischievous and delusive, there are many who consider it as an innocent mental idiosyncrasy or perhaps even a mild craze of brain, manifesting itself in producing subtle and recondite speculations, spider-spun, but wholly unintelligible to any, except those with similar intellectual peculiarities. This too is an error, and like the former comes from want of knowledge of Human Nature, for Metaphysics is as universal and indestructible as Human Nature. All men in civilised countries are more or less Metaphysicians, though all are not original or independent thinkers on Metaphysics; as all men have more or

less of the religious and poetic instincts, although all men cannot write a creative work like Hamlet, or a treatise on the Origin of Evil. All men who have ever thought of God, Free-will and Immortality—and most men have thought on these high themes—in so doing prove at once the universality and indestructibility of the Metaphysical and Religious instincts in man, for these are the common subjects of Theology and Metaphysics.

It is because the Metaphysical spirit is so universal that thoughts upon these subjects can be made more generally intelligible than if on a strictly scientific subject, like Psychology, where, unless one has studied the special and sometimes extremely subtle mental phenomena, and that, too, through the medium of the customary terminology, he will be unable to follow a Psychological argument. The truth really is, that Metaphysics may be made more intelligible than Psychology, both to the mass of mankind and also to the thinker, because it appeals to the universal experience of men who have in all ages and countries, in proportion to their state of civilisation, been thinking on its questions. Even those who have not heard lectures or read books, after their own fashion have speculated, so very general is the fact in our nature. Moreover, the final results of Metaphysics can be conveyed to men in less technical language than the result of Psychology or any other science, for though Metaphysics

does draw both on the facts and language of Psychology, and now even of Physical Science, yet it draws but slightly on the words of the latter and not extensively on those of the former subject; while the facts and results of both Sciences, which as Science may be considered beyond dispute, can be taken upon trust by the reader (though they should have been verified by the writer) of Metaphysical subjects. Metaphysics may be compared to an advanced Science like Mechanics, which postulates an acquaintance with the chief methods and broadest conclusions of the lower Sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Trigonometry; but from its introducing new conceptions (of Forces and their result, Rest or Motion,) whose speciality makes them subject for a more advanced Science, one might be a highly accomplished deductive reasoner in Mechanics, without having mastered all the special difficulties, or been familiar with all the more elegant, though less general, problems or theorems of the Sciences which are pre-supposed; and so also Metaphysics refers to the facts and conclusions of Science—chiefly Psychological and Physiological—but not to such an extent as to prevent one from being an original thinker, or an intelligent reader, who had not familiarised himself with all the reasoned results, or more special generalisations of the subordinate subjects. But though it is possible to read intelligently a Metaphysical Essay without

scientific training, it is unwise in our days for a writer not to have, at least, his Psychological foundation safe. And here lies the importance of Psychological Science, which is both the base and beginning of the higher Philosophy or Metaphysics. This is recognised by all—by Kant and Hegel, no less than by Mr. Mill and Mr. Herbert Spencer. And Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* has as accurate Psychological analysis as he has deep and abstract speculation founded on it, while the remark holds more fully still of Hegel, whose *Phenomenology of the Spirit* is a history of the successive stages of Consciousness, from its lowest point to its highest stage, where it changes its name and nature to Reason, which indeed appears in Consciousness, but yet is sense-transcendant, and superior to Consciousness. In fine we may read Metaphysics without being profound Psychologists, though to write with safety requires an accurate and extensive knowledge of the Mental Phenomena, and this last is acknowledged by the writers of the most opposed views.

On the other hand, so different is Psychology, which is a Science, from Metaphysics, which strictly speaking is not (though it always aims at being, and has often asserted itself to be, one), that one may be an original Psychologist without being a Metaphysician (using the word now in the sense in which it is applied to one with trained and special talent), for

deep Metaphysical meditation begins properly where the other sciences end, and when the highest generalisations and suggestions from the Sciences, and especially Psychology, have been handed in.

These constitute premises to the Metaphysical spirit, whose special business it is to read into these a further meaning, and from these generalised results of Science, and from suggestions from all sides, as from the Artistic and Religious Senses, to draw conclusions respecting existences beyond the reach of evidence of the Senses, outside and beyond the pale of any Science. It also seeks to reach one grand conclusion as to the sum and result of the Sciences themselves. From Plato to Hegel, Philosophy has aimed at unity; at finding the One in the Many, as well as at solving the problem of Being. According to Kant the former is possible phenomenally; the latter impossible, as beyond experience. According to Hegel, both are possible, and both are solvable by the one principle of Thought. Our own acute thinker, Berkeley, makes but one great step, by discarding Matter, to reaching unity—to finding the One in the Many; but he is as confident as Hegel in the competence of our faculties to prove Existence beyond Sense by means of Reason; and thus, in our ability to solve the peculiar problem of Metaphysics, the problem of Being.

This Essay is on Metaphysics then, because, with

Berkeley and Hegel, and in opposition to many, I believe in the possibility of Metaphysics as a subject of knowledge, and I recognise its actual existence in the world as a most important fact of Human Nature. It is a fact in our nature not to be set aside, which centuries of unwearied speculation show through history, and to which every man's Consciousness testifies, through his own briefer history; for all men have meditated on some of the subjects with which Metaphysics is conversant. That Metaphysics is an indestructible fact in Human Nature, shown more powerfully, instead of less, as Comte supposes, with a nation's growth, is also proved by what Bacon calls "Prerogative instances," as the written Metaphysics which the world has preserved, was produced only by the highest intellects of the nations foremost in each period of history. This appears from the Grecian, Arabian, and the Modern Philosophy, which last is a product of the three foremost nations of Europe—England, France, and Germany.

(3.) An exposition of the chief principles of Idealism and of the leading thoughts of the two great Idealists, Berkeley and Hegel, may claim attention on three grounds—First, as relating to a system of Philosophy professing to explain the universe; secondly, as involving a system of Ethics of importance for men to know and follow; and thirdly, because

both the Idealistic systems of Hegel and Berkeley have been perseveringly misapprehended, and industriously misrepresented in these countries.

But while accepting Idealism as a system of thought, I do not accept it in the complete or precise form projected by either Berkeley or Hegel. Persons may err, while principles still remain unshaken; particular arguments may be wrong, while the system itself has immortal and increasing vitality. The maxim, "Not men but measures," of practical politics becomes—not persons but principles, in speculative Philosophy. Thus, as against English Realism, I accept the conclusion common to Berkeley and Hegel, which resolves the External Universe into Sensations,¹ experienced or expected; and as against both English Realism and English Idealism, I accept the doctrine of Hegel, which declares that Knowledge is not limited to Sense as the sole source and field, as with Mill; nor to Consciousness as its only theatre, as with Mansel; for I consider that the conception of Hamlet by Shakespeare, or the conception of the Law of Gravitation by Newton (no less than the *a priori* conceptions or categories of Kant and Hegel), refutes both, and proves a faculty of Reason transcending sense, and a wide field for her exercise beyond Consciousness.

¹ With Hegel it is Thought, but Sense is only a lower degree of Thought.

Those conceptions of men of genius like Newton and Shakespeare were conquests of advancing Reason, not occurring at all to the savage, or even to the average man, and were taken from that territory beyond sense where Reason is at home, though they can be afterwards translated in great part into sensuous symbols. But I dissent from Berkeley's theory, that two co-related consciousnesses equal all Existence; and I dissent from Hegel's position, that thought in man is the highest reflective thought (or thought which is aware of itself as such), and thus the true and full Existence of the Universe; and from both, for the same reason, that neither can be verified by any faculty of knowledge to which we might appeal; not by Sense, which is confined to the earth; not by Reason, while she can and evidently does entertain some doubt regarding it.

The second reason why an understanding of Idealism is of great importance is, that it has an Ethical as well as a Metaphysical side. It addresses motives to the springs of the will, as well as supplies materials for the deepest thought. It relates to action as well as speculation, as every true system of Philosophy should, for man is not a merely meditative animal but an active being, and requires, when his speculation is done, to turn it into a system of action for life. And here Idealism particularly requires attention—as Metaphysical, it satisfies the want of man's intellect or thought, and opposes Phi-

losophical Scepticism and Scientific Materialism ; as Ethical, it offers opposition to the Positivist and Materialistic spirit of modern life, which is their practical outcome. And just as Metaphysical, Idealism calls for the profoundest meditation of the thinker, so as Ethical it asks the highest action of the hero. As Speculative, Idealism says the Universe is thought, and the thinker, the important factor of this thought, is the medium through which the awakened conscious Reason of the universe looks, which slumbered unconscious in geologic periods according to Hegel, or reposed in the Deity, before the creation of finite spirits, according to Berkeley. As Practical, Idealism says the Universe is Ideas, the Ideas with which Religion, Ethics, and Art is conversant (or, taking all collectively, is The Idea), and the individual is as nothing in their immortal presence—ideas in the sense of goals, or aims, which seem to shine as lights afar off, but really are suggestions springing up in the soul. They are greatest, and the man is nothing in comparison; even the collective individuals called Humanity are only important as they reverence and further the ideas, which for the time being are impersonated in them, although greater than they. The ideas receive their clearest comprehension from the best intellect of the race at any time, and take their brightest colour from its soul, while yet they are greater than any one unit or than the whole of Humanity. They are guiding stars for which and by

which we are to steer, and they seem at a distance because, though they rise in us, and are a transmitted inheritance, they are never fully realised in this world ; but the effort to realise them more and more is asked from us, and the attempt both makes the fullest life and demands the highest virtue.

I affirm this particularly, because Positivism in its most seductive shape, addresses itself to-day to the better spirits, and makes it appeal to their generous sympathy in behalf of Humanity, while all that is true and great in this regard for Humanity is a corollary taken from Hegelian principles. Here is truly the difference—the Hegelian, speaking of him now only as regards his ethical principles, thinks Humanity is to be furthered, but by furthering the Ideas. He thinks the furthering of them must be the true furthering of Humanity, and no other way is possible ; and he thinks if Humanity could ever pervert them or ignore them, and try to live without them, as Positivism thinks possible, there should, and in time would be an end of the race. Even in the very attempt, if successful, man would have only accomplished his degradation, and so have already partly ceased to exist, as a lower life is a partial death before we die. It seems the spiritual war of the future will lie much between Comte and Hegel, and if men must elect between these two, I greatly prefer Hegel.

Happily, however, Comtism is approaching

Hegelianism, which is as necessary for the weal of the species, as it is natural considering the source of Comte's doctrines, or at least their similarity to Hegel's. The most eloquent and able apostle of Positivism in England, Mr. Harrison, in an article¹ which I have seen before the last sheet of this work went to press, while condemning Metaphysics, admits men will be supplicating at its shrine with vague and longing yearnings until they have a new religion. He says, "Metaphysical mysteries will continue to live until this vague yearning is absorbed in a great and strenuous emotion." And he offers us the Positivist religion, "the deliberate effort to serve an immortal Humanity." I reply, Metaphysical problems will haunt us till they are solved, or shown to be insoluble; but I believe them to be soluble in time, and by Idealism; and I believe Idealism contains all that is great and true in this reverence of Humanity, which is distinctly a corollary taken from it, but with one fatal mistake or omission. The Ideas are superior to Humanity, and not Humanity to the Ideas; the Ideas of Truth, Justice, Benevolence and Freedom (as well as the special Ideals of Religion and Art), and in all the best and truest systems of Ethics—the Stoical, the Christian, the modern German—they were put first, and man second. And men have approved this ever and anon, at great crises, by merging their

¹ Fortnightly Review for November, 1872.

individual being, and giving up their individual lives, not for Humanity, but for a principle, an Idea, which was merely impersonated, or manifested, in Humanity. It will be well for Humanity the Idealist thinks, if the Divine Ideas are followed; it will not be well for them if they are ever forgotten, for the race, in abandoning them, would have given up the highest prerogative of Humanity, a reverence for, and a life by them. If they give up faith in them, it were better for the race to perish, is the Idealist's belief. The Positivist says, what matters it about Ideas, if Humanity survives and is happy anyhow? But how could they be happy? The Positivist's and Utilitarian's heaven consists in material things here, and life in memory of Humanity; the second is good, the first is no food to feed some souls upon. Grant all the vision realised, that all have plenty (and it is a pity so few can now hope for so much less), what a picture is presented of a number of units, as like as so many sheep peacefully and contentedly grazing in a meadow all day long. The race was once something like a herd of wild animals—of wolves or buffaloes—and Positivism is glad to contemplate the future and more placid prospect of the race regenerated into a herd of cattle or a herd of swine, enjoying themselves.

But we must ask why be over anxious for the happiness of such, any more than we now are for the happiness of the lower animals, which we sacrifice

for our use, or of the lower races of Asia and Africa, which the higher races of Europe rule for their own benefit. If men should by chance lose what alone elevates them, reverence for ideas, then we need care as little whether such a low race should be filled with material comforts or thrilled with sensual pleasures, as we do now about the extreme happiness of the gorilla or the South Sea Island savage.

Inscribe in the front on Humanity's banner great principles—put for her aim and goal the sublime ideas of Truth, of Justice, of Charity, and of Freedom, which Ideas, little realised as they yet have been, still form, together with the others, more strictly personal, the life of our life on Earth, and men will freely die for them in future as they have often done in the past; for Nature, happily, always has in her hidden resources, unknown till the occasion calls them forth, such men as the poet speaks of—

“Who loved and suffered countless ills,
Who battled for the True and Just.”

But put happiness alone as aim, without regard to these principles superior to man, and as it may be only the happiness of a degraded race, we may justly be excused from fighting much to realise the prospect, or being more anxious about their positive happiness than we are now for that of any other low type of sentient creatures.

It must be admitted that it lies deep in (at least in

civilised) Human Nature to wish to remove pain, even from the lower animals, and to redress wrong, even at personal peril, but it does not now (though it may be a developed principle in future), lie either in Human Nature or in the nature and reason of things to wish for a low race to be supremely happy. The thing almost seems an impossibility—a contradiction in terms—for the highest happiness postulates the highest capacities and faculties. Once pain is removed, which may move the keenest sympathy (and Bishop Butler remarks to the same effect, Sermons V., VI.), our sympathy with the positive pleasures of others is as a present fact of Human Nature very much less, and one is inclined to think, if these are not of a higher kind than sensual or selfish, it ought to be very slight, or not at all.

And then, how will you feed on this Positivist diet the soul say of a Shelley, who was ardent for the progress of his species, but not at the sacrifice of the highest attributes in man. Such will revolt, and spurn your realised heaven, if you have nothing better to show them; and the greater they are, the stronger will be their revolt; the only conclusion consequent will then be something worse than Materialism, and more terrible than Scepticism; it will be the deep and desperate, the calm and studied revolt of Schopenhauer against everything bearing the false guise and name of happiness—against the one mistake of having individual being at all. To surrender faith in

the Ideals would mean first to surrender faith in God, of whose essence they are part; next to surrender faith in Man, in whose history they have been ever a higher and higher manifestation; and last, after some generations, for the better surviving spirits, to surrender all faith in or desire for any form of existence; and, as with Schopenhauer, to wish to have done with life altogether, as a mistake made, and corrected only by death, which returns us to the state (not of individuality) in which we were originally, and "from which life is only a short episode." This, if the Intellect has not also withered, while the Ideas have ceased to shine, is the natural creed of a race of beings of exactly similar pattern, where the struggle for existence is great, as we see in the Buddhism of the populations of southern and eastern Asia. And the pressure of population, combined with the Positivist's social and spiritual programme, would bring the foremost nations of Europe to a like state, if a counteracting force be not developed. If the aims of the Positivist be ever realised without modification, the "Nirvana" of the hopes of the Buddhist, who, Mr. Harrison says, "thirsted after the extinction of his personality, and prayed for it with ecstasy," may yet become the dark dream of the proud and advanced races of western Europe; if Novalis' famous simultaneous suicide of the race do not first occur to prevent the survival of their dignity and acquiescence in their degradation. Thus reversing Macbeth's words—

“The times have been,
That when the brains were out the man would die,
And there an end;”

we may say that in such a state of society it is only if the “brains are out” the man would live, as the species of sheep or swine live on, and seldom show any ‘thirst’ for annihilation.¹

The third reason why I have written on Idealism is different, and is not in the interest of Ethics but Metaphysics, for both the Idealists, from whose principles we may hope for answer to these various systems of Materialism, Scepticism and Pessimism are misunderstood; and it is highly important they should not be—whether they have dangerous tendencies or not—though I believe it is the systems opposed to the principles of Idealism which are dangerous. At any rate, to see them clearly will be of advantage, whether they be friendly or dangerous.* It is the

¹ The importance of the Ethical side of Idealism may be considered some plea for dwelling upon it at such length in the Introduction, as the body of the Essay is chiefly Metaphysical.

* A word may be permitted in reference to these supposed dangerous opinions. Fichte was thought by many, in his lifetime, to hold opinions adverse to the higher spiritual interests of men. Yet since his death, Germany, with truer instincts, has reversed this judgment; and a sign of her present estimate is the words over the tomb of this her heroic son, who lived to teach, as he may be said to have died to save her, “They that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever.”

mist which magnifies the man into a monster, and there is certainly sufficient mist around the opinions of Hegel, though much more both mist and dust has been raised by the English critics.

While Berkeley has been misunderstood by the Realists of all shades of opinion in these countries, Hegel has been misunderstood by both English Realists and English Idealists, the professed followers of Berkeley; and though Berkeley has gradually attracted Realists more and more over to his principles, yet attempts are still made to refute him, though the small difference between them (entirely in Berkeley's favour) would make it a more gracious thing in them to acknowledge they were Berkeleians, as Mr. Mill does, and then point out, by way of criticism, their non-acceptance of his entire principles. But no: Hamilton, Mansel, Mr. Lewes, and many more will agree to most of Berkeley's principles (Berkeley coming first and compelling them, let it be remembered), but still they feel bound to refute him, so strong is the absurd passion for refutation, instead of criticism; the latter being the true business of Philosophy, while the former practice evinces a false view of it; and we have the periodical attempts at refutation, including one in the *Quarterly Review*, during 1871, and one in the *Edinburgh* during the present year. As regards Hegel, the refuters have had a fine time of it; they have flocked from all sides, the

first and irrepressible refuters being Hamilton and Mansel, and others not so generally addicted to the bad habit as Mr. Mill and Mr. Lewes, have, in the case of Hegel, followed suit. Hegel has been destroyed over and over again, hacked and hewn in pieces, but yet there has been an uneasy feeling, as if he was not quite killed. Why is this? The most suspicious fact about all attempted refutations of Hegel (and Berkeley) is the very great simplicity of them. How Hegel could have exposed himself to refutation lying on the very surface must strike the refuters themselves, one is apt to think, with an uneasy suspicion that it is only an imaginary person they are disposing of so summarily. And hence the frequent returns to slay him more completely. Hence the increasing space devoted to his destruction in successive Editions of Mr. Lewes' History of Philosophy. Hence, too, the occasional ambushed shots of Mr. Mill, from unsuspected places, and notes in his writings. (See Exam. of Hamilton, pp. 56, 70, 612. Logic, Vol. II., p. 320.)

It is not at all likely that one who, as even his critics confess, is of immense intellect should be guilty of such gross blunders, or should leave such simple and exposed avenues open for his own immediate destruction. All the objections are drawn from the very surface of the system, and evince no grasping of Hegel's principles, which would have made the objec-

tions crumble away and be seen to have been none at all. They are nearly all, including Mr. Mill's own, examples of the fallacy with which he charges all the objections to Berkeley, namely, *ignoratio elenchi*. There is indeed one deep English thinker to-day, Mr. Hodgson, who forms an exception to the rest, as he knows that he has opposed to him in Hegel no ordinary adversary, and accordingly sets about grappling with him with a gravity becoming the greatness of his opponent, and hence his criticisms, though adverse, are marked by both a pertinence and a power which make them not less valuable than those opposite estimates formed of the Philosophy of Hegel by his eloquent exponent and sympathetic critic, Dr. J. H. Stirling, who has done so much to render possible an intelligent apprehension of Hegelian principles in England. From the other critics nothing whatever can be learned; it is not Hegel, but a monster proceeding from "a heat-oppressed brain" they are struggling with; and, in fact, the conflict is really one in which they never meet their enemy at all, never cross swords with him. Something (which is here ignorance), as in dreams, makes them impotent to strike their enemy; though one would think they have some sense that such is the case, and so would feel a desire to know what Hegel really meant, and which surely must be something great, considering how many great minds have been attracted by his

system in Germany and France, and considering the estimate formed of it even by his opponent, Mr. Hodgson, who characterises it as the "grandest idea which the mind of man has ever conceived." (Space and Time, p. 196.)

IDEALISM.



CHAPTER I.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.

§ 1. INTRODUCTORY.—Modern Philosophy begins with the publication of Des Cartes' "Meditations, and Discourse on Method" sometime before the middle of the seventeenth century. Ancient Philosophy had sunk asleep after the sublime visions of Plotinus and Proclus in the fourth century. Some strange but all-pervading paralysis had settled down on the brain of nations for centuries, so that it could not think; and afterwards it was spared the labour by fixed belief, so that hardly anything was done or attempted in Philosophy until the sixteenth century. And as Philosophy had fallen asleep with visions of the absorption of the Soul into the Divinity in the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus and Proclus; so, just before awakening, she was visited

with similar dreams in the Pantheism of Vanini¹ and Bruno, the immediate predecessors of Des Cartes. With the latter came the clear day in which men do not dream, but think.

After its long rest of more than a thousand years, the brain of Humanity awoke refreshed and clearer, and at once and anew addressed itself to those mighty and mysterious problems which Existence presents for Philosophy to solve—the problems attempted by Plato and Aristotle, by Plotinus and Proclus. And this time the questions were to be attacked from a new side—in other words, a new Method of solving them was to be tried. This stirring of the Speculative spirit in modern times was itself a part, but the most central and significant, of a general agitation and revolution of the whole spirit of civilized Humanity, extending through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and scarcely even yet exhausted or quieted, and manifesting itself as well in Religion, Politics, Poetry, and

¹ Like those who led the van in the Religious Revolution, but, unlike others before and since, with similar opinions in Philosophy, these two paid for their dreams the terrible penalty of death by fire. They are the martyrs of Philosophy; and, if not for the greatness of their thoughts, yet, for the constancy with which they held them, their names should be remembered. In Lewes' "History of Philosophy," a vivid but painful interest is excited by the realistic narration of the martyrdom of Bruno by the Inquisition, and of the excommunication of Spinoza by the Jewish Rabbis.

Science, as in the region of abstract thought or Philosophy. For each and all in the future there was to be a new and wider life, which at once makes and marks the characteristic difference of the Modern as compared with the Ancient and Mediæval worlds. For the future terms of existence of Philosophy, in particular, Des Cartes struck the keynote in his memorable maxim, reiterated earnestly by Lord Bacon, that the indispensable first step for its successful prosecution was complete freedom from all pre-supposition. This principle, that to philosophise to any purpose we must renounce prejudice, gives a new and a second birth to Metaphysical Speculation, as it constitutes a new Method of philosophising. We were to consider nothing as certain that could by any possibility be doubted, if we were ever to have any firm foothold for our Philosophy: or otherwise all our reasonings, however subtle, will be tainted with the original vice of uncertainty hanging over our first principles. In one word, Scepticism was to be the beginning of Philosophy; but, just in order to prevent a Universal Scepticism concerning Philosophy from being the end.¹

¹ Stewart affirms that Hume's Scepticism ended where Des Cartes' began, in affirming "that no one proposition was more certain or even more probable than any other." I maintain that this is a misrepresentation of both these great thinkers; as this very proposition thrown down as the last result of one thinker and the first belief of the other, claims for itself higher certainty

Accordingly Des Cartes commenced by renouncing all previous Philosophy, and doubting every proposition which he could. He found only one fact, his own existence—one proposition, that he existed—undoubted and certain. Hence his famous position, *Cogito ergo Sum*, the basis for him of all after certitude—the fountain, as Mr. Hodgson expresses it, for Europe, of all future Metaphysical Speculation.

Since Des Cartes, there have been for his philosophical successors a line of monarchs in this region of mind, who, following his example of renouncing prejudice, and respecting only the authority of Reason, have in turn attempted to solve the great questions of Philosophy in the varying phases these assumed for each inquirer. These representative

than any other affirmation. If that be their position, the very statement of it destroys it, and makes it untrue. It dies in the act of proclaiming itself. Further, no thinker could hold such an absurdity, as it can hardly be denied that there are degrees of doubt. Stewart again affirms that the object of Hume was to establish a complete Scepticism. This also is wrong; and Hume affirms the impossibility of such Scepticism in his "Essay on the Academical Philosophy." What he did try to establish was a Philosophical, not a Universal Scepticism, which is impossible. Hume was hardly less misunderstood than Berkeley by the Scotch Philosophers, as Kant pointed out, who really saw the acute points seized by both these subtle thinkers. The confusion of thought still prevailing regarding Philosophical Scepticism generally, and Hume's in particular, I shall consider afterwards.

thinkers who have controlled the course of Philosophy since Des Cartes, are Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Hume, Berkeley, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. All these have been intellects of the very highest order that have ever appeared in the human species, while they are of different kinds of excellence. We have here the comprehensiveness and almost terrible profundity of Hegel and Spinoza; the wonderful critical and constructive genius of Kant and Leibnitz; the unsurpassed originality and fineness of philosophical perception as well as logical subtilty of Berkeley and Hume; and the united and consequent result of the labours of so many great understandings has been an advance of Philosophy both fast and far in the two centuries lying between Des Cartes, its founder, and Hegel, as some consider him, its final voice and finisher.

Of the two branches of Philosophy, Psychology, and Metaphysics, the former, which stands on the firm ground of admitted facts of human nature, has been not only successfully cultivated, but, in fact, created during the period, while the elder branch, Metaphysics, has passed through a rapid and remarkable series of transformations during the same time, impossible to be forecast by the thinkers of antiquity.¹ In modern times, the elder sister, Meta-

¹ I hold the reverse of Comte's opinion about Metaphysics to be the true one, as is proved by the history of the past two centuries. I maintain that Metaphysics appears only in great

physics, with eye ever fixed on the heavens, has been assisted and fitted for her flight from the earth by the careful warning and direction she has taken from her younger sister, Psychology, who is always on the ground; nay, even Physical Science, deemed her enemy, turns her ally, and furnishes her with new and pregnant hints to enable her to wrest from Nature her deep and self-contained secrets.

We see the Queen of the Sciences, as she was anciently esteemed, in her grandeur in the daring dogmatism of Spinoza and Leibnitz, who attempted to project the scheme of Creation as it might be conceived by an Infinite Mind; half a century later we see her with the decrepitude of age in the feeble and verbal philosophy of Wolf; and soon afterwards stunned, and at the point of death, shot through by the subtile shafts of the Scepticism of Hume. We

nations; and in them, as in man, not in their infancy, but maturity. And the most advanced nations ever produced the best—as Greece in antiquity, and England, France, and Germany, in modern times. And to speak only of the latter and modern nations, Metaphysical speculation was not common in the darkages, but what (if it is to be called by that name) must be further styled vicious Metaphysics. Modern Metaphysics, from the time of Des Cartes, is quite different, and its study is the surest sign of a great and cultured nation, in which it must appear as surely as Poetry or Painting. The vicious Metaphysics of the Middle Ages was a true instinct perverted, to the great strength of which Comte bears witness in his personification if not deification of the two abstractions, Law and Humanity.

see her finally apparently slain by the elaborate efforts of the "all-shattering" criticism of Kant, and her royal body "quietly inurned" by her destroyer, but with regretful pomp and reverent ceremony, as befitted fallen greatness. And yet she was not dead, but only tranced by Kant, for the sepulchre "ope'd its ponderous and marble jaws to cast her up again." As necromancers, fabled to summon up the dead, the potent successors of Kant broke the spell he had laid on Metaphysics, and inspired new life into her spirit, new blood into her frame. And since her great resurrection and renovation in the Idealism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, as far beyond the thoughts of Spinoza and Leibnitz, as theirs beyond Aristotle and Plato, we now see the claims of Metaphysics admitted by a new ally in Modern Physical Science,¹ as ex-

¹ When I say modern Physical inquirers admit the claims of Metaphysics, I do not mean to say they are good Metaphysicians. I think the Materialist solution is none at all. Without the conception of Thought or Will, to say the primitive germs had a principle of development presents no intelligible meaning to the mind. It rolls the whole mystery of Creation apparently into a short phrase; but it just happens to be meaningless, unless we show a Conception under it, which this theory seeks to eliminate. It restates the mystery we knew existed; but this time it is made to appear more mysterious than before, because we can give no meaning to the statement that inert matter can possess a principle of development. If it do it is not matter.

emplified in the Evolution Theory, which seeks to trace back all this beautifully ordered and infinitely diversified Universe, as well as the aspiring soul of man, to a common rude origin in protoplasmic germs with a mysterious principle of development.

In this progress or process of transformation, Metaphysical Speculation has evolved a series of great conceptions of the conditions of Existence, a number of grand guesses of the riddles of Reason, and of more or less harmonious hypotheses of the endless and multiform facts of the Universe, impossible even to the imagination of Ancient Philosophy; for imagination shapes itself from facts, and neither Physical nor Psychological Science, whose business it is to arrange their respective facts in an orderly way, and then to hand in suggestions from their generalisation to Metaphysics, had any existence worthy of the name of Science. Consequently, ancient speculation was always more or less in the clouds, while the Modern, however far in its "vaulting ambition" it may "overleap itself," starts from solid ground of experience.

The two opposite systems of Materialism and Idealism mentioned above are examples of hypotheses evolved by the development of Science. Both have been suggested to the modern mind by the methods and march of Science—Materialism by Physical, and Idealism by Psychological investi-

gation: and both were alike unconceived or at least conceived but vaguely in ancient times, because the sciences which suggest them distinctly were uncultivated then, and even in the modern period not extensively till the end of the seventeenth century.¹

¹ This points to one great superiority of the Ontology of Schelling and Hegel over that of Spinoza and Leibnitz—they are based on experience, on facts, and in spite of Mr. Mansel's assertion to the contrary, on facts of consciousness, although their conclusions transcend consciousness, and will not submit themselves for verification to it; as the Reason, higher than consciousness, they say, is its own verifier, and consciousness is an imperfect phenomenal projection of Reason itself. The Ontology of Spinoza and Leibnitz may be open to his objection that it starts with definitions of the absolute or substance; but the modern German is not; it starts from consciousness, in which this substance is presented; just as Mansel himself affirms, that one substance is presented, the *Ego*; so they say the absolute and the only substance is there given; but it does not there end its manifestations. Accordingly the Ontology of the Post-Kantians is not open to his objection to the older ontology, that it deals only with definitions, not facts (*Metaphysics*, p. 286); nor does it, as he affirms (*Prologomena Logica*, p. 84), "commence by giving the lie to consciousness," nor end by "leaving no test by which its own truth can be determined." Indeed, his own *Metaphysics*, in the opinions of Locke, Reid, Stewart, Kant, Hume, Mr. Mill, and even his master, Hamilton, "gives the lie" to consciousness, in affirming an immediate cognition of the *Ego*, for they are unanimous on this point, whatever be their other differences, that we are not immediately presented with the *Ego*. In fact, this assumption of its direct cognition, though by different faculties, is common

The illustrious names before enumerated, from Des Cartes to Hegel, represent the intellect of the three foremost nations in Europe, the only nations who have philosophised—England, France, and Germany—and the philosophy they have produced, which has proved itself to be one, and not three concurrent movements, is a European Philosophy. This wider consensus of thought in which it reposes, with its consequent less liability to error, constitutes another feature of difference, besides those mentioned before, between the Modern and the Ancient Philosophy, which was chiefly a product of the intellect of one nation, the Greeks. Not only were the questions more circumspectly and skilfully put, thus saving laborious waste of energy on inquiries which might afterwards turn out to be chimæras, but also from the dawn of the modern period we see different nations at first stirred simultaneously and without communication to speculate; and, ever since, we find their speculations, marked by a common method and aim, have been flowing together into one ever broadening stream, which at once grows clearer and deeper as it widens.

to him and Hegel; save that the latter justifies it. And as for test, Hegel's system does provide one—the Reason itself—and he justifies it; while Mansel, though equally needing one, cannot get it, but must content himself with affirmation—an affirmation that has not even the merit of originality, as it is to be found in De Biran and Berkeley.

§ 2. *Tendency to Idealism in Modern Speculation.*—

The final aim of all Philosophy has, indeed, ever been one and the same from Plato to Hegel—to find the One in the Many, to discover a unity under all knowledge, a single principle of connexion for all the phenomena of External and Human Nature, and from this principle incidentally to receive answers to certain questions, deeply interesting to each individual, as the Whence and the Whither of the world and ourselves. But, conditioning this final solution, and even its possibility, on the way to it there arise preparatory questions which present themselves differently to different ages and nations of the world.

The Sceptic of Philosophy thinks these arise to bar us from ever getting nearer to the answer; the Philosopher, that these new questions are simply clearer conceptions of the problem to be solved, and a nearer step to its resolution. *Prudens interrogatio dimidium est Scientiæ*, and so in Philosophy, a judiciously put question may contain in itself a half revelation, and direct the course of speculation for the future into the only profitable channel of investigation. A new hypothesis which may contain the whole solution presents itself first in the form of a question which awaits the man of genius to give it clear and definite shape. Such a question was that raised by Berkeley, nearly a century after it had been confusedly suggested to Des Cartes, namely,

does Matter exist as an entity *per se*? or, to put it differently, has the Eternal World for sentient beings any meaning, and, therefore, for them any existence apart from those perceptions of the senses, through which alone it is revealed to them?

Since our perception of an External World is through an actual sensation, and our conception of it a congeries of imagined sensations, would not the destruction of our powers of sense be for us the destruction of this world? and similarly, would not the destruction of all other faculties of sense in other beings be the destruction of its appearance for them? If all sentient beings were gone from the Universe, is not the External World, which translated itself to them only through the channels of the senses, gone? and if the translation or meaning of it for them is gone, what is left? The cause of these sensations is left, Philosophers and the mass of mankind may say; and so said Berkeley; but this cause, he maintained, is not inert matter, for the existence of which we have no evidence, as given neither by sense nor imagination, and which, besides, is a useless and contradictory hypothesis; nor is it, as others affirm, something resembling, or even analogous to our sense-given phenomena, which is an equally unprovable hypothesis; but it is the only sort of cause we have any experience of, namely, an efficient cause. We know the existence of our own Spirits, and that they are causative in willing, and operat-

ing about ideas; but we also know they did not produce these perceptions in us, which Common Sense wrongly referred to external objects; and therefore we infer the existence of another Spirit similar in some respects, but yet infinitely superior.

Berkeley's denial of Matter altogether, and of the External World in any other sense for sentient beings save as actually experienced or expected sensations having God for their efficient cause, produced a revolution in Metaphysics. Not that he was the first to doubt the existence of Matter, or of the reality of an External World save as phenomena relative to Mind. There was a strong tendency in this direction ever since Des Cartes, whose preparatory Scepticism had not suffered the existence of an External World to pass unchallenged; but he ended by accepting as true its existence, conceiving the veracity of the Deity involved in our apparently intuitive belief in it. The doubt of the reality of Matter is also latent in Spinoza's system, which merges Mind and Matter as equally modes of the one true Reality and Substance, and is in this unlike Berkeley's, which regards our Mind as real, and absorbs Matter between it and the Infinite Mind. Leibnitz, too, by his fundamental conception of internality as distinct from anything external, reduced the Material Universe to a system of inextended, and therefore immaterial, atoms, with a spiritual principle. And Locke and Malebranche both

doubted the existence of an External World; but Locke needed the hypothesis of bodies outside us as a cause of our sensations, while Malebranche did not, as he had anticipated in his theory of Occasional Causes the view of Berkeley, that God is the true cause of sensations in us.

But though Des Cartes, Locke, and Malebranche had doubted the existence of Matter, yet, still they tried to defend our belief in it; and it was reserved for Berkeley to deny its existence as a useless and baseless hypothesis, and in so doing at once to simplify speculation by dropping a fictitious entity; to save Philosophy from Scepticism resulting in the contradiction and confusion between the doubts of Reason and the beliefs of Sense; and to save Religion from the Materialism which the efficient and creative power, claimed for inert matter, tended to foster. His great conception was, that every fact of the External Universe was translatable into terms of mind—that for us men the translation, through sense-symbols, *was* the Universe: that what was not translated or translatable could be nothing else but the causative energy of the Deity, and not a reality standing apart from all mind, and different from it, of which our experience was an inconceivable copy or analogue; or a fictitious entity called Matter, of which our experience was an inconceivable effect.

§ 3. *Berkeley's Theological Idealism.*—As Berkeley's Idealism was the product clearly shaped by

his genius from a past tendency, so it continued to be a predominant influence through all subsequent speculation. He is thus the cardinal figure in Modern Philosophy, as coming midway between Des Cartes and Hegel, and as it was he who first clearly conceived and, by doing so, controlled the tendency of Philosophy. He gave to this tendency a precise and scientific shape, and then projected it into the future, destined to produce further fruit. In England he was only understood by one thinker, Hume, who attempted to extend his principles to the denial of the substantiality of Mind. The attempt was not a legitimate development of Berkeley's principles, for the immediate cognition of self and the substantiality and causality of mind human and Divine is the very essence of Berkeley's theory. Hume's denial of Mind was suggested by Berkeley's philosophy undoubtedly, but yet not developed from it; rather from principles and hints to be found in Locke; these in particular:—that the mind knows only its own ideas, and that the substratum of sensible qualities, as well as of operations and ideas in us is equally incognisable (Locke, Book ii., c. 23). The Philosophy of Reid and Stewart was the reply to the Idealism of Berkeley and the Scepticism of Hume—a reply which in the case of Hume was incompetent, and in the case of Berkeley irrelevant, as has been seen by friends of this philosophy, like Mansel, by foes, like Mill, and by neutrals, like

Kant. I agree with Mill, in regard to Berkeley, "that scarcely any thinker has been more perseveringly misapprehended, or has been the victim of such persistent *ignoratio elenchi*—his numerous adversaries having generally occupied themselves in proving what he never denied, and denying what he never asserted." I will add, what I hope to prove in another chapter, that the misapprehension of Berkeley has been most conspicuous in the case of what is called the Scotch Philosophy, which has been predominant in these countries from Reid to Hamilton. This Philosophy, under the name of Natural Realism, attempts to answer Berkeley, but fails to do so, because, after granting a truth first pointed out by Berkeley himself, and making it a cardinal point in its system, namely, that the sensible qualities or phenomena are what we directly perceive: yet, it cannot follow this truth to the common conclusion of Berkeley and Kant, that what is behind phenomena as root or Cause is wholly unlike, not even analogous, to them—being with Berkeley the Deity, and with Kant, the Noumenon.¹

¹ In one sense with Berkeley the phenomenal world might survive the extinction of all finite and conscious intelligence: as phenomena for the Divine Mind it might exist, but even then with Berkeley it exists only in and by the perception of it; and not as a real world (as Hamilton and Mansel suppose), the cause of our phenomenal one, and resembling it, projected from the Divine Mind, and capable of existing without it. Creation in

Berkeley and Hume were understood by Kant and the later German ontologists; and it is remarkable that neither Kant nor Hegel attempts to refute him after the manner of the Scotch, and, let us say generally, of English Philosophy. They substantially admit his Idealism, and its so-called refutation by both is that it did not go far enough—that is, they do not try to refute Berkeley at all. Kant's refutation in the *Æsthetic* is briefly, that Berkeley did not see the true *a priori* nature of Space as a necessary antecedent to the sense-given phenomena, without which these would be contingent and perhaps illusory; and in the *Analytic*, that it was the existence of things without us which first rendered possible the perception of our own existence—a proposition consistent with Berkeley's Idealism (as these things are only phenomena produced by God), but supposed by Kuno Fischer to be inconsistent with Kant's own Critical Idealism.¹ Hegel, in like man-

time, which seems a difficulty for Berkeley, means for him the actually evoking of the phenomenal world for the perception of the Infinite Spirit, which potentially contained it in its infinite but latent creative energy and fulness. There is just as much difficulty in conceiving creation fully by finite faculties for the Realist as the Berkeleian, finite faculties being the assumption of both.

¹ Mr. Mahaffy thinks, and I believe rightly, that it was not, as Fischer says, to Berkeley but Des Cartes, that the Refutation of Idealism in the *Analytic* refers (see "Kant's Critique, Meiklejohn's trans.," p. 166). If so, Berkeley's refutation by Kant is no

ner, makes no attempt to refute Berkeley, but charges him with stopping at the threshold of Philosophy. But we are to remember that Berkeley was, as Professor Fraser asserts, the source of the whole new movement in Philosophy—both of the English systems opposed to him, and the kindred, though far more comprehensive and internally articulated, systems of the later Germans. Kant agreed with Berkeley, that all we reached in Experience was phenomena, but differed in maintaining that things *per se* lay at the root of phenomena, instead of phenomena being produced by creative energy. Fichte adopted a third alternative, rejected alike by Berkeley and the Realists, that the Ego itself—an internal cause—produced the perceptions in me, and projected them outwards, so as to appear a non-Ego; hence his Idealism is extreme subjective Idealism or Egoism. Schelling and Hegel, but especially the latter, developed this line of thought still further; the former affirmed that Mind and Matter, equally real, were merged in a higher, the Absolute, which was the indifference of the two, but which at the same time was revealed by Reason—this last forming his advance on Spinoza.¹ This is Objective Idealism.

more than that he had a different view of Space, while neither believed it a real entity.

¹ Mr. Lewes, in his "History of Philosophy," does not see this, and hence his error in affirming Spinoza's system to be su-

But Hegel, more complete and consistent, makes a rational advance on the positions of both Fichte and Schelling; with him not an individual—the *Ego*—as with Fichte, nor an indifference, as with Schelling, but a universal Thought was the Absolute, and the sole existence. And the essential nature of this absolute was not indifference, as with Schelling, but a process of development, by which it unfolded itself from its pure state, into all the stages and variety of Nature and Man.

§ 4. *Hegel's Absolute Idealism.*—As the result of Hegel is the last result of Philosophy, and shows Idealism carried to its extreme limit, a fuller outline of his system may be here desirable. Though the Hegelian absolute Idealism is in many respects opposed to the absolute Spiritualism of Berkeley, there is one point where the system of Hegel affiliates itself to that of Berkeley. Not only did Berkeley determine the line of thinking for Kant, if only to supplement the deficiencies of himself and Hume—not only did Kant lead to Hegel—but the connexion between the two Idealists is more than historical

terior to Schelling's. Schelling saw that to know the Absolute we must have a faculty of absolute knowledge, which he declared a true philosopher possessed in the Intellectual Intuition; but Spinoza forgot to consider the nature of the faculty by which he cognised the one Substance: and if the faculty be limited, as his system implies, then it cannot verify the pretensions of his doctrines to absolute knowledge.

succession, there is actual logical filiation. And it is in Berkeley's proof of the Existence of God, and the peculiar relation between the Finite and the Infinite Spirit that the filiation between his system and that of Hegel appears. The steps taken by Philosophy, from Des Cartes and Locke to Hegel, may be thus briefly shown. Let us consider the example chosen by both Hamilton and Mill, that of External Perception. When I look at a distant mountain, a sensation, idea, or phenomenon occurs in me, of which I am conscious. What is the cause of this sensation which I perceive in me? The Realists affirm, that an entity called Matter produces the perception in me. But, as they made Matter inert and unintelligent, this seemed to Berkeley no explanation. Berkeley then explains the production of the idea, as he calls the sensation, by an external cause, but a Spirit, as spirit in me is already known to be an efficient cause. Fichte makes an internal cause, the *Ego*, produce the sensation, thus abolishing the distinction of the duality of Spirit, and the peculiar relation subsisting between the finite and Infinite Spirit, which is the essence of Berkeley's Theological Idealism. With Hegel, something which is at once personal and impersonal, individual and universal, man and nature, thought and things, is the cause of the sensations in me, and the cause and substance of all that exists in the Universe. This something appearing in Conscious-

ness, apprehended by Reason, Hegel calls the Absolute or Thought. Hegel thus sums up all the Idealistic tendencies of his predecessors in one, into a complete and absolute Idealism in which Thought only exists.¹

¹ Undoubtedly, Berkeley's principle that external perceptions are produced in me by a Spirit, if it is not qualified, leads logically to Hegel. For why should not internal feelings, such as those of ill-health, or unpleasant thoughts, which I do not willingly or consciously produce any more than external sensations, be referred to the same external and spiritual agency? And why not the train of ideas in the mind, which Algazel, the Schoolmen, and Malebranche, had already before Berkeley's time, referred to Divine Irradiation? Why not even our seeming volitions, as conceived by Spinoza, and as expressed by the poet,

"Do we move ourselves, or are we moved by an unseen hand at a game
That pushes us off from the board, as others ever succeed?"

All this would merge my spirit, my individuality, in the absolute, as with Hegel. Berkeley, it is true, has provided an answer to this objection to his system, if it be an objection; for we are to remember that, though the individual is merged under the universal in Hegel, yet still the rights of the individual may remain; the universal, the absolute, may be only able to develop itself by allowing freedom to the individual—a freedom only controlled finally by Reason. And so Stirling understands Hegel. At all events, Berkeley asserts we are conscious of the individuality and causality of the *Ego* or finite spirit, which he describes as a thinking active principle, "which wills, knows, and operates about ideas." But the answer given by himself is not sufficient to save his system from development in the direction of Hegel, for he does not tell us where to stop with his principle, that an external cause produces ideas in me because I am conscious that I myself do not. Why should it be only ideas of external objects, and not internal feelings? and why

Hegel, when he has obtained his one principle, considers his task as a philosopher but begun. Accordingly, he makes the most gigantic attempt to verify his principle, by carrying it through all Philosophy, and through all History; in Philosophy seeking to show there is nothing but the various aspects which Thought has now reached; and in History only the different stages of its course of development. By thought alone he tries to explain not only all present phenomena, but all the past

only ideas, and not everything? This is the part of Berkeley's system which has been objected to by Mansel, who connects it with Hegel, but in a quite different way from the above; by Mill, who considers his proof of God's existence illogical; and by Professor Fraser, who thinks it only certifies his existence so long as the ordered Universe exists. (See *Life of Berkeley*, p. 378).

But this is not the great positive part of Berkeley's system, which remains intact, where he shows the true meaning for men of the Existence, Reality, Causality, and Substantiality of the External Universe, and that all these receive their significance from our sensations and their observed simultaneity and succession—the Existence of an External World being its perception, actual or guaranteed; its Reality, the reality of the perceptions; its Causality; their invariable succession; and its Substantiality, the permanence of an associated group of these sense-percepts. For Science and the exigencies of life no other meaning than this is ever needed for these Categories when applied to the External World. This is their true physical meaning. Any further hyper-physical meaning which men throw into them is either imaginary or to be explained by the only thing known beyond phenomena, viz., Spirit.

presented by Man and Nature; the history of both being but Thought, conscious or unconscious, in its successive stages of progress; the last stage on which we and Nature now stand, and which we now constitute, being Man and Nature as they now are. But as Nature for Man is his conscious interpretation of her by Reason, and what she is beyond what Reason sees in her is zero, we may say only Reason or conscious Thought exists. In fact, with Hegel, Thought, which alone exists, has two senses, conscious and unconscious; it was unconscious in Nature before Man ever appeared on the earth, and it is now conscious in Man. And existence has two senses—for in one sense Nature only exists in our intelligible interpretation of her—her existence is the interpretation (and in this he agrees with Berkeley). In another, she existed before Man ever appeared. She exists now for Reason only as read by Reason—the reading of her is her existence. Yet, she must have existed in geologic periods long before Man as unconscious Thought. And this unconscious Thought is for conscious Thought inconceivable, and therefore in one sense non-existence, but in another sense existence. For our illuminating Reason was gradually developed from this unconscious thought, as the gradual clearing of Reason's eye, in the history of both Man and Nature proves; and, in fact, at one time Thought in Nature was trembling in the balance between the unconscious-

ness of the plant, and the first faint consciousness of animal. And this process of development connects and makes one the conscious and unconscious thought, as we still see repeated in the unbroken progress from the unconscious infant to the conscious man.

Thought, at first, was alike different from what we now regard as Mind and what we now regard as Matter, for consciousness is an accident, not an essential of Thought; and this pure Thought possessed within itself a principle of development into the endless aspects and individualities of Mind and Matter, all of which are manifestations of it, from the insentient dust beneath our tread by insensible gradations to the sublimed spirit of Man, which broods over the mystery, while aspiring to an immortality of its individual being. Pure thought gave the created existence to things, but conscious thought gives them now their second and intelligible which is also their real existence. This pure essential thought first substantiated itself in (and by doing so made) the matter of the earth and sun and stars, and gave them law and harmony; then infused itself under, and burst into life in, the vegetable world; became by further development incarnate as well as sensitive in animals; and lastly, as its highest sublimation, awoke as conscious Spirit in Man. In him it passed through the successive stages of Consciousness, Self-consciousness, common Reason, up to

the illumination of the Philosopher and Poet, in whom it shines as the true and steady light, which alone knows the Universe, and which by knowing makes the Universe a World of Truth and Beauty for themselves and the rest, out of materials which are dull and dark and non-existent for other eyes. It is the Poet who sees, and in seeing makes, "the light that never was on sea or land," who reads into Nature what he seems to read out of her. It is the Philosopher who deeply and greatly thinks, and in thinking re-creates, the Universe, which he evokes from the Nothingness of the unknown. It is the Philosopher rather than the Poet of whom we should say—

"He saw through Life and Death, through good and ill;
He saw through his own Soul.
The marvel of the Everlasting Will,
An open scroll,
Before him lay."

The successive stadia traversed by thought in Hegel's system are similar to those indicated by Bacon. "The first creature of God in the works of the days was the light of the Sense; the last was the light of Reason; and his Sabbath work ever since is the Illumination of His Spirit. First he breathed light upon the face of the Matter, then he breathed light into the face of the Man, and still he breatheth and inspireth light into the face of his Chosen."

The above is an outline of Hegel's Ontology,

the most remarkable system which has yet been submitted to man. The logical evolution of the system of which we give the ontologic or real result displays a depth of intellect, and a force of imagination probably never combined in such great proportions in any mortals save Plato and Shakespeare. And it is this which makes the system so dark to the student. For these qualities are rarely united in a high degree in any, and Hegel has both in the highest. There may be other reasons for his obscurity. Perhaps his own great light went out, as all must, if the problem be not only transcendently difficult but even infinite. Perhaps there may be a purposed obscurity, as English critics have hinted, *e. g.* Mansel (Bampton Lectures), and Stirling (Secret of Hegel), or a natural difficulty of translating his great and sweeping abstractions into the concrete which alone the common intellect and common sense can follow.¹

¹ At all events he is obscure, and consequently he has been refuted by English critics, and particularly by the great adepts in the art of refuting any given system—even one they did not understand—Hamilton and Mansel. If Berkeley, the clearest of writers, could be misunderstood and therefore refuted by them, a great opportunity here offered itself in the case of one who was admittedly obscure to all, and whom people vaguely felt to be dangerous. For the refutation would then be perfectly clear to both author and reader! Besides these two were a sort of moral police—our philosophical coast-guards—to keep off German Pan-

CHAPTER II.

ENGLISH AND GERMAN IDEALISM.

§ 5. SENSATIONAL AND RATIONAL IDEALISM.—The Absolute Idealism of Hegel is very different from the Subjective and Theological Idealism of Berkeley. We have already referred to the historical and logical filiation of the two systems. One conclusion is common to both, but this conclusion constitutes what is great and original in Berkeley. It was he who first pointed it out and emphatically enforced it. It is this, that the existence of an External world is for men—for sentient beings—the knowledge of it, to Berkeley by Sense, to Hegel by Reason. It is that the interpre-

theism, like the Rinderpest of to-day, from English shores. A very happy position, as they were thus enabled to be Philosophical Dictators at home, and offer the English world their Natural Realism, instead of German Transcendentalism as the only true and genuine Philosophy. It would have shown more gratitude in them to have acknowledged what they took from this source, instead of taking part and trying to refute the remainder, which admittedly they did not understand; but this would have shown how much they borrowed and how much even of that they misunderstood.

tation of Nature *is* Nature.' To Berkeley the annihilation of all consciousness is the annihilation of both Mind and Nature—utter Night and Nothingness remain. But to Hegel the annihilation of Consciousness would only mean the annihilation of

' When Berkeley said that the existence of the External World is our perception of it, it is to be noted that this must be understood to mean more than actual perception of it, as both Professor Fraser and Mr. Mill point out. It means sensations, both experienced in fact, and expected in faith, that what has been will be again under similar conditions. It means, I affirm, further than Fraser or Mill allow, not only those common sensations which all men may have, and which afford a ground for scientific interpretation of Nature, but those special presentations which the Artist and Poet receive from External Nature. A cloud was for Shelley more than a hazy outline of varying shape and hue, it was all those beautiful suggestions which constitute his wonderful "Ode to a Cloud." And though Wordsworth complains of the soulless Peter Bell that "A primrose by the river's brim, a yellow primrose was to him, and it was nothing more," yet even to the poet himself it was still nothing more than Berkeley's principle implies. Both cloud and primrose were the perceptions external and internal; and all beyond these was a cause efficient to their production, but no way like them. But Mill's "Permanent Possibilities of Sensations," and Fraser's "Group of Guaranteed Sensations," must be qualified as here indicated, for it is only the sensations corresponding to what are called the primary and secondary qualities of bodies that are permanent and guaranteed in the fullest sense. The æsthetic perceptions are not common to all, and may never return in the same manner again even to the same person.

things in one sense as we now know them. In another sense of existence they survive as before man appeared. But existence in this sense is for our intelligence the same as non-existence in the full and true sense. But both Berkeley and Hegel affirm what English Realists, like Hamilton and Mansel, cannot understand, that the abolition of our knowing faculty is the destruction of *our* external world. They think rocks, and sea, and cloud remain just as they were though all faculties of eyes and ears and nerves were taken away; because they think that our phenomenal rocks, and clouds, and sea, are in some way a copy of, or at least analogous to, the things in themselves behind. But, even Kant who is a Realist, and to whose Realism theirs is so greatly indebted, is against them here.¹ For there

¹ Accordingly, Mansel charges Kant with Dogmatism in negation, because Kant affirms that things in themselves are not like their appearances. He says (Metaphysics, p. 354)—“If things in themselves are absolutely unknown, how can we say whether they are like or unlike anything else?” In the *Prolegomena Logica*, p. 82, he goes further. He says, “in the absence of proof on either side the presumption is in favour of what is at least subjectively true” (that is, that things *per se* are like phenomena). The two passages are important. They clearly show (an opinion only hinted at by Hamilton) that he thinks things *per se* are *like* phenomena. They further show a complete misapprehension of the system of Kant, with whom things *per se*, whatever else they might be, or not be, were *different* from phenomena. That they differ from phenomena as well as cause them is

is no likeness between phenomenon and noumenon. And if Kant is consistent, no category, no predicate applies to things *per se*, save existence—even this only in a peculiar sense of existence.

This point, common to both Berkeley and Hegel, nearly the whole of Berkeley. But it is sufficient to rank him high amongst the highest thinkers,

all we can be sure about, according to Kant; difference from phenomena is their very essence. The passage further proves what I affirm in the text, that Mansel never saw the view of Berkeley at all—that trees, rocks, and cloud, being phenomena of Mind, are destroyed by the destruction of Mind. He thinks a reality like our phenomena would remain after the extinction of all conscious intelligence. In fact Natural Realism, which has so many sides, here returns to Platonic Realism, in thinking that something greater than our appearances lies behind, of which the latter are copies, and which might subsist independently of any mind. That this is really the view of Mansel and Hamilton is seen by Professor Fraser, who, however, does not go on to show its inconsistency. He states their opinion to be that “in sense perception we are face to face with a world that exists independently of all Sensation, and of all intelligence—an extended world, that in its essence might survive the extinction of all the conscious life in the Universe.” Mansel himself thinks we directly know *one* thing *per se*, the *Ego*; will he affirm that the *Ego* is any way *like* its cognitions or feelings or volitions? Kant only said the same of all things *per se* which Mansel must see is true of the *Ego*. Kant then is not wrong in denying what we have not the faintest evidence for in facts of consciousness, or whisper of Intelligence, while we have evidence to the contrary in the only thing *per se* which according to Mansel we do know, which is clearly not like its appearances.

as being the great conception in which lay, as in a germ, the whole future of Philosophy. In this point and the proof of it was the seed from which have been evolved two extreme systems, yet both Idealistic, the absolute Sensationalism of Hume and Mill, and the absolute Idealism of Hegel,¹ the one by accepting the disproof of

¹ If, as Berkeley said, our sense-apprehension of the External World was the External World, the next question of Hume and Positivism was inevitable. Is not Mind or Spirit equally, our inner sense-apprehension of it? But Berkeley had given an answer by anticipation, when he affirmed, "I am conscious that I am not my ideas, but something different."

And when Berkeley affirmed that God was the efficient Cause of my ideas in case of External Perception, because I am conscious that I am not and Matter cannot be such cause, it is inevitable that the next question will be asked, might not God be the sole Efficient Cause of everything in me, ideas, volitions, and emotions? Berkeley's answer to this is the same as to the other objection, that we have consciousness of Efficient Causation in willing and operating about ideas. With Berkeley the final appeal is to consciousness, in answer both to Hume and Hegel. Here he anticipates the view of Mansel, that the *Ego* is given in consciousness. But Hume denies that it is in his consciousness, and Hegel that, even if so given, consciousness is the final court of appeal.

The nature and the boundary of the *Ego* is indeed the central question of every Philosophy to which all inquiries tend, and it must be allowed Berkeley has not devoted sufficient consideration to it. But he has, undoubtedly, given a practical answer, if not a profoundly speculative one, to both Hume and Hegel. And

Matter, but denying the validity of Berkeley's argument for the existence of God; the other, by following, though entirely independently of Berkeley's prompting, the line of argument so clearly traced by him to its extremest point. The one system sees no Efficient Causation; the other sees nothing else in the universe; the one sees God nowhere, nor can know Him in any way (save by the haunting of a strange suggestion, which this extreme Sensationalism cannot easily merge under either outer or inner fact of Sense); the other sees God everywhere beneath the world of nature, which is merely His woven veil, and knows him in the high soul of man, which is the manifestation of His spiritual presence. To the one there is no Creation; to the other, nothing but Creation ever going on under Nature's face. One system takes its departure from Sense, as the sole principle of knowledge; the other from Reason, a higher faculty than Sense. In Berkeley the distinction of two cognising faculties, so important in Kant, is not insisted on, and there seems a tendency at times to give the lead to Sense, though with Locke he acknowledges the superior faculty of Intellect, if not consciously, at least unconsciously, in the masterly way in which he uses it to establish his

he has intimated the true line of argument for a speculative answer, on which line Mansel has worked, though I cannot think with any great success.

system. With Hegel Sense (as well as the Understanding of Kant) is subordinated to Reason as the true and sole principle of knowledge. With Mill, Sense is the source and limit of knowledge.

Hence the two opposed systems of Idealism, which follow from Berkeley, the Sensational Idealism of Mill, and the Rational Idealism of Hegel. Mill carries Berkeley's principle, that the External universe is for us our sense-perceptions of it, to the inner world of Mind; and with him the whole universe of Matter and Mind is just what our senses, external or internal, tell us. There may be modes of Being beyond for more or higher faculties of Sense, but the only word for these is the Unknowable. Hegel will not allow Sense to be the source or bound of knowledge, as with Mill, nor consciousness to afford the only field for facts in verification of it, as with Mansel. For Sense is variable in the savage and civilized man, in the poet and philosopher, and the average man, while Reason is the same in all: again, there is a great world beyond consciousness, of which consciousness reflects but a part, and that imperfectly. This world is only for the Reason, which clearly sees what Sense, a lower faculty, cannot; but it is this world of sense-facts which consciousness clearly reflects, and therefore we need not look there for the verification of the conclusions of Reason. She is her own verifier. She is, in the words of Lord Bacon, " Truth, which only doth judge

itself." And here Hegel is far greater and truer than Mill. Men cannot and dare not surrender this world lying beyond Sense. For it is a fact; it exists, and we do know it, and we know it from Reason. Does not Music suggest an immense world beyond Sense? Do not Poetry and Art? Does not the Religious instinct in man connect us with it? Bacon, as great and practical as Mr. Mill, was much of the poet also, and saw this. He considered the poet's aspirations after an ideal world a proof of the immortality of man. And Poetry and Art are the proof of a world transcending Sense, but not transcending Soul, which with Hegel is Reason.¹ And the

¹ The Hegelian view is intimated in the following, from an able Metaphysician and beautiful writer, Rev. Mr. Martineau:—"By vision of Imagination we see an ideal beauty enfolding many a person and many a scene, and appealing to us as a *pathetic light gleaming from within*; but here (*i. e.* in the Sense Philosophy) we find it all resolved into curvature of lines and adjustments of color." And elsewhere, "If the poet always looks upon the world through a suppliant eye, craving to meet his own ideal and commune with it alive; if prayer is ever a 'feeling after Him to find Him,' the fervor and the joy of both must be best sustained if we are conscious not only of the stillness of His presence but of the movement of His thought, and never quit the date of His creative moments." (Contemporary Review, April, 1872.)

That there is a world beyond Sense, with which even on earth we have communion, is also clearly indicated in a remarkable and most original chapter in the writings of the greatest English thinker after Berkeley and Hume, I mean Bishop Butler.—(See

Poet or Artist, the true interpreter of this world, ever feels, in translating the inspiration of Reason into facts of Sense, that he has succeeded but imperfectly; that there is a world of immeasurable grandeur and greatness, beyond which he is impotent to reveal fully and clearly to men. He can only point it out to them, so that the same spring in their souls may be touched, that they may try and see for themselves. But that there is in part a world incommunicable to consciousness proves consciousness not to be the final test of truth and existence, as both Mansel and Mill maintain. Mansel, indeed, alludes to this World beyond consciousness, but he considers it the region

Sermon XIV., "On the Love of God.") This and the preceding, with an Essay on Personal Identity, and a chapter in the Analogy, on a Future Life, constitute the Ontology of Butler, and, prove his great gifts as an original Metaphysician. He did not prosecute Metaphysics further, as he considered Ethics the proper study for man. In the chapter referred to he proves the existence of a super-sensual world by the very instances mentioned in the text, viz., by capacities unfilled, by aspirations unrealized, which he thinks the Deity alone can supply or gratify; as well as by the existence of *Æsthetic* perceptions, which partly put us in communication with this ideal world. He says, "There are certain ideas which we express by the words 'world, order, harmony, proportion, beauty,' the farthest removed from anything sensual." And, "there are objects, works of Nature and Art, which all mankind have delight from, quite distinct from their affording gratification to sensual appetites, and from quite another view of them than as being for their interest and further advantage."

of what he calls Negative Thinking. (*Prolegomena Logica*, p. 277.) With Hegel and Schelling it is positive thinking, and the highest thinking.

Mansel holds that this phenomenon of negative thinking cannot be explained on the hypothesis that Thought equals Being. But I think Hegel's is just the system which can best explain this. For though Sense, at its highest, is a stranger in this region, Reason is at home; and the striving to pass the conditions and restrictions which Mansel speaks of is precisely Reason's struggle, on the frontiers of her

And these ideas are to him as "real as truth itself." Again, he conjectures that "every thing of grace and beauty throughout the whole of Nature" meet in the Author and Cause of all things, who may hereafter be "an adequate supply to all the faculties of our souls, a subject to our understandings, and an object to our affections." Indeed, three great and (as surely Mill would allow) by no means visionary thinkers, Butler, Bacon, and Berkeley, all agree with Hegel, that we are in communication with a Sense transcending world, and not that we know all that is to be known about it; and they differ in this last from Hegel.

No Poet in modern times has widened the inner vision of men to this super-sensual world more than Shelley. And Mill has written on Shelley's poetry, and contrasts it with Wordsworth's as more creative. Now, if creative, we ask what faculty creates? And does it only, in creating, combine sense-materials? Does it not suggest, if not introduce us to, a world beyond sense? Mill may call the faculty Imagination; with Hegel it is Reason; and the region into which she conducts beyond Sense is part of Reason's territory.

empire, to advance further. The phenomenon of Negative thinking is not the impotence of the imprisoned eagle, beating the bars of her cage—it is the growing faculty which the young eagle feels for stronger and farther flight. And Hegel emphatically denies Mansel's statement, that we are imprisoned, and that "centuries of speculation" have solved none of our doubts. Reason has surely advanced since the age when men made weapons of flint, and this we see clearly to-day, when comparing the savage with the civilized man.

Though I do not accept the whole of Hegel's conclusions, I consider his Spiritual Idealism far superior to Mill's Sense-Idealism, and truer, too. The existence in the world of Poetry, Metaphysics, and Religion, for ever proves another world beyond Sense, our connexion with which we will not, and cannot if we would, part with. It is reason transcending consciousness, greater than sense, which shows to the "poet, hidden in the light of Thought," such sublime visions as our Milton, "blind but bold," had of Paradise; which shows to the sage, in supreme moments of revelation, a larger world of Truth and Reality, of which the world of appearance is but vesture and veil, as it seemed to Plato; and which shows to the religious soul an Infinite and Absolute Spirit, the source of love, and light, and life, as it was to John the Apostle. And we venture to affirm very positively that the

three divinities of Religion, Poetry, and Metaphysics, will long exist for men, spite of the Positivism which is so closely allied with this sensational Idealism, and which would do its best to ignore or destroy them. Hegel's Idealism may without its fault have led to the Atheism and Materialism of Feuerbach, which finds its extreme expression in his dictum that, "Man is what he eats;" but English Sense-Idealism tends to a *practical* Materialism and Atheism, which no one has more earnestly protested against than Mr. Mill himself, and of which the last result is, Man is his banker's balance, Life is material comforts, and Heaven is the prolongation of these and more resembling them for ever—a Heaven to be got by a faith which yet showed no faith in all that was likeliest Heaven on the Earth. This is a worse sort of Materialism, a more hopeless Atheism than the other, for there is at least some colour for Feuerbach's view; the soul is dependent in part on the body; the other is untrue, and the last voice in the world from Satan. It is against this Philosophy, materialistic in the worse sense, that true Philosophy and true Religion to-day and at all times proclaim war; and the best side of Hegel's Idealism is where he turns a terrible spear against the serpent head of this Philosophy, which creeps on the ground, briefly and accurately characterized in Scriptural language as "earthly, sensual, devilish."

This Philosophy of material comfort, which reverses the high and true principle, that "Man doth not live by bread alone," is the canker at the root of modern civilization, which, if not held in check by the only counteracting agencies, Philosophy and Religion, would destroy all that civilization has gained, nay, even its own existence, by surrendering the high Ideals of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good—shown in the form of self-sacrifice, and believed in by the best from Plato to Hegel—which alone make the higher life for man, and which constitute his high heritage from Heaven, for mere material comforts—for "a mess of pottage." And yet, when gained, these good things would soon bring surfeit, without some, ever so slight, mixture of the higher. The gross sweets would soon cloy without some infusion of the spiritual into life's cup. True Philosophy, and Hegel's chiefly, is an answer to this Philosophy of Manchester, as it has been styled.

Novalis said Philosophy will bake no bread, but she will give us the heavens. And Hegel, in the same spirit, in a well-known passage (quoted and misunderstood by Mr. Lewes, as Stirling points out), in answer to the question put as an objection to his system, "Whether it is the same, if my house, my property, the air I breathe, this town, the sun, the law, mind or God, exist or not?" replies, "But in truth, Philosophy is precisely the doctrine which is to free man from innumerable finite aims and ends, and to make

him so indifferent to them, that it is really all the same whether such things exist or not." Stirling decisively settles, against Lewes, Hegel's meaning here to be, that Philosophy frees us from innumerable finite aims and ends, such as "my means," "my house," "my property;" but that material ends and absolute existences, as the air, sun, or God, should not have been included in the objection.¹

¹ Again, in objection to Hegel's principle, that being and non-being were the same, it was asked if it was all the same to have or not to have a hundred dollars. And Hegel's answer, described by Mr. Lewes as "delicious," was, that "Philosophy had nothing to do with 'a hundred dollars.'" To me this seems precisely *the* answer, and a great one, and the more one reflects, the truer and greater it appears. Hegel was never found wanting in a pertinent answer to far deeper objections than this shallow one, which yet Mr. Lewes thinks relevant. He, of all thinkers and of all men, made no irrelevant answers to objections to his own system, and raised no irrelevant objections to any other system. In his examination of every preceding thinker he goes straight to the centre, raises the only issue worth raising, and never misunderstands. Witness his criticism of his great predecessor, Kant. Here he goes at once to the centre of the system, and the vulnerable point in Kant, the nature of the *Ego*, and our cognition of it. Mr. Lewes would do well to remember this—Hegel will not readily be found misunderstanding, and he never gives an irrelevant answer. Mr. Lewes somewhere, in his in many respects admirable work, "The History of Philosophy," speaks of the "odious clap-trap" of Cousin as disagreeable, but his own style in speaking of the serious answers of a man like Hegel as "delicious" would perhaps seem to some more offensive than the rhetoric of M. Cousin.

And Poetry joins with Philosophy and Religion in protesting against this creed. Thus Shakespeare says,

"What is a man
If his chief good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed?—a beast, no more.
Sure he who made us with such large discourse—
Looking before and after—gave us not
That capability and godlike reason
To fust in us unused."

§ 6.—*Result of Hegel according to the German critics.*—If Hegel is so superior to Sense Idealism in the superiority he gives to Reason beyond Sense, his finding in another and most vital question of every Philosophy, the Individuality of the Man and his destiny in the future, is dark and doubtful. He makes Man great Here; what is he in the great Hereafter? There are differences of opinion amongst his followers, and amongst his critics. Dr. Stirling, the eloquent and able expositor, as well as sympathetic and clear English critic, of this incomparable Metaphysician affirms that Hegel's system aims at a complete reconciliation between the highest claims of Philosophy and the deepest truths of Christianity. But others understand him differently. Our business is to try and fathom his meaning; even to know the opposite opinions attributed to such a thinker as Hegel is important. To try to understand, then to criticise, but not to refute Hegel or Kant, is the business of Philosophy, for some time

to come. For these cannot be refuted, save by those who first clearly see their systems, and then see deeper. Nay, they cannot be refuted, (and the same holds of Berkeley,) save in part, for they are each one in his degree in possession of the great positive results of Philosophy up to his time. They have great partial truth which may, like the double and triple pictures of objects presented to imperfect vision, be focused into a fuller Philosophy in future. This is always the tendency of Philosophy—each system is an advance to clearer light, to deeper truth ; and Hegel, whatever his defects may be, has more of both than his predecessors. Hence his opinions are worthy of the most careful consideration, as he came last with all that previous Philosophy had taught him, in which he was profoundly versed ; and besides, he brought a titanic intellect to the consideration of the questions.

Hegel considered it incumbent on Philosophy, if she had got possession of the sole principle sought for so long, to apply and by applying to verify it through all the experience of Man, and in every existence actual or possible. And this principle should be, in Hegel's opinion, not only an Ontological or real principle, the source of all being both in man and nature ; but a Logical principle of which all the knowledge of man should be an instance, and an Historical principle of which all his experience should be an exemplification. And thus

not only is Thought, with Hegel, the source and reality of man and things ; but the development of Thought, as The Idea, is the apparently blind and aimless struggle of man through History to a higher light, and a greater good ; and all his Arts, Sciences, Religions, and Institutions, are the results reached by Thought, which Philosophy sums up and generalises. They are thought, objective and as it were crystallised, in which, therefore, thought subjective or Reason should read and recognise itself as its mirrored reflexion. Thought is the one existence, but it throws out forms or appearances of itself upon which it then concentrates its gaze as objective, and reads into them their true meaning, which is their true existence.

In one respect, the illustration of the mirror may mislead, and here, according to English critics, is the objection to Hegel. In the mirror the reflection is unreal in comparison with man the looker. But in Hegel, say the German critics (as Michelet and Strauss), the mirrored reflection of man's Thought in Philosophy and Art is more real than the individual man who looks. Indeed the individual man can scarcely be said to look at all, or even to exist as individual, but only the universal, the impersonal, the absolute, the reason which looks out from his soul as from a window where it has taken its temporary seat. The absolute uses him as an instrument to see through, just as in History it uses him as

means of developing itself, and then casts him aside as of no consequence whatever. "The Individual withers, but the World is more and more." The product reached is more real and far more important than the tool; Philosophy and Art, the summed result, more important, more real than man, who sums; but the process of developing Thought is the most real of all. The process of advancing Thought, clearing its eye as Reason, widening its sphere of action as Will, though doing so by means of man, is the important point. Man is only a means, and his best Philosophy, Arts, and Institutions, are only marks of how far the Idea has travelled—are result and proof of development so far.

"Through the ages one increasing purpose runs,
And the thoughts of men are widened with the process of the
suns."

But the "increasing purpose" is the chief thing, and the "widening thought." Hegel takes both under Thought, which is impersonal, universal, and immortal. It alone lives, and moves for ever forward on the whole, though sometimes, for a time, it goes backward; the Philosophies, Arts, and Religions pass away in part; and are only more real than man their maker, because they mark how far Thought, or the Idea, has advanced, and are, each one in its time, truth and reality, and all together the whole truth and reality then, but not for the future; while the individual man is used and consumed as material, in

the merciless and mysterious march of the Idea to a goal impossible to foresee. The individual man seems hardly to exist ; even now on earth he is unsubstantial as the cloud, and evanescent as the foam. Thus the imperishable dignity and importance which other systems had given to the individual seem to be withdrawn ; and here we detect one point in common with it and the Positivism of Comte, which equally merges the Individual. But Positivism only merges the Individual in the Race, while Hegelianism in this view goes farther, and merges the Race in the results reached, and even this in the process of reaching.

Here a Shakespeare or a Goethe, a Confucius or a Calvin, are of less account than in the Positivist creed ; for here they differ from ordinary men, only that in them the Idea more mightily manifested itself, in order that through them it might reach fuller function, and be furthered faster in its mysterious onward march.

In like manner, a Reformation and a French Revolution are means by which it advances resistlessly and remorelessly, though heavily and laboriously, to some strange goal, which appears, on the whole, to be progress to a better. The universal, Thought, is the one reality, and the individual a passing shadow. And, as the essential feature of Thought is its evolution, we are left finally with the process of development as the Universe. But this

Heraclitean result, as never existing fixed, but always-changing, would seem to be shadowy and unreal too, as Stirling considers it, so that here for men this entire universe has become a vast vanity—a fleeting vision by an impersonal reason of its own ceaseless changes. Moreover, in this pushing to a purpose of the Idea, Schopenhauer saw an element impossible to be merged under Reason ; in fact, he saw little reason in history or in the world, but the reverse, everywhere chance, the result of something blind, but powerful; and accordingly announced that not Reason, but Will, was the first and one existence. The world was Will, and not Thought, according to him; while Hegel takes Will under Thought, as an inner necessity of Reason. It is undoubtedly difficult to merge this element, and Hegel shows this prominently where he makes the chief feature in the Idea to be its process of unfolding. This element seems different from Thought in our sense of the word.

But, omitting Schopenhauer's objection, this result reached is far beyond and away from Berkeley's Idealism, and is in one respect quite opposed to it, being nearer Plato's Realism. In Berkeley no Universal nor anything can exist apart from a conscious mind, human or Divine.

§ 7. *Result of Hegel according to English Critics.*—But there is another interpretation put upon Hegel by some German and most English critics,

which would bring him in close approximation to English Idealism. This is, that man by the subjective Reason which dwells in him, and which is his, is the only real existence, everything existing only as known by Reason, all beyond the knowledge of reason being inconceivable, and therefore, for Reason, non-existent. He even goes in advance of Berkeley and Mill here, on the side where he is nearest them. For Reason, with Hegel, is at its highest in man, and what cannot be reached by his Reason is non-existent, but with Berkeley there is a higher Intelligence, and with Mill there may be modes of Being beyond our faculties. It is curious here to remark how Hegel and Mill each go beyond and fall short of the other. Hegel widens the sphere of Reason beyond Sense and Consciousness, to include all that exists; and there are existences beyond the ken of Consciousness, but none beyond that of Reason. Mill narrows the sphere of reason so as to make it operative only about facts of Sense which are presented in Consciousness, but he believes there may be a world quite unknown and unknowable beyond. In this I think he is inconsistent with his Subjective Idealism. At least, if he means it to be an absolute Sense-Idealism, which would explain by Sense all that is actual and possible, he is. But waiving this, Mill does not think that the real existence of anything external to us but other minds admits of proof (Exam. of Hamilton, p. 232); and, therefore, we

should not allow the existence of this world, for which there is no proof, any more than of the fictitious entity called Matter, which he rejects, with Berkeley, because there is no evidence for it. English critics understand Hegel in this latter sense, that the existence of things, and even ourselves, is the knowledge of them, and there is no existence beyond.¹ This is Hodgson's interpretation (*Space and Time*, p.

¹ When I say English critics I should only include Stirling and Hodgson, as Mill, Mansel, Hamilton and Lewes all show either that they can make nothing out of Hegel, or that they have not taken the necessary trouble to do so. That which is the difficulty to me in Hegel is that he seems to result both in Plato and Protagoras. For the one universal exists apart from mind, and the intelligible relations or ideas seem to exist too in some sense without minds, which is Platonism and Realism, and yet again this universal Thought and these universal relations of Thought only exist truly for Reason or conscious Thought. They are or exist only as known by Reason, and there is nothing beyond Reason and this impossible apart from conscious beings, which is Protagoreanism.

There is one ingenious trick performed by some critics; when they cannot understand, or read wrongly; they then object, thus turning their faults into merits, their own inability into intelligence, and raising their difficulties to the dignity of objections. Thus Mansel cannot understand Hegel, and therefore cannot refute him, but he can quite easily set up an imaginary Hegel, and destroy him in the most complete fashion. See *Metaphysics*, pp. 312-316, for an admirable specimen of this mode of dealing with an adversary. See also Hamilton's refutation of Hegel (*Discussions*, pp. 24, 25), where in two half pages of destroying criticism Hegel is decisively disposed of.

392) ; Mill's (*Exam. of Ham.*, p. 82) ; also Mansel's (*Metaphysics*, p. 312, and *Prolegomena*, p. 299). Dr. Stirling, who must be credited with a completer understanding of Hegel than any Englishmen, and most Germans, seems in doubt. For in the notes to Schwegler, written since his "Secret of Hegel," he speaks of the "shadowy Universal that apparently alone is the outcome of Hegel" as the "greatest difficulty in his regard" (*Schwegler*, p. 435). But again he gives it as Hegel's system that "sensations and ideas in a subject constitute the Universe." Now, this

Hamilton devotes the text to destroying Schelling whom he considers the master, and the foot note to the easier task of settling the pupil Hegel. Single-handed he undertakes to dispose of both at the same time, but the master Schelling shall have the honor of experiencing all his skill of fence in the text, while an occasional thrust and without ceremony at the pugnacious and presumptuous pupil Hegel in the foot-note is quite enough to do for him. In truth in reading Hamilton's or Mansel's refutation of Hegel, one is strongly reminded of the comparison. of a combat between the owl and the eagle.

The difficulty I find in Hegel mentioned above, and which seems to be Stirling's too, I do not wish to set up as an objection, thus making what is perhaps my fault my merit. I think there may be consistency though I cannot find it yet. In a great thinker like Hegel, I expect fuller knowledge will shew as in nature greater harmony, and I distrust all superficial appearances of inconsistencies and contradiction, of which there *seem* more in Hegel's case than any other thinker, thus furnishing the means of so many easy refutations of him, to those who are disposed to exercise this art.

latter is Berkeleianism, and generally English Idealism; the former is nearer to Platonic Realism or to Pantheism. Stirling remarks that "these so-called permanent ideas are after all but relations, forms that always existing, not *per se*, but only *per aliud*, can never be said in truth to exist at all. Annihilate the things, and where are your forms?" True; but Berkeley would thus express it, annihilate conscious thought, and where are your forms? and so would Hegel, too, in Stirling's final finding of him.

The different interpretations seem to arise from the double meaning, in which Hegel uses the word Thought. For it is both subjective and objective with Hegel, and in the latter sense can exist apart from consciousness. It is both the conscious thought as exercised by a thinker, and also the intelligible and sensible relations which this thought sees in things, and which are things. Both are thought and the same thought, save that one shows an aspect of which the other is destitute—namely, consciousness, which yet is in no way an essential of thought. For Hegel proves by History and Logic that conscious Thought is a development and strict continuation of unconscious Thought. But Berkeley assuredly would not apply the word Thought to the intelligible relations existing apart from Mind; for Berkeley affirms more emphatically than any other Philosopher that, apart from Mind, these have no existence. They were made by a Mind, address

themselves to a Mind, have no meaning but for a Mind, and cease to exist with the cessation of Consciousness or Mind.

English Idealism and Berkeley would affirm that these intelligible relations and this "shadowy Universal" have no more existence *per se* than the fiction called Matter has. In fact, Berkeley's attack on abstract Ideas was levelled against this very point; he maintained that abstract Ideas could not exist save in the form of a particular perception representative of a commonly associated cluster of perceptions, and *a fortiori* if a Universal could not exist in the Mind as the Conceptualist believes, it could not exist apart from Mind in Nature, as the Realist thought. And Berkeley considered the belief in Matter the most remarkable instance of these two absurdities—an abstract Idea existing apart from some particular sensation, and an external reality existing though all consciousness were withdrawn from the universe. Thus in this sense, Hegel's Absolute Idealism stands opposed to Berkeley's Idealism and approaching Plato's Realism. With Berkeley, Consciousness, Mind, Intelligence, like ours, but also greater, together with ours, constitute the Universe. And Conscious Intelligence was from the beginning, is, and ever must be, the Universe. This is not Hegel, in one estimate of him; but in that of Stirling (Schwegler, p. 387), that "Sensations and Ideas in a subject constitute the Universe," it is very close to him; but

even so understood, there is a difference, for consciousness was not with Hegel presiding at the beginning, though pure Thought was. The reconciliation of the two views of Hegel's Philosophy has not yet been fully effected, even by Sterling, though a fuller understanding of it may show them both to be accordant aspects.

§ 8. *Mill's Relative and Hegel's Absolute Knowledge.*—The one side of Hegelianism which, we can see, leans to Mill and Berkeley, is deserving of notice, as here a union between English and German thought may be possible, as Stirling suggests (Schwegler's "History of Philosophy," p. 466).

At present they are streams flowing separate, thus placing Philosophy, (which should ever be, as she tends to be,) one, in a very unsatisfactory state. As the reconciliation is not likely to come from any move on the part of Mr. Mill, who everywhere expresses his aversion to German Transcendentalism, it is the more necessary for others to show there is less irreconcilable opposition than seems to Mr. Mill himself. Thus his doctrine of the Relativity of Human knowledge is stated in his Logic to be that "of the outward world we know and can know absolutely nothing, except the sensations we experience from it"—that is, the existence of the outer world is our knowledge of it, but this knowledge is limited to sensations. Now Hegel also holds that the existence of the outer world, as of everything, is our knowledge

of it; but, the sensations which appear in Consciousness form only a part, not the whole of our knowledge of the Universe. The sensations are the whole of what is commonly called the External World; but there is a larger world than this, with which we communicate, and the Sense is not sufficient to give us this world. A higher Faculty is needed, and that is Reason: but yet the existence of this world is what we know of it, and it is non-existent in the true sense unless known. Mr. Mill seems to think there is a huge unknowable world out of which Consciousness has cut a small sphere, which also is the field in which Thought must confine itself: but the field can never be widened, as men have only got a fixed number of senses, external and internal. But Hegel does not acknowledge an unknowable world beyond. This world is non-existent until taken possession of by Intelligence. A world may indeed be created by advancing Intelligence, but it has no true existence till it is known. The world which Reason conquers she creates. Thus she always knows all that is to be known; and, if more is to be known, she first makes it for her own widening nature to see. And I think Mr. Mill would allow, that though our external senses are the same as those of the men in the "flint age," yet some of our internal ones have been developed since, and more might be in future; and that part of our conception of an External

World is the internal suggestions which Nature has power to arouse in us—from which it would appear that we are conquering more of what he considers the irreducible and unknowable world by gradually increasing faculty. A gradually increasing faculty in the history of man he must admit, which at least must increase our knowledge of the External World by increased range as well as quality of sense-powers. It is but a step further to admit one faculty superior to all these, which gives a Shakspeare such a knowledge of the Universe as other men with as keen external senses and as clear intelligence, yet wanting the “capability and God-like Reason,” here seen in its highest manifestation as the Supreme faculty, are wholly and utterly strangers to, until he comes down as from another sphere to tell them of it. And when he tells them, some understand, because they have a little of this superior faculty latent, of which he has such a prodigality fully developed. The Universe, even the External Universe, was something to Shakspeare and Shelley beyond the sense-facts, but something which still tried to translate itself into these, and, in every form of metaphor, yet was still felt to be untranslated entirely. Reason was the translator, and what she could not turn into sense-meaning she yet knew for herself.

The doctrine of Relativity is again stated in the Examination of Hamilton’s Philosophy, in what Mr.

Mill considers the "most extreme form in which the doctrine can be understood," to be "not merely that all we can possibly know of anything is the manner in which it affects the human faculties, but that there is nothing else to be known; that affections of human or of some other minds are all that we can know to exist." Now, this "extreme form" of Relativity is not far from Hegel, and is a fresh instance of the tendency of extremes to meet. Mr. Mill seems to think Hegel is the farthest away from holding the Relativity of Knowledge, but, as here stated, Hegel's Absolute Idealism, with a little concession on either side, could shake hands with it. Hegel also believes "all we can possibly know of anything is the manner it affects our faculties," but Reason is one of these faculties, and the highest, and not only is affected, but itself affects; he also believes "that there is nothing else to be known" besides the affections of Mind, unless, we must add, the Mind, or Thought, which knows the affections and itself. Mr. Mill's own view of the Relativity does not go quite so far as this, the doctrine, as he affirms, of Hume, Berkeley, and Ferrier; his own is, that our knowledge of objects, and even our fancies of them, are confined to Sensations, actual or imagined (Exam. p. 8), though there may be things we do not know. I am only concerned here to show that the extreme form of Relativity, which affirms that nothing exists, but Mind and its affections, is not far from the ex-

treme form of a Philosophy of the Absolute, which says only Thought exists, though Mr. Mill thinks they are at the opposite poles of Philosophy.

But Mr. Mill will have nothing in common with Hegel, and there is no one thinker for whose views he has shown less respect. This is the more remarkable as Mr. Mill must be aware of the powerful influence Hegel has exerted on European Speculation during the past half-century; and, besides, he has always shown to men far inferior to Hegel, that consideration to which a great thinker is entitled. In a recent article in the *Fortnightly Review*, while giving their just meed of praise to Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Berkeley, amongst others of less note, as Hobbes and Hartley, who have influenced Thought, he makes no mention of any of the later Germans except Kant. Now, certainly, if praise is due to Spinoza and Leibnitz, Hegel deserves mention, especially as Mr. Mill describes his Philosophy as an emanation from that of Spinoza and Leibnitz (*Logic*, Vol. ii., p. 314;) and it surely has an advantage over theirs in coming after the Kantian revolution in Metaphysics; while it professes to be based on Experience and not on definitions. Beside Hegel's mode of thought, even his Method and his conclusions are more akin to Mill's own than the mystical thinking which he charges on Hegel's, but which is really to be found in Spinoza's system, so majestic but shadowy and unsolid in its structure. And Mr. Mill again,

without giving proof, charges German Transcendentalism with putting Philosophy back into its cradle. If he refers to Hegel here, and thinks his an infant's utterances in Philosophy, we should like to know where are the matured meditations of the man to be found. The direct reverse is the truth. Hegel brought profound knowledge of all past Philosophy and a might of mind, unrivalled almost in man, to bear upon all its problems.

Mr. Mill again, in his Examination of Hamilton, charges Hegel with maintaining that *all* predicates, including all contradictory ones, are applicable to the Absolute. This would have been much nearer the truth if affirmed of Spinoza and Leibnitz. It is far from being the case with Hegel, who rather affirms that *no* finite predicates can fully or truly express the nature of the Absolute, for predicates imply limitation; and his quotation from Hegel does not justify the inference of Mill from it. Hegel says, "What kind of an Absolute Being is that which does not contain in itself all that is *actual*, even evil included?" And Mr. Mill thinks this implies that *all* contradictory predicates are true of the Absolute. Hegel's point is, that the Absolute is all that is actual, but, being so, the attempt to describe it by applying finite predicates to it is rather misleading. If the Absolute with Hegel is the one existence of which all things that appear are forms, it follows that every appearance of it might be affirmed of it; but

then, each such predicate expresses only a passing and partial phenomenal appearance of the one Subject, and so is no full or proper description of it. It is the one Reality from which all flows ; but when such an affirmation as this is made about the Absolute, then we cannot, as Mr. Mill thinks, immediately affirm the contradictory of this about it, and say it is *not* the one Reality. That would be suicidal equally of the Absolute, and of our arguments about it ; but to say it is both good, and not good, because two such passing manifestations of it appear, and here are finite predicates, is consistent with its actual existence. Might not two exhibitions of one man's Reason, still more of all Reason, which is absolute with Hegel, be one good and the other not good ?

As Mansel and Hamilton equally with Mill object to Hegel here, that his system violates the Law of Contradiction, it is important to see more fully the weight of the objection. With Hegel the Absolute is all that is actual, therefore every finite predicate in the dictionary may be affirmed of it, even contradictory ones, though they cannot be affirmed at the *same instant of the same individual*. Thus my body cannot be both sick and well at the same moment, but this would not apply to the absolute which is one, and yet has many manifestations. It may thus in another individual be at the same instant well, though in me not well. It may thus be strong and weak, black and white, tender and fierce, good and bad, &c., because all these are finite predicates.

The Law of Contradiction should be limited to individual manifestations, and also, as Kuno Fischer says, to these at the same moment. The Absolute is not subject to it in regard to finite but only essential predicates, and if we grant the existence of the Absolute, it could not be; and if not subject to this Law as here shown, it is vain to try to disprove its existence, as Mill attempts, by showing it violates the Law of Contradiction. The Absolute has nothing to do with this Law save that (so far as the Law holds) the Absolute itself makes it a necessary Law of Thought when thinking of finite things. Mr. Mill says it is a law of consistency. Just so, and its application is to finite things, to keep our thought from annihilation of itself, by affirmations such as "a pain is not a pain;" but the Law cannot be so far sovereign ruler as to overthrow the Reason which set it up as a delegated ruler, sovereign in its own sphere. The Absolute is all that is actual, even at the same instant, and everything that becomes in successive instants, whether these be expressed by contradictory predicates or not. In many cases they must be so; but they are passing and partial, and the fact that the One is also many permits these contradictory phenomenal appearances to exist, and by consequence to be all affirmed of the one subject. But essential and infinite predicates must be affirmed and cannot be denied.

Thus the Absolute is Real, is One, is Substance,

is Cause, is Infinite, is Good, but we cannot then say it is *not* (in this the true sense) Real, or One, or Substance, or Good. Here the law of contradiction is not set aside, as it may be if we apply any finite predicates to the Absolute. But neither at the same time is it in subjection to the law of Contradiction or Identity, so that these would be superior to it, and so the real Absolute, but rather here the laws of Identity and Contradiction are part of the essence of the Absolute itself, are simply the reason's own assonance with herself, essential forms of herself, which her own self-identity does not suffer her to revoke. The Laws of Thought, equally with Space and Time are essential forms of the Reason indeed, but not superior to Reason, so that they should control Reason and thus become the true absolute. The phrase "Necessary Laws of Thought" leads to this misconception that they are superior to Reason. Neither, on other hand, may Reason set these Laws aside. They are of the essence of Reason, and she will not change. This view of the sphere of the Necessary Laws of Thought I consider a complete answer to all that these three thinkers have really seriously advanced as objections to Hegel. For the sum of their objections is that he violates the laws of Thought—that, in the language of Mansel, "he denies, in certain relations, the validity of those laws of Thought which he acknowledges in others." (*Prolegomena Logica*,

p. 84.) And Hamilton affirms Hegel's whole Philosophy is founded on wrong views of the law of Excluded Middle ; while Mr. Mill thinks that to hold that the Absolute contains all that is actual is to have abrogated the authority of the Law of Contradiction, and so to have 'logically extinguished Transcendental Metaphysics by a series of *reductiones ad absurdissimum*,' which, he thinks, will be the honour awarded by posterity to Hegel. There is little sign as yet of this special honour being accorded to him ; and we think Mr. Mill rather over-sanguine about the early death of Transcendental Metaphysics, the wish being, no doubt, parent of the prophecy. Whether it be the monster of Mysticism which Mr. Mill regards it, or the bugbear of Pantheism which Mansel paints it, it is somehow spreading into every capital and centre of intelligence in Europe. If it be a mental contagion like the cholera, as perhaps its opponents consider it, and there seems a fatality in its silent steady march over Europe, yet there is little chance that it will devastate and then quickly disappear. And it has now not only invaded France, but England, spite of the union there (as against a common enemy), of the adverse English Association School, and the kindred but ungrateful Scotch Intuitional Philosophy, to ward it off.

Mr. Mill makes another attack against Hegel's Philosophy, on the side, too, where it approaches most nearly to his own ; and it is worth noticing,

as Hegel's is the one system which can best defend itself against this charge, which has been brought against nearly every Philosophy. Mr. Mill affirms that the foundation of the systems of Schelling and Hegel is the assumption, that what is inconceivable is non-existent, a proposition totally destitute of evidence, and which no evidence short of Revelation could prove. (Exam. of Hamilton, p. 82.)

Now, this famous proposition—which may be described as *the* fallacy of Philosophy, since first affirmed by Protagoras, in his principle πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος; which has been signalized by so many thinkers as a dangerous rock to be avoided, yet upon which, like Locke and Hamilton, they afterwards ran—is in one important sense true, and forms the ground for both Mill's and Berkeley's denial of Matter, and is in a fuller and completer sense true and consistent in the system of Hegel than in any other. In what sense then is it true that what is inconceivable is non-existent? In an actual sense,—what I cannot conceive has no existence for me, as I cannot realise it to myself by any knowledge of it. And if, as Mill would affirm, it may yet exist for others, this can only mean for me, that I try to conceive some way in which they may conceive it. I fail by hypothesis, and so its existence is blind, or none, for me, save through belief that others have faculties by which it may be apprehended, and that by this apprehension it may receive existence for

them. For me it has only existence by faith, unless it can be connected with some of my faculties of knowledge, and then it has existence for me in the true sense. But even the believed existence is only such because we can in some mediate way conceive it; that is, we believe that though we cannot conceive it other beings can; so that even its existence by faith gets any meaning it has from its being conceived. And, even with Mr. Mill, a Subjective Idealist, the inconceivable for all Minds is non-existent for all, and what is inconceivable for men is non-existent in the full sense for us; and has but a believed existence (which is not real existence), because we think others can conceive it. Or, as Mr. Mill himself expresses it, "We do not so much believe the fact as believe that we should believe it, if we could have the needful presentation in our experience; and that some other being has, or may have had, that presentation. But the belief is without understanding, for we form no mental picture of what we believe." (Exam. of Hamilton, p. 91.)

But if Mr. Mill has not proved the existence of other beings with different faculties, even its believed existence, imperfect as that is, becomes only problematical; and if he cannot prove the existence of other minds higher than ours, this problematical believed existence is practically non-existence; and if he disprove the existence of higher intelligence, it is strictly non-existence. Hence, to speak as he does

of modes of existence beyond our faculties, is unwarranted, till the existence of other minds is first proved for their apprehension. These are non-entities unless other minds already exist. They cannot be spoken of by a subjective Idealist but only by a Realist, who thinks things can exist apart from all mind. Berkeley does prove the existence of a higher Spirit, and hence is consistent when he speaks of existences apart from *our* mind, but not therefore apart from all mind. Hegel does not believe in a higher conscious Spirit than the human, and hence he also is consistent, in affirming that what it cannot conceive has no existence.

With Hegel developed Reason is the highest faculty of knowledge, and what is entirely beyond its reach is beyond all faculty of knowledge, and, therefore, is strictly non-existent in the fullest sense. He alone, if we except Schelling, can absolutely and consistently with his system hold this proposition. In English Idealism as held by Mr. Mill our universe is our knowledge of it; but there may be a higher knowledge than ours, and therefore a universe we cannot reach.

Of course it is difficult for Hegel to prove this proposition, while he admits the existence of one single mind outside his own. For its faculties of conception may be greater than his own, and therefore may show a wider sphere of being to that mind. Besides, the world of existences would then be

different to the ploughman and philosopher—to the philosopher of to-day and of a thousand years hence ; and before conscious Thought appeared it would seem there was no existence at all.¹

But Hegel, as no other Philosopher could, holds the thesis consistently and absolutely, his proof being granted ; for his system tries to justify it, and not merely assumes it, as Mill affirms. And he differs from Mill in holding absolutely what Mill can only hold relatively, that the Universe is what we know of it,

¹ But we must remember that the true Existence with Hegel is the known—the knowledge *is* that full and true Existence, while there is an existence before knowledge, yet even this can only be affirmed *after* it has been known, but not *before*. Thus we are justified in affirming Existence before man appeared, though not future unknown existence. Any future existence now inconceivable he would say is non-existence strictly, till it is made by advancing thought. Any past Existence before consciousness appeared is only Existence for us now, as it can be connected with our apprehending faculties, but *was* non-existence in the true sense before the faculty appeared. It never is Existence in the full true sense, save as there and then apprehended by Thought.

Unconscious Thought may cast up existences, as it did in the field of Nature, before Man came, but these existences are non-existences in the full sense till Conscious Thought or Spirit reads into them their meaning, which is their proper Existence. This existence of things before conscious Spirit appeared, is an example of his principle, that being and non-being are the same, for it was non-existence in the true sense, if not then apprehended by Thought in some manner.

and that we ourselves are what we know of ourselves; for to Mill the Universe might be more to an intelligence wider than ours, while to Hegel the Reason is the highest intelligence. Yet the conclusion is common to Mill's Sense-Idealism, and to Hegel's Rational Idealism; but the sphere of knowledge is much wider in one than the other, and the mind of the knower is the highest in one, but not in the other: and thus the conclusion is not only more absolute, but more consistently held by Hegel than Mill. The difficulty for Hegel, and one which I think he has not surmounted, is to prove that the philosopher's thought of the Universe, and especially his own, is the highest and fullest. I agree with all three thinkers, that existence for each one is his thought of it. Each one's world is made and bounded for him by his faculty of Knowledge; nay, is that faculty, and therefore the fullest existence would be that shown to the greatest Thought—would *be* the greatest Thought (using the word in a wide sense, to include Will and Emotion, as Hegel does); but then, existence thus varying, we are to consider existence for the highest Reason the true, because the widest and clearest, existence. But how are we to prove that man's Reason is highest? Here Berkeley appears truer than Hegel, and more consistent than Mill: for Berkeley has proved an Infinite Spirit to exist, but Mill does not allow his argument to be logically valid, and thus he is

reduced to the inconsistency of maintaining that there are modes of being inaccessible to our faculties, while he has not proved the existence of higher faculties by which these modes of Existence are apprehended; and therefore, in strictness, these entities are either non-existent or he must admit existence apart from any mind able to perceive it—which is the Platonic Realism he would be the last to hold—the doctrine he has most protested against—the very doctrine he charges on the German Ontologists. He says in his *Logic*, that the doctrine of Realism has “never ceased to poison Philosophy, whether disguised under the Abstract Ideas of Locke, under the ultra-nominalism of Hobbes and Condillac, or the ontology of the later Kantians.” Here seems one case where the virus has infected his own Philosophy, while Hegel’s is free from it. In fact, both Hegel and Berkeley are consistent—Mill is not. For existence beyond the human mind, there is always with Berkeley one mind, that of the Deity, to perceive, and thus to make it. And with Hegel there could be no such existence, for existence is made by the knowledge of it by Reason, and never can be in advance of Reason, which creates it. Reason is like a lamp which sheds a sphere of light around it in the midst of darkness. Now what she illuminates exists truly, and the illuminating is the true existence—all beyond is non-existent, because unknown. But there is only one lamp with Hegel, and that is the

Reason; and its fullest and farthest ray is thrown from the intellect of the Philosopher as from a watch-tower into the inane, which is the non-existent. Of course it may be here objected, that, if Reason is at war in different systems of Philosophy, we can consider her one and her empire undivided, only so far as she has made up her mind in the conclusions common to-day to these apparently opposed systems.

But even here Hegel is found consistent, as his view is, that all philosophy tends to unity, and the last is the result of the previous, and his own the true sum of all before; or rather Philosophy in its history, as a man is in his life, is one and identical, but has greater wisdom in maturity. A fuller comparison of the two systems of Idealism is inconsistent with the limits or scope of this Essay, which aims rather at a comparison of Idealism with the opposed systems of Realism and Materialism. My object has been to show the historical relation of Berkeley's Idealism to succeeding systems, one English, as best exemplified by Mill's limited Sense Idealism, which assumes to be the real continuation and true result of Berkeley; and one German, the Absolute and Rational Idealism of Hegel; and to draw attention to the broad lines of connexion, and to the chief points of contrast between English Idealism generally and that of Hegel—especially as his professes to be a complete system of absolute knowledge, and is at least the consistent

and consequent thought of a profound intellect, and undoubtedly indicates the line of march for Philosophy in the future. I do not believe the system contains absolute truth, for on Hegel's own principles, widening Reason is widening existence—is widening knowledge—therefore, unless Reason either ceases to advance or gradually grows blind again, and retrogrades to the darkness from which she has emerged, we have not reached the fuller Philosophy of the future, and therefore our present Philosophy is not Absolute Philosophy. It is only absolute for to-day, and in this sense, that Reason to-day can know all that is to be known to-day, but not what may be known in future—that is, absolute only in comparison with the past or present, but not with the future—or, in other words, not absolute in the full sense. It is an Absolute which is also a relative and limited knowledge, unless Reason has reached its highest possible development.

But whatever be the real or imagined inconsistencies of this system, it stands in Philosophy the most transcendent attempt ever essayed by any of the aspiring sons of men, to solve at once, and by one principle,¹ all the problems of Philosophy, and (what English Idealism and Realism alike shrink from as apparently hopeless, even in future) all the Sphinx enigmas of existence, as well as the “riddle of the painful Earth.” Even the mystery of life, which looms so vast and menacing to some thinkers;

which seemed to be thickening, rather than clearing, with the victorious march of Science, ever revealing myriads of unsuspected facts, and undreamt-of secret relations, in an ever-widening Cosmos ; which, like a thick mist, had descended slowly, and crept over the once clear and cheerful reign of Poetry, filling its modern manifestations with a sense of the "heavy and weary weight of all this unintelligible World," as, with Wordsworth and Goethe ; drawing from its best spirits in the highest nations only a wild wail or defiant laugh, as of reckless, despairing and shipwrecked men afloat on a raft, drifting they know not whither, as in Byron, Heine, and De Musset ; even this great and increasing mystery the system of Hegel seeks to reduce from its portentous dimensions to a shape manageable by Thought.

What all shrink from, speechless and chilled in its presence, the "final inexplicability" of Mr. Mill—"the transcendent problem which the Universe presents" to incompetent faculties, in the words of Mr. Spencer—this mystery in which we live, and by which we are enveloped on every side, Hegel alone fronted boldly and feared not, contending that the mystery raised by Reason must be resolvable by Reason, or, if not, it was an unreality. His Absolute Idealism shrinks not even here, for Thought is the one Existence, and a great menacing mystery, hanging as a huge irreducible reality, apart from Thought, apart from Mind, must be penetrated by Thought, and

then its terror is gone. This, too, is what the Reason knows it to be, and all beyond is non-existent. The inconceivable to Thought is nothing here, as in other cases.

The mystery was raised by Reason, the huge shadow projected by her own impotence, in her own more unenlightened days. This is the explanation of its apparent existence as a reality and an entity irreducible by Thought. But now Reason sees it, by her gradually purifying vision, to have been a cloud created by herself, and which the true knowledge of it pierces and dissipates. There is nothing beyond—there is nothing now but what Reason knows. Thus the Mind is the master still of the Universe, and the last and most terrible enemy not subject to its dominion is destroyed. Hegel is the one undaunted thinker who has gone to this extreme, though quite consistently with his Absolute Idealism.

§ 9. *Concluding Remarks on Hegel's Philosophy.*—Like his contemporary Napoleon in the material world, Hegel aimed at Universal Empire in the higher world of mind, and, like him, he found in what was original and unattempted the greater attractions for his daring genius and ambition. Though, when we come to consider the audacity of each, and their probable influence on the future, we may perhaps think that the “King of Thought,” as a great English thinker calls Hegel, was, of the two, the greater birth of time.

What was the audacity of Napoleon's Alpine passage, of Egyptian and Russian invasions, to that of this Conqueror, who attempts, by his Method, *to re-think the great thought of Creation*; who alone professes to have raised the Isis veil from Nature—alone to have found the one principle of being which all the sages sought from Thales—alone to have tracked the waters of Truth to its pure, primitive fountain in the realms of Logic, which, by a tremendous trope, he describes as “the Exposition of God, as He is in His eternal Essence, before the Creation of the World or of a single finite being”—who finally attempts to reduce to subjection of Reason the night which surrounds, and the mystery which slays, that She may be all in all?

But the parallel between the two Conquerors does not stop with their daring, nor is that the chief claim of either to greatness. Both were men who believed they had a mission at the most critical period of the world's history, and in a great measure the same mission, which each strove strongly to fulfil. Hegel's was to stop the destructive work of Hume, Diderot, Condorcet, and the French Encyclopædists generally, and to build up again; Napoleon's, to check the work of Robespierre, Danton, and the French Revolution, but to re-shape society in a form consistent with the consequences of the Revolution. Hegel also accepted in part the destructive work of his predecessors, but saw men could not live upon nega-

tions, and thus tried to build up again speculatively Morals, Society, and Religion, by giving them a deeper basis. He tried to dive deeper than any before him for the pearl of Truth. He saw that men could not live without new truth—if the old was insufficient, and that they were perishing for lack of new; and this he attempted to provide, as none of the destroyers like Hume had attempted. The Positivism, of which Hume and Helvetius were the parents, Hegel saw was too gross and earthy (while yet impoverishing) sustenance, for the high-born, and even yet heaven-surrounded soul of man. For the soul is still of high descent, spite of its sense surroundings, and although the Earth,

“The homely Nurse doth all she can
To make her foster-child, her inmate man,
Forget the glories he hath known,
And that imperial palace whence he came.”

The destroying work had been going on long, but none had come to build up again. The Encyclopædists had destroyed and broken with past Truth, which they declared to be cheat and delusion, but they affirmed that nothing spiritual could be known. Here was the most critical pass Humanity had reached since the break-up of the Roman Empire, and Hegel saw all men hungering for new Spiritual food, and none to purvey for them. He saw society must collapse without the Spiritual, that men would

die for lack of Truth, and he made the greatest attempt which had been made for eighteen centuries, not only, as we said before, to solve all problems of Philosophy, but to provide new Truths for starving Humanity. This is his claim, not to the glory of a Napoleon, which he has too, but to the higher glory of the spiritual Teacher. He felt his mission in the World to be that of the old Prophets, and his message the same as theirs to men, "Turn ye, turn ye, why will ye die?"—and not less his mission to finish the work of the old Sages, to discover the One in the Many, and to solve the Mystery of Life. To estimate Hegel properly it is, above all, necessary to remember this—that he wished to ground the old Truth deeper, and to furnish new; that no one else had done this; and that men were feeling this above all things needful. This his historical position is forgotten, just as in the case of Napoleon, who tried to do practically, though on a less comprehensive scale, what Hegel tried to do speculatively—to construct anew.

But both Hegel and Napoleon—alike in coming at the end of a great moral and social Revolution, which they felt it their mission to arrest from rushing to chaos—were also alike in this, that they were subject to the weaknesses of mortality and were men in their respective spheres, Spiritual and Material, of unparalleled ambition.

The ambition of Lucifer in Heaven is, perhaps, a

nearer parallel than any to be found in men's records. And here, in the weakness of the men, lay the weakness of the work of both, great as we may estimate that. If there be defects in the system of Hegel, we think it will be found connected with his ambition to be autocrat, original, and unapproached in Philosophy—to stand as the sole Sage on the highest pinnacle of the temple of Philosophy. He brooked no rival as great as himself—just as in the case of Napoleon. His Ambition seems greater than his love of Truth. This, the sublime sin of the Angels—which is so close to virtue—was his and Napoleon's. "By this sin fell the Angels," as Wolsey says, himself another example; and by this fell Napoleon; and by this, as the secret disintegrating element, may fall Hegel's system in its completeness. And we already see the empire he ruled alone divided amongst the German critics, as the empire of Alexander amongst his generals. But if the "big war, which makes ambition virtue," seemed at first to justify this infirmity in Napoleon, the love of Truth and the pursuit of it, which is the first virtue in a thinker, would have consecrated the same quality in Hegel in the bigger Spiritual war in which he was engaged. But we are not sure the love of Truth was put first. Thus though immortal in his work, he was mortal too, yet the weaknesses of his character, like those which appear in his system, are closely allied to greatness.

To the parallel between Hegel and his contemporary, let me add what Schwegeler tells us in his brief biography of Hegel, that he concluded his first great work, "The Phenomenology of the Spirit," on the day of the memorable battle of Jena—abstracted as Archimedes when the Roman soldier slew him over his problems—regarding only his own great work, while the thunder of Napoleon's artillery was to be heard from the field, on the issue of which his country's fate hung suspended.

The last words were written on the day of Napoleon's victory, and left Hegel upon that day a conqueror too. Of the two works accomplished on that evening it is possible that the *Phenomenology of the Spirit* may yet be seen to have been more significant for humanity than the battle of Jena, great as that has since shown itself to have been; as the Professor of Jena may yet appear a greater being than even the Victor of Jena. As born within the same year (Hegel being the senior), and considering the mighty work that each attempted, and the unfaltering way in which each achieved it, we may well say of the two Titans of modern time: "They were two lions littered in one year," but "the elder and more terrible" was Hegel.

NOTE TO THE PRECEDING CHAPTER.

As the chief objection urged by Mansel against Hegel, whom confessedly he did not understand, turns on his supposed Pantheism (which Pantheism yet Hegel rejects, in a passage quoted by Mansel, in his Bampton Lectures), and as Mansel is here the mouth-piece of many, it may be well here to see what it amounts to. It is supposed by him that in Hegel's system the "heir-looms of the human reason," God, Free Will, and Immortality are all abolished; and it is not to be denied that, in the case of some of Hegel's disciples, as Michelet and Feuerbach, this is partly true, for Michelet maintained that the eternity of the Spirit, as such, required the extinction of the individual. And Feuerbach maintained a similar opinion. But against these we must place others, disciples of Hegel, who attempted to demonstrate, on Hegelian principles, the immortality of the individual soul. And against Mansel we must place Hegel's own words: "Is it not the case, that in this Philosophy the Spirit is elevated above all those categories which involve Decease, Destruction, &c., to say nothing of other equally express declarations?" In the face of this and other affirmations of Hegel, quoted by Stirling, who thinks Hegel perfectly sincere in the "hope of immortality," how can Mansel affirm "that a personal immortality, though not openly *denied*, seems excluded by inference, an inference which others have not hesitated to make?" (Bampton Lectures, p. 257.) Is Hegel responsible for the conclusions drawn from his supposed principles, by one class of German critics, when others have drawn just the opposite, and when he himself affirms the opposite?

It must be allowed, indeed, that Philosophers, from Solomon and Socrates to Hegel and Schelling, have succeeded but ill in giving a *positive* proof of the immortality of the Soul, but yet, I am inclined to agree with Stirling, that of any Philosophy which has appeared, the best proof of our immortality can be de-

duced from Hegel's principles, and there is nothing in them against the existence of the individual hereafter, any more than now, in spite of the conclusions which Michelet and Feuerbach have actually drawn from them, and which Mansel thinks they might draw from them. For if the Individual can exist *now*, consistently with being part of the Absolute, it could do so hereafter. If the Many can exist now, and yet be but modes of the One, they could equally be so in any future time. It is therefore necessary to disprove our individual existence now, which would be rather difficult, or to admit such individual existence may be prolonged in future, for anything this Philosophy affirms to the contrary. Even if our sense of individuality here were all explained away, and it were proved we had properly no existence here, save as a manifestation of the Absolute, yet still is it not obvious that this manifestation which is called me, with which I am so closely identified and interested, may have a similar (call it) existence of whatever sort you please, hereafter? It appears to me that even on Pantheistic principles—and Hegel's are not Pantheistic—the objection urged by Mansel (*Metaphysics*, p. 290) would fail. For if I exist now and yet am part of the All, in the same manner I might again. This only proves Pantheism can frame no argument against the existence of the Individual hereafter; and any Pantheistic system which tries to do so is self-destructive, as it is an individual brain which constructs it, and the system which would prove it impossible for the individual to exist in future would equally prove he could not exist at present; but the consciousness and knowledge that we are in some sense individual here refutes the conclusion, and shows that after the same fashion we may exist again.

But indeed Hegel's principles go further, and, I think, ground a positive argument for future and further existence. For we feel that we now exist in some way, and that the essence of our existence is Thought or Reason, which is absolute and immortal, and above Death. It is not in its nature to die, and though it may be said the immortal part is not one but impersonal, yet it

is in some so strange but intimate manner blended with my individuality, with my consciousness, that I seem to share its immortality. The argument of Bishop Butler—that Death, though it destroys the body, and with it the sense, does not affect the intellect—grounded on the fact that progressive diseases leave the power of thought unaffected to the last moment, and strengthened by our Natural belief in the Law of Continuance, approaches to that here indicated from Hegel's principles.

In this system it seems to me, more than in any other, the Soul secure of her existence may “smile at the drawn dagger and defy its point,” for in it more than in any, the Soul, notwithstanding the low yoke-fellow of Sense with which she works, yet in the midst of her meanness knows the greatness of her descent, and finds in herself an assured pledge of immortal prospects. But it is to be added, lest “Divine Philosophy should push beyond her mark, and be procuress to the lords of Hell,” that it is compatible with this her natural immortality, that the Soul may isolate herself from my consciousness in future; and it may be that to have a sense of individuality—a continuation of my existence in future—may require effort of Virtue here, a Virtue too which is prescribed by Reason, and a Reason which may require the renunciation of all that Sense holds most dear in this world, for the sake of the higher ideals.

Here again this system is superior to the refined Epicureanism of Mill's. Virtue must be ready here to renounce, as in the true spirit of Christianity she must renounce, all earthly pleasure of outer and inner sense at the supreme order of Reason. She must be her own reward.

“Beatitudo non est virtutis pretium, sed ipsa virtus.”

Nay, virtue must renounce hope of an Epicurean heaven hereafter. Both the Hegelian Ethics and our hope of immortality, as given in the Hegelian system, in my apprehension of it, are contained in the following great lines of our greatest living poet:—

“Glory of warrior, glory of orator, glory of song,

Paid with a voice flying by, to be lost on an endless sea;

Glory of Virtue to struggle, to suffer, to right the wrong—
 Nay, but she looked not for glory, no lover of glory she,
 Give her the glory of going on and still to be.

“The wages of sin is death: if the wages of Virtue be dust,
 Would she have heart to endure for the life of the worm and the fly?
 She desires no isles of the blest, no quiet seats of the just,
 To rest in a golden grove, or to bask in a summer sky;
 Give her the wages of going on and not to die!”

Nor is Free Will abolished on Hegel's principles, but is rather needed, both as a condition of virtue and of the final consonance of the Reason, (which is divided amongst so many individuals) with itself, while the existence of God is the cardinal verity of the whole system.

I do not profess to adopt all the opinions of Hegel, nor to have as fully fathomed his secret as Dr. Stirling, but having tried to grasp some of his great principles, I have tried to follow them, just as the German critics, to what I consider their consequences, and I do not see that they lead to the destruction of the individual either here or hereafter, as some have thought, and more asserted, without the slightest warrant, like Mansel. If Mansel had fairly grasped Hegel's principles he might have seen they did not necessarily lead to Feuerbach's disbelief in a future existence; but it was easier work, and better suited his purpose, to let others draw the conclusions and then furnish for him his “frightful examples.” Finally, in reference to Feuerbach's Materialism, I think Hegel's just the last Philosophy on which to ground any argument placing man in subjection to his body. For his great superiority over Mill's Idealism consists in this, that the Senses, which are closely connected with the body, are not the sole sphere nor the highest faculty of knowledge. Something, as with Plato, transcending sense, which may perish, independent of the body, which is subject to the degradation of the dust, is the first and last and highest in Man.

It is the influence and importance of this system which render it necessary that it should be fairly represented. And it is

high time that something of this system should be understood in England, preparatory either to accepting or rejecting it in whole or in part.

The English critics of Hegel, with but two distinguished exceptions, Dr. Stirling and Mr. Hodgson, have acted worse than the famous unjust judge, who hanged a man first, and tried him afterwards; for they pass sentence without giving even this chance of reversal of judgment—they do not try him at all.

CHAPTER III.

IDEALISM AND MATERIALISM.

§ 10. *Materialism*.—Besides the Idealistic theories mentioned in the preceding chapter, which agreed in making something mental the sole existence, having Matter for its modes, there is at present in England and in Europe another and an opposed system, which regards Matter as the single and first existence, from which it explains Mind as one of its modes or properties, as heat, electricity, or chemical action; but admittedly a very unique property, since it is self-conscious, while none of the other properties possess this very peculiar feature. In the Idealistic systems, Consciousness as with Berkeley, or Thought as with Hegel, is the one Reality, and binds together and projects its own sensations, thus making them seem external objects. Here objects are made by Mind, and exist by being known. In the Materialistic system Matter is the *prius*, and throws out Mind in the course of ages as an accident attaching itself to its higher and more complex forms, but (and here is the difficult fact for this system to explain) having the quite sin-

gular power of mirroring in itself, and thereby first revealing, all the other forms and powers of Matter as well as itself. In this respect it is confessed, indeed, it differs from any of the other properties of Matter, such as heat in a substance, or vitality in an organism, or even instinct in the lower animals; as it alone is conscious both of itself and of them.

Now Idealism, in any form stated in the preceding chapter, cuts completely at the root of this Materialism, even if its own statement of itself is not self-destructive. For whether we take the Theological Idealism of Berkeley, in which Matter is only the perception of it by the human or divine Mind; the Sense-Idealism of Mill in which it is a "permanent possibility of Sensations;" or the Absolute Idealism of Hegel, in which it is a manifestation of Thought; in all it exists only as far as it is known; the manner in which it becomes accessible to our faculties is its existence. With Berkeley, what is over and above our sensations received from supposed Matter, is the creative and sustaining energy of God, with Hegel the creative energy of Thought, and with Mill a possibility of Sensations. In all it exists only as known, and has no existence as an entity apart from Sensation or Thought. If indeed it could itself think, it might then exist for itself; but it is to be noted, even then its existence would only mean that it translated itself in some way to this faculty of thinking which it is supposed to have, that is, it

exists not as Matter *per se*, but only for Thought. So that in fact Thought is still the *prius* here.

I am not acquainted with any great thinker except Locke who believed in Matter as an entity *per se*, and who yet supposed it might think (see Book IV., Chap. III.); and there is no absurdity in supposing what is called Matter might think; it is no more than supposing lodged under external bodies a faculty which we know is under Man's; but even if there were, it would be no argument for Materialism. It would only mean that Matter which now exists only for our mind or some mind would then exist for its own mind besides, but still would have no other conceivable existence save its apprehension by mind. But we are justified against Locke in maintaining on Berkeley's principles, that not only what is called Matter has no existence save as apprehended by Mind, but also that it has no Mind of its own; since there are no signs of its having existence as an independent mental entity any more than as a material one. If Matter *per se* can exist at all, and can also think, both the Matter is different from all our conceptions of Matter, and the Thought is different from our thought. And if what is called Matter does think, this still is no argument for Materialism (as Cousin thinks, who examines this passage from Locke and pronounces on its material tendency), but is quite as explicable on Idealistic principles—indeed can be explained only on these—

while if Matter has no existence as an independent entity, then one kind of Materialism is effectually destroyed. And this Berkeley accomplished.

§ 11. *The Materialism of the Evolution Hypothesis.*—That Matter as an entity *per se* can exist, and can itself think, or produce thought in me is a wholly unmeaning proposition. But that what we call Matter, without being an entity distinct from Mind, was first, and evolved Thought is not so apparently unmeaning. In fact it is a theory which many scientific men hold, even those who disclaim Materialism in the grosser sense.

Modern Physical Science tries to trace unbroken continuity from protoplasm to Man; from molecular and chemical action up to the energy of the Soul; and this it thinks would be an inductive argument,—while so-called Matter remains constant, and yet its manifestations are so various, from unconscious properties up to and through the instinct of animals, from the first faint perception of the mollusc, by further gradations through the low intelligence of the ape, to the high intelligence of Man only a little lower than the angel—that these are all accidents of the one underlying essence; that all these are manifestations of the one permanent substrate Matter; and that Mind is only the last and most elaborate evolution, the most complete and refined, because a function of the most complex and highly finished form of Matter, the human organism;

which itself sums up, and is an instance of all lower properties, vital, organic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, down to the merely geometrical properties of figure and solidity. This last property of Mind which so-called Matter has assumed (it is allowed) is peculiar, but this is to be expected from analogy. The peculiarity is, that at one point in time Mind flashed into conscious being, and ever since tends to a clearer and more comprehensive consciousness of itself and the world of Matter.

That there is unbroken continuity, even from the lowest to the highest, a conjecture thrown out by Locke so far at least as regards animal life, I think is very likely. It was suggested by analogy to Locke, and was also drawn by Bonnet as a corollary from the well-known Metaphysical principle of Leibnitz, the Law of Continuity. And the evidence for it at present raises the guess to a highly probable hypothesis, which has been worked in our own time very successfully by Mr. Darwin in one department, and Mr. Herbert Spencer in another. Thus the latter maintains, and with reason, that the chasm between chemical action and vegetal life is every day narrowing, that the gap between vegetal and animal life is already quite filled up, as Naturalists have discovered forms which manifest so equally the nature of both that it is impossible to class them under either by preference, and that even to make them a sub-kingdom between is im-

possible, from the same difficulty of knowing where to draw the line of separation, as it "crops up afresh at any assumed places where this intermediate sub-kingdom may be supposed to join the other two."¹ Even where there was supposed to exist an impassible gulf in the break between Man and the lower animals, Mr. Darwin introduces the conception of gradual development, (a conception based on undoubted historical fact, both of Man so long as we have records, and of Nature from signs left to be read by the scientific inquirer), and by this hypothesis bridges the gulf ideally which had been bridged really, till the action of ages had broken it down and hidden it from our view. Not here, as in other cases, does the law of continuity hold now before our eyes in space while showing itself clearer every day. The connecting links do not now exist, but they did exist. And here they were so much harder to find, till the new conception of the chain's being concealed by stretching backwards in time, instead of before us in space, was introduced. Thus the methods and march of Science, chemical, geological, and physiological, have furnished a new argument for Materialism un contemplated by Berkeley, and against which, though his principles may be good in the hands of others, yet any arguments of his own will not tell, as these Materialists do not

¹ "Contemporary Review," June, 1872.

require the conception which Berkeley exploded, of Matter as an entity *per se*. At least the more intelligent of them, like Professor Huxley, disclaim the Materialist hypothesis. And Mr. Herbert Spencer, who more than any other living man has worked out the Evolution Theory in relation to our mental and moral nature, strongly repudiates Materialism, while as strongly maintaining the gradual Development Theory. While defending this doctrine against Mr. Martineau, he quotes from his own writings:—“Hence, though of the two, it seems easier to translate so-called Matter into so-called Spirit than to translate so-called Spirit into so-called Matter (which latter is indeed wholly impossible), yet no translation can carry us beyond our symbols.” And Mr. Mill,* though a professed Berkeleian, defends the

* But if Mr. Mill accepts the views of Mr. Darwin or Mr. Spencer, his Method of inquiring into the Origin of Ideas to ascertain the “pristine purity” of the verdict of Consciousness becomes very imperfect, as it could only lead to the verdict of Consciousness as pronounced by the present generation of men, and so would be relative to it, and not an absolute verdict. The question of the Origin of Ideas would then, in order to ground upon it an absolute and final argument as to the primitive perception of an External World, or of any other important notion now in Consciousness, be carried back to the origin of man—to the origin of animal life—to the origin of Nature—in a word, to the primitive mystery of Creation. And we could neither *now* find an absolute verdict, nor at *first* (unless we shared the Creator’s council), nor at *any intervening time* from the origin of things to our

Darwinian hypothesis (Logic, Vol. II., chap. xiv. on Hypotheses), and nowhere opposes any of the

present developed consciousness, because it is the result of a *continuous change* from unconsciousness to Consciousness, stretching over ages. Another objection (apart from this which turns on the acceptance of the Evolution Hypothesis) to Mr. Mill's Method of commencing with the origin of Ideas, is, that from the child to the man there is an analogous change to that here pointed out. There is a *continuous change* from unconsciousness in the infant, through the first faint dawn of consciousness continuing on to the highly-educated consciousness of the man, and still more developed consciousness of the thinker; now at what point in a continuous change of consciousness can we get a state which we might interrogate for a final utterance? There is no possibility of disputing the fact that Consciousness begins at zero, and grows not *per saltum*, but by insensible degrees; and it is not less certain that all our notions, now marks of definite sensations, were once, like Consciousness itself (from which they came with the assistance of others' teaching), in a germinal state, because thought, and the sensations to which they now refer were then incipient. But if both Consciousness came from zero to its present state, and every concept passed through like stages, and it is impossible for him to dispute either statement, then Mr. Mill's Method of going to the Origin of Ideas breaks down, because impossible. Next, if practicable, it would be useless in Metaphysics. For if there be development (and there undoubtedly is in the race), even if we could get the primitive verdict of Consciousness in the present generation it could not furnish us with an absolute argument either as regards the External World or anything else.

It is in the case of the External World that Mr. Mill particularly applies this method against Hamilton, in order to explain why the belief in it is, as he says, in our present Consciousness, while he thinks it was not there at the beginning. I am

important and really great conclusions (taken isolated, and not as forming a system) of Mr. Spencer.

quite agreed with Mr. Mill and all Berkeleyans that the true meaning of the Externality, in the sense of Exteriority to our bodies, is given by tactual and muscular sensation associated with visual ones; that the former are the first and real meaning, and that, without them, our idea of Distance and Externality would be emptied of all meaning—that if our bodies were fixed like a tree in the ground, and our head, hand, and eye incapable of motion, we would see the word distance had no meaning; and the notion of the Externality of anything to our bodies would never have entered the mind. There would only have been variety of visual perceptions, which could mean nothing but variety of visual perceptions, and by no means, unless by inspiration, or unless one sense, the eye, could also have tactual feelings, could we have any real idea of distance, which begins to get a meaning only after locomotive effort. It *has* a meaning for a blind man, it would have none for a plant supposing it sensitive or intelligent, unless a set of muscular or tactual sensations, which make our meaning of Distance, could be inspired into it while motionless. If perfectly motionless, we would have no idea of Distance, or if we could be at the planet Jupiter by a wish, and without muscular or tactual feelings, we should have none either.

But though I am with Mr. Mill here, I contend that to go to the infant's consciousness to prove there is no idea of an External World (*i. e.* locally external to the body) would only prove what, it is evident, must be the case, that our present idea of it, as compounded of visual and tactual sensations, largely experienced, is different from the child's rude and germinal one. It might also show that the true meaning of Distance and Externality is muscular or tactual, and not visual sensations. But whatever way this question might be settled, the question of an External World, in Berkeley's Idealism, is quite independent of

It seems to me that when these thinkers disclaim Materialism, it is only the gross and unintelligible Materialism against which Berkeley directed his shafts, and which he finally disposed of, that they repudiate. It is a mere question of naming, whether this theory shall be called Materialism or not. It is not the Spiritualism of Berkeley, which affirms Conscious Spirit is, was, and must ever continue to be the universe. It is not the Absolute Idealism of Hegel, which affirms Thought is the sole as well as the first Existence. His objection to any such sys-

its settlement. For whether the eye or the touch gives us Externality (in the sense of locality), it is still also Internality with Berkeley, as neither visual nor tactual perceptions, which together make up for us so much of the External world, can exist *outside*, that is, *separate from*, a mind. This is the answer to all, including Mr. Abbott, who think to refute Berkeley, by trying to refute his Theory of Vision.

But we cannot with Mr. Mill allow the argument of Berkeley, which is absolute and *a priori*, to turn on one so precarious and *a posteriori*, as could be got from inquiry into the origin of Ideas, which, as above shown, cannot be absolute; and we cannot for a moment allow Idealism to turn on such a controversy as whether the eye *reveals*, or the touch together with muscular feelings, *gives* the meaning of Distance (though I have not the slightest doubt of the substantial truth of Berkeley's views). Berkeley's Idealism is so comprehensive that either solution leaves it undisturbed. Let sight give Distance, still visual sensation never yet existed to our experience wholly separated from the perceptive power. If it can, and if we are shown how, then, and then only, Berkeley is refuted.

tem is, that it "is a mere *after one another in time* ; but there is no necessity, no thought, no notion in it." We will grant the Evolution Hypothesis proved as a Scientific Theory, but as a Metaphysical Theory it explains nothing. It does not explain why the successions and evolutions were so rather than otherwise, but only says that they are so. Hegel and Berkeley try to explain ; with the former the sole existence Thought, and what we know, because it is in us as reason, must have been at the commencing, and the universe is all a necessary development from it. The first cause is not unknown, it is Thought, which is the one existence now. That it should possess a principle of development is also known ; it possesses such now, as appears on looking at it in the African and European, and not less too, in the stages from the infant to the man. And that even once Thought should have been unconscious and afterwards become conscious, is not unprovable. Here we possess a principle of development presented in Thought, and one which we see in us, not one outside us as the Evolution Theory merely states, while failing to explain. The *prius* is given to us ; we know it because it is in us ; it possesses a principle of development because we see this also ; and it was once unconscious and yet could develop into consciousness, as we see still. Now, here is attempt at explanation and justification in Hegel's system ; I will not say that it is complete,

because in one respect I think Berkeley's better, but it tries to give an explanation, and it is a very great attempt, while Evolution is no Metaphysical explanation at all. Without some principle or conception introduced to explain the *why rather than otherwise*, the result is all blind chance and contingency. Berkeley sees also the necessity of assuming some principle, and he, like Hegel, reasons from a Spirit which we feel we possess, to an outside but superior Spirit, which must have originated the entire Cosmos, as it still sustains it. With both, Mind is and was the universe, but with Hegel it was at first unconscious, with Berkeley conscious.

Berkeley, in placing Conscious Spirit first, seems to me to reason, if not more deeply, yet more strictly from analogy than Hegel, as it is the only thing we really know, with Berkeley and even with Hegel, to be causative. But the conclusion common to both is, that Thought was at first, as it is now, the one principle from which all differentiation of form and successive development of being have proceeded and shall proceed. And here I agree with both and with Bacon, who affirms, "I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal Frame is without a Mind." And Bacon's argument (which is also Hegel's and Berkeley's), against Democritus and Epicurus, holds to-day against their modern representatives. "For it is a thousand times more

credible that four Mutable Elements and one immutable fifth Essence, duly and eternally placed, need no God, than that an army of infinite small portions, or seeds unplaced should have produced this order without a Divine Marshal." His objection to the seeds producing the order without a mind is the objection to Professor Huxley's derivation of the universe, including Thought, from protoplasmic germs, themselves anteceded by chemical combination ("Fortnightly Review," February, 1869), unless with Berkeley a Spirit be first, to make the germs by his plan and perception of them; or with Hegel, there be an inner necessity of development in pure Thought, which was the essence of the Absolute, before the creation of the world.

Let me state here, lest there be any misapprehension, that this Materialism which yet accepts Berkeley's view, that matter is merely phenomenal, is held to be a Metaphysical explanation by only some scientific men. With Mr. Spencer, although he has worked the Evolution Hypothesis to explain our mental and moral aptitudes, it is still only a Scientific theory, not a Metaphysical one. It serves to explain some of our apparently *a priori* beliefs, and some of our moral principles, and throws light both upon Psychology and Ethics, but is not offered as an explanation of thought and of things, as it is with others and appears to be with Professor Huxley. Mr. Spencer is a deep and original thinker, and sees

it is not an explanation of the mystery of being, which he gives up as hopeless for men, though only after trying to prove it hopeless. Now, this is a consistent theory though a negative one, and is ably maintained by this profound thinker. It was also the conclusion which Kant came to, though he recovered the supersensual world, our connexion with which he had destroyed speculatively, through the practical Reason, and showed also that through the Moral law we stand in important relations to this super-sensual world. Mr. Spencer appears more consistent than Kant in his views of the incompetence of our faculties to penetrate the world beyond consciousness, for after showing we cannot fathom it he makes no further attempt to reach it in any way. He says in a brief but powerful article, (before alluded to) in the "Contemporary Review," "Speaking for myself only, I may say that, agreeing entirely with Mr. Martineau in repudiating the materialistic interpretation as utterly futile, I differ from him simply in this, that while he says he has found another interpretation, I confess that I cannot find any interpretation; while he holds that he can understand the Power which is manifested in things, I feel obliged to admit, after many failures, that I cannot understand it. So that, in presence of the transcendent problem which the universe presents, Mr. Martineau regards the human intellect as capable, and I as incapable." And finally he says, "the Ultimate Power

is no more representable in terms of human consciousness than human consciousness is representable in terms of a plant's functions."

§ 12. *Mr. Spencer's Negative Realism.*—I recognise in the opinion, as above expressed, of Mr. Spencer, a great and profound though only a negative view of all Metaphysics. I do not share this view, but it is really the only one to oppose to Hegel or Berkeley, who both think the human intellect competent to the "transcendent problem" of the universe. The question really is between this the view of Mr. Spencer, which was also Kant's, and what is common in the opinions of Berkeley and Hegel—or perhaps rather the view of Hegel only, as he alone goes to the extreme length of affirming that there is no mystery raised by Reason which she cannot solve, and no mystery beyond her which she cannot know, since complete inaccessibility to Reason condemns it to annihilation. *The* question of Philosophy lies between Hegel's and Mr. Spencer's views, unless we allow of an intermediate opinion, which would affirm that though we have not now Absolute knowledge, yet we are not for ever condemned to ignorance, but that the gradual development of Reason, which is a vital point in the belief of both, may by-and-by give us fuller light.

This view of Mr. Spencer is held by all Philosophers who do not believe in the possibility of a Philosophy of the Absolute, either now or at any future

time in the progress of our species. It is the prevailing opinion since Locke, powerfully insisted on by Kant, who thought the Speculative Reason incompetent to reach the supersensuous World, the existence of which he yet believed in, and our connexion with which he recovered by the Practical Reason. This opinion of Mr. Spencer's is held by him both ably and consistently, whose Metaphysics here stops, as at "the utmost butt and sea-mark of her sail." This Theory believes in existence beyond reason's flight; in "thoughts beyond the reaches of our souls," with the Hamlet of Shakespeare;

"That we can nothing, nothing know,"

the consuming thought to the Faust of Goethe. It accepts that the mystery must ever remain unsolved, that the Isis veil which Nature has dropped over her features can never be raised—that the "all-comprehending idea," which "she broods over for ever," is truly for us past all finding out.

But this view of Mr. Spencer's is not the Scepticism which affirms that all solutions are alike vain, and that even the negative solution, that says there is no solution cannot be trusted, and that the true philosophical attitude to all such questions is suspense of judgment. To this Pyrrhonism there is an answer. But this theory is not the Scepticism of Pyrrho. Nor is it even the Positivism of Comte or Hume, it thinks we can *prove* that something, *not* Matter *nor*

Mind, is the "Power manifested in things," but what it is we cannot now nor ever know. It declares the "antithesis of subject and object never to be transcended while consciousness lasts, renders impossible all knowledge of that Ultimate Reality in which subject and object are united." (Principles of Psychology.)

Now, against the gross Materialism of Berkeley's day his arguments were completely triumphant. Berkeley truly remarked of Matter, "Without it your Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence, but become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world." His effectual destruction of Matter destroyed the gross Materialism, which made something inert and unintelligent existing apart from all mind, the Cause of things and Professor Huxley disavows it; against the more refined Materialism which makes so-called Matter—a merely phenomenal Matter—the *prius*, Idealism generally is decisive, and Mr. Spencer disavows it; but to his own theory, which is *not* Materialism and *not* Idealism, and which affirms something we cannot know what, but neither Matter nor Mind, is the "Power manifested in things," I confess the powers of Idealism will be taxed to the utmost to give an answer. It will try all the might of Philosophy; and her very existence in the positive sense is staked on her competence to give an answer. If Mr. Spencer is right, Philosophy in the higher sense is

impossible, and we had better abandon the problems as waste of labour. And he tries to prove their insolubility, so long as men are subject to conditions of consciousness.

I confess it is not easy to give a complete answer to this theory from the principles of Berkeley. For Berkeley should prove not only that a conscious Spirit like ours is exterior to ours, but that nothing but conscious Spirit is. Not only that "Consciousness is the deepest thing in the universe," in the language (not the thought) of Professor Fraser, but that it is both widest and deepest; that it embraces the universe, and there can be nothing outside it. Now, with Mr. Spencer there is existence beyond Consciousness, and even with Hegel. Berkeley, it is true, has the advantage here over all who differ from him, in being the more strict analogical, if not more inductive, reasoner. He reasons from the only power he knows to one resembling it, and he also admits it may be a superior and infinite Spirit; so that, perhaps, here he may allow for existence deeper than Consciousness, as well as more modes of Consciousness than we have; but yet he does not seem to have escaped from that Anthropomorphism which follows, like their shadow, the highest flight of all Philosophers; and which hardly allowed him to conceive of any mind or intelligence detached from Consciousness, or of the working of any thought save what appears in Consciousness.

Berkeley can show that the grosser Materialism is absurd; that the more refined Materialism of to-day is no explanation whatever, unless it falls back on Idealistic principles, by introducing some conception to give necessity of Reason to the successive and orderly developments of time, and the endless and harmonized co-existences in space; he can also, against either the English form of Realism, whether the representative of Brown or the more unphilosophical Natural Realism of Hamilton, triumphantly hold his own theory, which resolves our conception of the External World and its Reality, Causality and Substantiality, into sensations and their relations; but against the theory which affirms that something deeper than Consciousness, and different from Mind, was the originating cause, and is still the "power manifested in things," Berkeley's, which affirms that the Universe is made up of two Consciousnesses, our own and one similar though grander, will, I think, unless Consciousness is widened, be very difficult to establish. To disprove the existence of Matter, and prove the existence of a Mind like ours is not a sufficient answer to this view—much more must be proved. He should show, in the opinion of Mr. Spencer, not only that Matter, *one* thing supposed different from Mind, has no existence, but that *no one thing* out of innumerable possible things exists different from Mind, and that mind like ours; which is the kind of exhaustive negative it is so difficult to prove.

In holding that Consciousness in some form equals the Universe, Berkeley stands opposed to all Philosophers, and so his position is difficult to sustain. He is opposed to Spinoza, in whose system the one Substance had myriads of attributes, which could expand into myriads of existences inconceivable to man, to whom it only translated itself under two modes or forms, Thought and Extension. He is opposed to Locke, his master, who thought man might be the lowest of intellectual Creatures, and that, "to reduce all to the narrow measure of our capacities is to make our comprehension infinite or God finite, when what He can do is limited to what we can conceive it;" to Mill his follower, who thinks there may be modes of being beyond our Consciousness and Knowledge, without however needing lodgment in any other Consciousness; to Spencer, who thinks that there is manifested in the Universe an Ultimate Reality, not expressible in terms of our Consciousness; even to religious Philosophers like Mansel, who consider the mind of the Deity can never be known to be like the human, nor His Consciousness subject, like ours, to those forms and limitations, without which Consciousness is inconceivable to us. He differs also from Kant, and even from Hegel, in maintaining Consciousness equals the Universe, for Hegel maintains not Consciousness, but Thought to equal all Existence; while he gives a proved expansiveness to Thought beyond Consciousness, which

enables him to meet the difficulties which the views of all these other thinkers present to Berkeley's views. So that Berkeley, in fine, would have to prove explicitly the proposition so often implied, that the inconceivable is non-existent; and the inconceivable with Berkeley means what cannot be brought into conscious representation. This proposition cannot be held by any consistently but by a Hegelian, with whom Thought is widened beyond Consciousness to include all Existence.

To Hegel's system then we must look for a more complete answer to the views of Mr. Spencer, if even there it can be had. In that system of Absolute Idealism no real thing can exist beyond the pale of Knowledge; not even a mystery unfathomable, as with Mr. Spencer, for the mystery, so far as unpenetrated by ray of Reason, is by hypothesis unknown—and then how do we even know it exists? It is precisely for Knowledge as if it did not exist. Here is a case where being and non-being are the same. Therefore we may affirm the mystery does not exist if utterly unknown. On the other hand, as far as known it is not a mystery, but reduced to subjection of Reason. The Empire of Thought comprehends all Existence, for all beyond it (using the word the thought to include the most advanced Reason, and granting, as Hegel proves, Thought wider than Consciousness) is as being unknown non-existent for her, and can only become existent by the further advance of

Thought itself. Mr. Spencer is a Realist, and can allow a mystery to exist, and many other existences too, deeper than plummet of Thought ever sounded ; but Hegel, as an Absolute Idealist, cannot, and he alone can oppose a consistent theory to that of Mr. Spencer. There is still the weakness in Hegel's system, that he has not proved the Philosopher's Thought the highest, and if not, there may be existences outside, though if they are never known in any way by him they are same as non-existent.¹ And, according to the views of eminent critics, there must be understood an extension of Thought to include purpose or Will as well as Reason. Thought and then

¹ This may be true for the Earth and for to-day, but there are infinite stars in Space, and Time is eternal. What we know on Earth to-day may be all that is knowable, but how can we be sure the eyes of the Absolute are clearest in conscious man on the Earth ? And when we leave the Earth there is an ocean of Time to be entered, where a possible unfathomed may be actual ; where a purpose we must passively front is all-powerful. Hegel's answer would be, that the Absolute is superior to Space and Time, and Will is but an aspect of the Absolute. Space and Time are but forms of the Reason, which yet she can see cannot be superior to her, or control her as Absolute. Space in the case of External things, and Time in the case of everything but herself, govern her thoughts, yet the Absolute must be conceived as both timeless and spaceless, but *not* purposeless.

But its *nisus* towards a purpose through History seems to leave Will and Time unmerged in the Absolute, for "Process of development" the essential feature of the Absolute implies both Will and Time. (See also Hodgson's Space and Time, p. 373.)

Will are, no doubt, inseparable in us, but were they always so in Nature? Though inseparable, yet are they not distinct? Might not then the purpose have been first without the Thought? Or does not the mystery, apparently slain by Thought, revive the day I die, where a powerful purpose, as yet not fathomed, seems to dispose of Thought and Will, as far as I am concerned. The answer to this opinion of Schopenhauer (with whom individuality as with the Buddhists is an accident and an error, though Existence is necessary,) is the answer to objections to the existence of the individual hereafter, on Hegel's principles, which was attempted before, (note, ch. ii.)

But without further attempt to meet the view of Spencer from the *systems* of Berkeley or Hegel, I will only say here, that on Hegel's *principle* (which is also in part Mr. Spencer's own), of developing Reason, if Philosophy is now unable to solve all difficulties, she may have higher hopes in future; and, meantime, we are urged by Nature to try. The effort may bring us nearer to the solution. It may be Nature's way of teaching us (which, on Idealistic principles, is Reason's.) A fuller examination of the theory of Mr. Spencer, which affirms we can never know, would lead into a consideration of Philosophical Scepticism, which I reserve for an Essay to follow this.¹

¹ Elsewhere Mr. Spencer grants an extension of our Knowledge, so far beyond what Mr. Mill considers its legitimate

In this chapter I have exposed where Berkeley is perhaps weakest, though even there he is original. In the next I shall attempt the easier and more agreeable task of showing where he is both great and strong, and original, in opposition to his numerous critics.

§ 13. *Spirit of the Scotch Metaphysics*.—It is the more necessary to do so, because Metaphysical speculation in these countries seems still in so low a state as to stand astonished, even yet, at Berkeley's disproof of Matter, and cannot see his conception of an External World, by any effort of imagination (as the numerous refutations show, including the very latest, from an advocate of Natural Realism. See No. 272, "*Edinburgh Review*.") So little progress has been made, that thought and energy are still wasted on this futile and wholly fruitless work of attempting to refute him. Fortunately, the complete, the absolute futility of all such attempts, and even of all future attempts,

sphere, as greatly to excite his surprise. Mr. Spencer widens the empire of knowledge far beyond Mr. Mill, but as the sphere of the possible is infinite, and may be actual, though not for us according to Mr. Spencer, he is still far from granting Hegel's theory of Absolute Knowledge, or Berkeley's theory of a Consciousness equal to existence. But he grants we may have an experience of something outside Consciousness; a most important step in the direction of Hegel. *Fortnightly Review*, (Vol. I., pp. 521-550.)

can be shown beforehand, by clearly showing what he did mean. It will then appear, that for every proposition in the Realist Hypothesis, there is a parallel one, as Mill says, on the Berkeleian; the difference between the two being merely that one supposes an unknown quantity called Matter referred to in every word expressive of objects, while the other makes no reference to this entity, which is non-existent, because contradictory, for it. The unknown quantity, in Mathematical language, is running under all the assertions of the one; it is eliminated completely in the other, and no difference appears.¹ “*Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem*,” is a maxim on the side of Berkeley; and every fact of the External Universe, that men can assign a meaning to, is explained on Berkeley’s hypothesis, as well as on the other, and by a simpler means. I believe all the ingenuity of man cannot escape from the complete, comprehensive and happily very concise arguments of Berkeley, in disproof of Matter as an entity *per se*; and that his conception of an External World, as made up of sen-

¹ There is another difference, but in Berkeley’s favour. He thinks things would be dissolved by the dissolution of all consciousness. The Realism of Hamilton thinks they would remain, standing apart from all mind. This is Platonic Realism, by no means yet extinct in Philosophy, but Hamilton professes Nominalism like Berkeley, and tries to reconcile it with Conceptualism.

sations, when supplemented by the emendations contained in his principles, and made since by Mill and Professor Fraser, is equally unassailable.

That Philosophy, so late, has to defend Berkeley, is greatly owing to the influence which the Scotch Philosophy has had for half a century, by which it was able not only to misrepresent him, but also to prevent men from seeing the true sequence to the original and fruitful speculations of him and Hume, to be the thoughts of Kant and Hegel.

The whole Scotch School I consider an irrelevant parenthesis in the higher Philosophy¹ (though it has done good service for Psychology), interposing between these really great and European thinkers, Berkeley and Hume, and their true successors, Kant and the later Germans. It was a side current in thought, insular, and not fruitful. In Philosophy, as distinct from Psychology, all its utterances, with perhaps the exception of those of Brown, are away from the questions Philosophy is deeply bent on answering, and are often in the case of the late Master "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." This is not so much from want of ability

¹ When I say the Scotch School, I do not include two great Scotch thinkers, Smith and Hume, who are immortal for ever by their thoughts which widened the horizon of Humanity in its mental, moral, and social out-look (and this the more important side), as much as ever Newton did on the physical side by his deductions and discoveries in Astronomy and Optics.

in the leaders, as from the small spirit which animated the movement, as compared with the parallel one in Germany. They never rose to the "height of the great argument" of which the whole new movement in Philosophy was a part, as Kant, Fichte, and Hegel did, who saw the gravity of the crisis in the history of the human mind which had come, when men wanted deeper-grounded Ethical as well as Metaphysical principles. Hence, spite of the eminence of the men, and the high intellect of the Scotch nation of which it was a growth, Natural Realism as a Philosophy, was destined to fail. Nor will its eclectic and conciliatory spirit help to arrest, but rather will hasten its dissolution. This spirit is out of place, when men need new Metaphysics, but rather will spoil alike what is good in the old and what is promising in the new.

For the true view of Philosophy is, that it is one by progression, as a man is by growth from childhood; and so to piece old and new thoughts together into a patchwork Philosophy, and try to give it a unity and organic wholeness which is not from growth like that seen in the History of Philosophy, or even in the growth of the individual's own mind, will be found to be an impossible thing.

There could be as little unity in such, as in a poem made up of extracts from various sources, and as little consonance or sympathy between the different parts, as in the thoughts and feelings of the

man and the child, if put together as a system to guide our future conduct. Accordingly, Natural Realism, a compound of Platonism, Berkeleianism, Kantism, and Cosmothetic Idealism, is destined, from want of inherent principle of life, to dissolve into the more fruitful elements from which it was combined.

The Scotch Metaphysics was of home manufacture, and though an inferior article, yet, its makers had sufficient influence at home to keep the importation of the superior foreign article from Germany away. But "protection" for Native Philosophy to support the home manufacture, was as disastrous here as it has been proved to be in the other cases of "Protection for Native Industry." Happily now Free Trade is understood to be of importance, as well in the spiritual as commercial world, while of incalculably greater consequence in the former case than in the latter; and the most important importation from Germany for a long time will be her thoughts, and chiefly those of Kant and Hegel. A good sign of revived interest in speculation at home is the increased interest in Berkeley's Philosophy, and Idealism generally. There are now, as the sceptre has fallen from the old and paralysed hand of the Scotch Philosophy, great signs of growing vitality in the young and already vigorous English Philosophy, as is shown in the writings of Mill, Spencer, Hodgson, and Stirling, but in nothing more sig-

nificantly than in the new and closer consideration which is given to all Berkeley's, and I may add Hume's, speculations.

It seems in these countries, Philosophy is, at last, inclined to grant Berkeley's case a careful hearing, and is resolved to have the points between his Philosophy and the opposed systems of Realism brought to an issue. For these reasons, I devote the next Chapter to defending Berkeley's positive doctrines, including his disproof of Matter, and his conception of an External World, against his most conspicuous adverse critics.

CHAPTER IV.

BERKELEY AND HIS CRITICS.

§ 14. *Berkeley's Originality in the estimate of the Scotch Metaphysicians.*—Idealism, in the form held by Berkeley, which absorbs the External World into modes of Consciousness, is a modern conception. Hamilton indeed in his Lectures quotes a passage approvingly, in which the existence of Schools of Idealism in antiquity is affirmed, as the Eleatic and Platonic. But these were not Idealistic in Berkeley's sense. Plato does certainly with Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel, regard the material world as one of appearance; but then this external, as well as our spiritual world, was to Plato a coarse and imperfect copy of a far more magnificent real world behind, the great and true World of Ideas, for the contemplation of which only the minds of the Gods were suited. And this was never the sense of Berkeley, and could not be, without destroying all his Philosophy (though Professor Fraser thinks he was approaching it in the *Siris*). He did not believe in the independent existence of ideas apart from mind, which is Plato's Realism; nor even the modified doc-

trine of their independent existence *in* mind, as abstract ideas apart from a particular perception, which is Locke's Conceptualism. He believed that no idea could exist save in and by the perception of it; and also that nothing could exist detached from mind; the first of these propositions constituting Berkeley's Nominalism, and the second his Idealism; the two doctrines with him being necessarily connected and mutually correlative.¹

Thus the direct antithesis of Berkeley's Philosophy is Platonism. No single Philosopher stands so prominently opposed to Plato as Berkeley, and two out of three of his original doctrines are directed precisely against him. It is from a not uncommon confusion of two senses of the word Idealism, or rather two applications of it, that Plato and Berkeley are classed together. That Idealism is a modern conception Hamilton elsewhere admits, but he nowhere points out the ambiguity in the same word when applied to such different thinkers as these two.

¹ Berkeley also recognised the other leading principle of Nominalism, that the object of Thought may be a symbol with the particular thing (or perception) it stands for forgotten for the moment, and thus that we may carry on a train of thinking in this symbolical manner, without reference to the special intuition to which the symbols relate until the process is completed. (See *Minute Philosopher*, Dialogue VII.) That we reason by symbols is consistent with his principle, that nothing exists save in perception of it; for the symbol itself so exists.

The ambiguity is this, that the name Idealist means sometimes with us, and nearly always with the Germans and French, one who recognises in Understanding or Reason a higher faculty of knowledge than Sensibility ; while again mostly with us, and occasionally with foreign thinkers, the word merely means one who denies Matter as an entity *per se*, or who tries to explain the world from sensations. In the first sense which subordinates sense to intellect as the source of higher and sometimes sense-transcending knowledge, Plato might be called an Idealist, as also Leibnitz, Des Cartes, and Kant. Hegel is the most consistent as he is the Absolute Idealist in this sense. In this sense Idealism is opposed to Sensationalism, and in this sense Berkeley seems sometimes an Idealist and sometimes not. In his Commonplace Book there are expressions very close to Hume's views, but again the independency he assigns to spirit, and the existence of a faculty which rises to the conception of a Spirit beyond sense, whose existence he tries to demonstrate by this faculty, seem to be opposed to Sensationalism. It is with this sense of Idealism in his mind that Kuno Fischer (in his work on Bacon's Life and Writings) calls Berkeley "no Idealist but a complete Realist,"¹ meaning Sensationalist.

¹ This writer uses the word Idealism in these two senses, but without giving any hint of the ambiguity, in his commentary on

This ambiguity in the word Idealism has caused much unnoticed confusion in the thoughts even of those who are not unaware of it, and I am inclined to think Hamilton must have been under its influence when he quotes in his Lectures, and lets pass without note or comment, the application of the word Idealist to Plato. For Plato is a Realist and Berkeley an Idealist, in the English application of the words, although Kuno Fischer would just reverse the application of these terms.

Hamilton may, indeed, here be confusing or letting slide into each other the two meanings of Idealism, as he is assuredly wrong in opposing Idealism to Materialism, on the principle that in one

Kant; and even in two successive pages (see Mahaffy's Translation, pp. 130-132), we have the totally different Idealism of Spinoza and Leibnitz on the one hand, and of Berkeley on the other, without any explanation afforded us of their difference, or any reference to the totally different principles which discriminate and divide each of these two kinds of Idealism from the systems opposed to them, and which may separate them as much from each other, as we see in the case of the two conspicuous examples of Mill's Sensational Idealism, and Hegel's Absolute Idealism. Cousin also uses the word in two senses without any comment, as he opposes Idealism to Empiricism, on the principle that the former makes Reason, the latter experience, the important factor in knowledge, while elsewhere he speaks of Berkeley's Idealism—a very different sort of Idealism—and not distinguished by any such principle, as it may be Empiricism as well as Idealism.

the object is educed from the subject, in the other the subject from the object, since (as understood generally in these countries, and even by himself in one passage) Idealism and Materialism may be combined, and Hobbes is adduced by him as an example of the combination,¹ yet he accurately

¹ As a further instance of the confusion reigning in Hamilton's mind between the two sorts of Idealism, and the want of any true principle of distinction between Idealism and Materialism, see his remarks in his Lectures (vol. I., p. 297), where he accounts for the alleged fact that a "Philosophical System is often prevented from falling into Absolute Idealism or Absolute Materialism, and held in a kind of vacillating equilibrium, not in consequence of being based on the fact of Consciousness, but from the circumstance that its Materialistic tendency in one direction happens to be counteracted by its Idealistic tendency in another." On this ground he thinks one may explain why the Philosophy of Locke and Condillac did not more easily slide into Materialism. He then states a different principle from that announced in the text, by which to mark a Materialistic system, "deriving" he says, "our whole knowledge mediately or immediately from the senses, this Philosophy seems to be fairly analysed into a scheme of Materialism," and the further reason why it did not pass into Materialism was because it also held the doctrine of a representative perception. Now, here the principle of Materialism is derivation of knowledge from the senses; before, it was evolution of the subject from the object; but these are two different principles of distinction, as the senses are not *object* in his opinion (nor in any sound view), but *subject*. Further if evolution of knowledge immediately or ultimately from the senses be Materialism then it is a question if Berkeley and Mill are not Materialists, though he himself calls

notices elsewhere the fact, that it was reserved for Berkeley (and he adds Collier) to articulately announce Idealism. (Discussions, p. 198). He is wrong indeed here, and shows his want of acquaintance with German thinking, in styling Berkeley an Absolute Idealist, which is a very inaccurate word for Berkeley's system, as it applies to no Idealistic system but Hegel's, and the qualifying word is well understood to be appropriated to Hegel's system both on the Continent and here. He simply spoils all the significance of the word Absolute when qualifying Berkeley's Idealism by it instead of Hegel's.

Berkeley an Idealist, and also calls Hobbes a Material-Idealist. How then can Materialism and Idealism be the two antithetic schemes as he affirms, if both may be united; and if they be united, must not *both* subject be educed from object, and object from subject, on his principles? The fact is, the Idealism here opposed to Materialism is the Idealism of the Germans—of Leibnitz and Hegel, which makes a higher faculty than the senses the source of knowledge. It is not and could not possibly be Berkeley's Idealism which resolves the External World into our Sensations, and which did take its departure from Locke's supposed principle, that the senses external and internal are the sources of our knowledge. It is perhaps the fact that Berkeley did extend Locke's supposed principles to all knowledge; if so, Hamilton should then style him a Materialist by his second mode of marking a Materialist, and not a Materialist by his first. Again he has never told us that there are two kinds of Idealists. I believe he never saw the fact, and his own principle of distinguishing Idealism as he conceived it from Materialism, as I have here shown, is full of confusion.

The usual and proper word to characterise Berkeley's Idealism is *Subjective* or *Theological*.

Hamilton then is right in conceding to Berkeley the honour of being the first to announce Idealism to the world; though he thinks to take away much of Berkeley's credit as an original speculator by insinuating, as regards his Idealism, that in fact all the principal arguments in support of such a scheme are found fully developed in Malebranche's immortal *Inquiry after Truth*. "This," he says, "Malebranche well knew, and knowing it we can easily understand how Berkeley's interview with him ended as it did" (Discussions, Article on Idealism, pp. 200-202). Hamilton and the Scotch School in general have been very assiduous in finding anticipations of every great thinker generally, and it would seem for the purpose of robbing them of the credit of being original. Thus Stewart derided Kant, and discovered to his own satisfaction anticipations of him in Cudworth; and of Fichte and Schelling, in "those gross conceptions of the infancy of human Reason," &c. (Dissertations, Second Part, sec. 7). He also found anticipations of Berkeley in Malebranche, as Reid found them in Locke, though Reid omits to show the passages really pregnant with suggestions. So Hamilton finds every thinker anticipated, and his voluminous writings are, both in the notes and text, one long attempt at this sort of work. It seems not only was Berkeley anticipated by Malebranche (and

possibly Malebranche by "many of the older Catholic divines"), but Kant was by Leibnitz, and even Hegel, wrong as he is, by Cardinal Cusa and Jacob Böhme. He will not even allow to Hegel the merit of perverse originality,—originality even in error. "To Cusa he says we can indeed articulately trace word and thing, the recent Philosophy of the Absolute." (Discussions, 539). And it seems as if this habit has not yet ceased. For in the number of the "Edinburgh Review" for July, 1872, we have the last refutation of Berkeley's Philosophy by an adherent of the Hamiltonian Philosophy, ascribing (here departing from his master) all that was good in Berkeley's thoughts to Des Cartes and Locke, and the rest, which was merely fallacious, to Berkeley himself.¹

¹ The writer alluded to tries to take all credit from Berkeley as an original, or even as a logical thinker. He affirms that Berkeley got all his principles either from Des Cartes or Locke, and then reasoned fallaciously from them. Thus Berkeley's disproof of Matter is this very common fallacy, "Thought is Existence, Matter is not Thought; therefore Matter has no Existence." (p. 19.) Also, Berkeley's "Polemic against Abstract Ideas" is, he says, "one of the most curious blunders, one of the most serious, elaborate, and fervid illustrations of the *ignoratio elenchi* to be found in the history of Philosophy." (p. 23.) And so Berkeley is disposed of.

The flippant attempt made here to do so easily what Kant made so elaborate an attempt, but without decisive success, to effect by his proof that space is a form of Sensibility (the only clearly

Now, what does all this industrious grubbing (of the fashion of Wagner in "Faust") for anticipations come to? To little in their hands, though it manifests an important truth, which they did not see, nor any one fully, till pointed out by Hegel, namely, that Philosophy in full fruit of to-day must have grown from seeds; that to-day the human Intellect, as shown best in Philosophy, stands as the development, the last result of the Intellect of the past; that all great truths appeared first in a rude and germinal form, and became gradually clarified from their first confused perception; but then, when cleared from confusion, the conceptions no longer look back, as this Scotch Philosophy is striving to force them, but look

opposed view to Berkeley's, while yet Idealistic), is paralleled by the presumption which seeks thus to reverse the verdict of History, spoken through great thinkers; or the small spirit which attempts to take "what not enriches it," the best reward of a great one, his revered and illustrious memory in the eyes of posterity.

And the competence of this critic to do what has so often been attempted in vain by great thinkers—to refute Berkeley—may be judged by his own very significant admission, that he does not understand what Berkeley means by saying sensible bodies are *in* the mind. See pp. 44-45, where every sentence shows he knows nothing whatever of Berkeley's system. To say sensible bodies are *in* the mind he confesses is "a not very intelligible phrase." And he goes on to show that he quite misunderstands this phrase, which every one who knows anything of Berkeley understands quite well.

forward, and become the means and steps themselves of leading to further clearness and purification of the vision of Reason.

§ 15. *Idealism latent in Des Cartes, Locke, and Malebranche.*—Let us grant then that Berkeley was partly anticipated. This is no diminution of his glory. It is only a new example of Hamilton's law that we cannot consider anything standing unrelated to any preceding antecedent. Berkeley's thoughts had antecedents; but his glory consists in the consequent conceptions, and further fruit, which he and others have since evolved from the antecedents.

And Des Cartes, Locke, and Malebranche were his predecessors, to whom he was indebted. A short notice of his debt may show more clearly what he took, as well as what he added.

Des Cartes, indeed, doubted the existence of Matter, and an External World; yet he ended by believing it, as he thought we had implanted or insinuated into our minds an instinctive conviction of the existence of an External World. And he, more than any other philosopher, on account of his belief in the existence of innate ideas, was bound to believe in the existence of an External World, as it seemed to him otherwise that the Deity had insinuated into our minds delusion from our cradle, and made us for ever the children of error by sowing its seed from the first, and before the dawn of Consciousness and Memory. The innate ideas all seemed

to pledge objective existences, the innate idea of a "perfect being" to pledge the existence of God, and of Matter to pledge an External World. But then a faculty of Intellect suggested a doubt of its existence; and here was a grave dilemma for the entire Reason, which he could solve in no way but by believing the Instinct in preference to the Reason, lest otherwise we should have an example of the Deity deceiving us. True, it was not a satisfactory solution; but it is pretty much Hamilton's own mode of resolution of a similar difficulty, when he affirms that we must trust Consciousness in what she seems to say, or else "the root of our nature would be a lie."

Locke also doubted, like Des Cartes, though not so clearly as the latter, and his solution is, perhaps, even more unsatisfactory than the Cartesian one. In the Second Book of his Essay, Locke frequently affirms that we have no clear idea of Substance, and in one passage (Book I., ch. iv.) he says, the idea of Substance is one "which we neither have, nor can have, by sensation or reflection." The affirmation that we have no clear idea of Substance, so often repeated by Locke in Book II., chap. xxiii., shows how strongly, but confusedly, Berkeley's thought was working in the mind of Locke, so great and original, but not always clear or consistent. Berkeley took up his thought, and simplified it into this: we have no idea of Material Substance at all, be-

cause there is indeed no such thing, no such support of attributes existing outside the mind, but only one inside mind, and the only one needed, which is the conception of the perpetual production of our perceptions, in an orderly way, by the fiat of the Deity. With Berkeley there is no support outside at all; for, in fact, the attributes exist only through perception of our minds, and do not require an external support. They are never outside the mind at all, in the sense of existing *apart from mind*; things would not remain as common sense supposes, standing the same, if mind were absent; but our perception of them, which is their existence for us now, would be dissolved with the dissolution of Spirit. Here is a very great advance to clearness in the conceptions of Locke. Sensations are the sufficient materials out of which to construct the External World, and it dissolves with the dissolution of these materials—it collapses completely with the collapse of Consciousness.

Again in the Fourth Book, and from quite a new side, Locke raises the sceptical objection, that if all knowledge relates, as he says it does, to ideas, how can we be assured of the Existence of things without us? He attempts to answer this objection in two separate chapters (Book IV., chaps. iii. and xi.), but with indifferent success. He finally resolves the difficulty in two ways: first, in a practical way, that our assurance of an External World is as great as our state

needs; and next, in a manner similar to Des Cartes, viz., by Faith, as he says, "the confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us is the greatest assurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material beings." (Chap. xi. sec. 3.) The practical answer is none for a speculative Philosopher, and the certain trust in our faculties will suit him still less than his great antagonist, as Locke does not believe, while Des Cartes does, in innate ideas, and further believes such ideas, if clearly conceived, have objective facts corresponding to them; and so, unless we think the Creator meant to insinuate error into our minds from the beginning, he accepts the instinctive deliverance, hoping Reason may be reconciled in some manner; but with Locke all knowledge and all ideas come from Experience, and there are no innate ideas; and so he has a greater difficulty in explaining the idea of Substance and the belief in an External World. He did not see the explanation of Berkeley, that Experience is gradually learned, and that when learned we often make inferences from it which are supposed to be intuitive promptings, but really unwarranted inferences; and we think too that notions are in our minds which are not there legitimately at all, such as Substance. (He did not indeed explain how the fictions are made, as both Mansel and Mill point out.) But to doubt the existence of an External World would not, as Locke thinks, imply that our faculties

deceived us—but only that we mistook a fiction for a reality, and an unwarranted inference for an intuitive impression. If, as Mill says, we have got faculties for finding this out, we cannot charge Nature with deluding us, or at least she afterwards relents in enabling us to find out the delusion, which would be analogous to Bishop Butler's instances, of "severity and indulgence," to be found in the Constitution of Nature. Perhaps the cheat was a kindness after all—an ingenious device of the mother to educate her children—the condition of bringing to the finest point the speculative spirit in man. For these supposed delusions are never suspected by the savage or brute. However this be, if the delusions are found out, Nature's cheat was only play (if not Education); if not found out, as in the savage, then it makes no difference; in either case Nature is defended.

So Malebranche, before Berkeley, had arrived close to Berkeley's positions,—nearer than any other,—as Hamilton rightly says; but yet Malebranche had not the whole of Berkeley's Philosophy wrapped up in his, as Hamilton supposes.

To Malebranche, indeed, Matter was in every way a useless hypothesis, but not to Locke, who required external things to account for the production of ideas in us. In fact, Locke, under force of the principle of Causality, postulated an external world (like Cousin, his adverse critic on this point) as the

cause of perceptions in us ; but with Malebranche bodies (if they existed) *could* not act on mind, and thus he was driven—by the same principle of necessity to seek a cause for every new phenomenon—to the Deity as cause of my ideas, or rather of making me a sharer in His own identical perceptions. This is his *Theory of Vision in God*, which is the nearest approach to Berkeley's Idealism. With Malebranche, Substance had no duty to perform as with Locke, and thus was a quite superfluous supposition to him, but nevertheless he accepted it, supposing Revelation testified to its existence, as did Des Cartes, because he thought the Creator's veracity implicated. Both believed in it, but the belief was destitute of meaning to Malebranche.

§ 16. *Philosophy a progressive growth. Every Philosopher indebted.*—These anticipations of Berkeley are referred to as showing there was a powerful tendency in speculation in the direction of Berkeley's Idealism, also how much Berkeley took from others and how much he added, but not (as with Hamilton,) to detract from his fame as the true originator of the Idealism which goes by his name. Some may see in the confused anticipations of Berkeley a deduction from his glory, but I think most unfairly.¹ For the

¹ The last defender of Natural Realism, and assailant of Berkeley in the *Edinburgh Review*, is evidently actuated with the same spirit of detraction as Hamilton, but he shows it still more manifestly than the master.

whole course of Philosophy has been progressive, as Hegel and Mill both think, and each thinker has adapted and adopted hints and suggestions from his predecessors, into which he infuses a new life by his new application of them—by seeing in them a significance and importance entirely unnoticed by those from whom he took them, in whose hands they lay comparatively inert and lifeless. With the single exception of Des Cartes, the father and founder of Modern Philosophy, none of the great thinkers are original in the sense of owing nothing to those who went before them. Thus Spinoza simplified the position of Des Cartes, by making his two subordinated, but yet independent, substances of, Mind and Matter, with no power of interaction, to be merely modes or aspects shown to men of one higher Substance, which yet might have revealed myriads of other modes to other beings, or might have developed them for self-cognisance. In like manner Leibnitz borrowed something more than hints in his theory of Pre-established Harmony from Spinoza, which yet is not considered a great detraction from his genius, since he made a more general use of the conception; while he also took, and still further simplified the principles of Des Cartes. Locke, who is, perhaps, next to Des Cartes, the most original, as his thoughts have been the most plentiful seeds of after theories, stands yet indebted to Hobbes for some of his views of the sources of knowledge;

while what was to Locke evidence of the existence of the External World, the Soul and the Deity, shows marks of acquaintance as well as of agreement with the thoughts of Des Cartes. (See Essay, Book IV., chaps. ix., x., xi.)

That Berkeley then should be indebted to those going before him, is only an example of a general law, which is equally exemplified, if we consider those who came after him. For Hume undoubtedly got hints, most obvious to such a subtle intellect, not only from Berkeley, but even from Locke. For Locke asserts that we have no ideas of either Material or Spiritual Substance; and also that many words apparently expressive of action convey no idea, when sifted, of action, but only of passion; as also the notion that we cannot get the idea of the origination of action from bodies, but only from Spirit. Now Hume only went farther when he affirmed that not only have we no idea of Substance, bodily or spiritual, but on Locke's principles, reasoned strictly upon, there is no such thing; not only do we get no idea of power from the apparent action of bodies, but no idea even from spirit, we get only the same in both cases—namely, close succession, into which, from custom, we introduce the unlawful conception of Cause or productivity,—an illegitimate conception, whether applied to the productions of poetic genius, the productions of volitions and motions, or the productions of Nature. In each and

every case there is merely succession, not productivity; but in the inner world the succession is so intimate, in the external so invariable, that we introduce a conception of causal or necessary connexion, so that we fancy the antecedent *produced* the consequent. This most pregnant, far-reaching, and powerfully destructive conception (if we accept it) was contained in hints lying innocent in Locke; it had also been applied by Hobbes, yet not to the sweeping extent to which Hume carried it.

Hume, in like manner, tried to extend Berkeley's principle, that Matter and Abstract Ideas existed only in the particular perception of them, to another startling result. He asked might not Mind, equally with Matter or the Abstract Idea exist only in this or that particular perception of it—might not its phenomenal manifestations, passing and various as they were, be the only Mind, under which, as in the case of Matter, he had put a fictitious entity as a supposed support of those fleeting and perishing perceptions, which had really no unity.

So Kant, a profoundly original thinker, who put Philosophy into a new groove for the future, was confessedly indebted to Hume, if only in a negative way; as he saw from the clearness of Hume's conclusions the only possibility left for establishing a Metaphysics in his own conception of it. He was also indebted to Berkeley's original hint that the Universe is only our representations.

Again Fichte develops Kant, without subtracting from his own credit. Schelling develops Fichte; and Hegel, not less profound or original certainly than any of his forerunners, hesitates not to take from Kant, Schelling, and Fichte, his leading principles, and from all before, whatever he pleases, as his by right of philosophical inheritance,—an inheritance not acquired and put idly by, but made by him to return accumulated profits for the future.

It is therefore to little purpose for Reid, or Stewart, or Hamilton to find Berkeley's principles (perhaps we should rather say premises) in preceding Philosophers, unless they can also show that he got his conclusions likewise from the same source, or that they are of little significance; but the fact that they have laboured so hard to overthrow his conclusions, without any success, and also that they all have (what Kant maintains in case of Reid) more or less missed the point of his arguments, shows that they could not establish this. And that Berkeley's conclusions were really his own—that he made a new application of them to destroy Scepticism and Materialism—and that his conceptions were most fruitful in the future, it is impossible now to deny; though, as in the case of all great thinkers, there will be found smaller ones who are most industrious in trying first to disprove his principles as untrue, and failing in that, to discover that they are not new.

As Hallam, the distinguished historian of Euro-

pean Literature, said regarding Locke, "The name of Locke is part of our literary inheritance, which, as Englishmen, we cannot sacrifice"; so we may say, in like phrase of Berkeley, that his name is one which as Irishmen we cannot now, after History has pronounced her verdict, suffer to be depreciated. And the same might be said of Hume by his countrymen; though in each case the prophets have had the least honour in their own country, and in all have had to hope for Time to approve them the thinkers for the ages and for Humanity, and not merely for the day or for their own country.

These three thinkers, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, represent the intellect of these three nations in European Philosophy, as by a singular chance they represent the three schools of Philosophy,—Realism, Idealism, and Scepticism. Their thoughts constitute our special Philosophical inheritance, what we have to offer for what we have taken from other countries. They are thus also part of the intellectual inheritance of Humanity, now ranking with—

"Plato the wise and large-browed Verulam,
The first of those who know."

These three save England in the past from Hegel's reproach of being the one nation indifferent to the higher Philosophy, and from M. Taine's similar charge of being, from her practical character, incapable of Metaphysics. History has pro-

nounced in all three cases its final and irreversible verdict; and though late in the case of Berkeley and Hume, their increasing reputation now is some compensation for the neglect and misconception they so long suffered. For History is in the long run just, and is tender of the fame and memory of those who have given drink to Humanity at the fountains of Thought and Truth which they have first opened.

§ 17. *Berkeley's advanced Position.*—What was the advance, then, of Berkeley on Des Cartes, Locke, and Malebranche, who had all doubted the existence of Matter, while with Malebranche it served no purpose, even as a hypothesis? And where lay his special merit?

In this lay his originality, that Berkeley saw a consistent explanation of the whole so-called material Universe, and even by his Theory of Vision, of its apparent externalization, together with our seemingly intuitive perception of it, by granting only ordered sensations and a subject through which to perceive them; also an explanation of the nature and a proof of the existence of a Spirit, by reasoning from our own conscious but finite Spirit to a connected but superior one, as the Cause of the Sensations which our Spirit did not consciously produce. And his merit lay in this, that by his view of the material Universe, he escaped the Scepticism, which both Des Cartes and Locke clearly saw lying coiled like a serpent at the roots of Philosophy—the true Tree of Know-

ledge, of which whoso^e eats knows good and evil, for man's gain, if such knowledge was once his loss. But these two Philosophers had scarcely "scotched the snake," certainly not killed it.

Truly, as far as their systems were concerned, they might further say of Scepticism, in Shakespeare's words :—

"She'll close and be herself; whilst our poor malice
Remains in danger of her former tooth."

The systems of both Des Cartes and Locke had only served to summon up this evil Spirit of Scepticism, but were wholly incompetent to lay it. For with both, Sense seemed strongly to testify to something an appeal to Reason could not justify, and the result must be, and actually was, Scepticism. And in such light it was regarded by Hume, the impersonation of the Sceptical Spirit in Philosophy. (See Essay on the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy.) Reason seemed stupified at the very commencement of all attempts at philosophizing, by her inability to verify or even clearly to understand what it was which our intuitive perceptions seemed to say.

But Berkeley, by denying the existence of Matter, and showing that the External World is made up, not of something which we cannot reach, and which therefore may be doubted, but of something in ourselves, namely, our sensations, the existence of which even Hume could not doubt, avoided the

contradictory testimony, and therefore the complete confusion of both Reason and Sense; avoided too the contradictions in the very notion of Matter inert and unintelligent, yet active and productive of such a marvellous effect as perceptions in us for our intelligence; and hence escaped the contradictions which gave birth to Scepticism, and destroyed the creative power supposed to be lodged in Matter, which had produced dogmatic Materialism both in ancient and modern times. On Berkeley's principles Scepticism of the External World is impossible, as the extremest Sceptic cannot doubt his own Sensations; and Materialism with a resulting blind and brutal Atheism is impossible, after the chimæra of Matter which supported it is destroyed.

The aim of Berkeley was great, to destroy at one blow the twin-headed monster of Scepticism and Atheism—the monster of modern time—and thus at once to take rank with the Sages in Philosophy, and with the Saints in the Calendar, for his services to the cause of Philosophical and Religious truth. The aim was the double glory of St. Augustine and Aristotle; and his fame is in no small measure compounded of that of each; though, with Mr. Mill, I consider his place in Philosophy the more unassailable one.

§ 18. *Belief in Matter.*—The existence of Matter and of an External World had been believed in by all, both thinkers and average men, yet the

existence of each rested upon a different ground of conviction. Men believed in Matter or Substance, because they found the notion rooted in their minds, more or less confusedly, and could not account for its being there, unless it testified to something outside; though here when the ordinary man came to think of it, from want of reflection he could hardly say whether he had the notion or not, or of what sort it was; while the thinker like Locke could clearly see just this far, that he could not clearly see any notion,—in fact, that he had got, strictly speaking, none at all. (Book I., chap. iv., § 18.)

But in Philosophy the proper appeal is to the thinker, whose intuitive perceptions are the same as the ordinary man's, with this most important difference, that by introspection he can more strictly make them an object for his Reason to see and read them, and by his educated faculty of abstraction and power of conveying clearly what he does see in accurately chosen language, he can bring out and lay before other thinkers his thought, and thus institute a comparison with theirs. When now the appeal is made to the thinkers, we find, since Locke, they are unanimous in stating we have no idea of Material Substance. This is conceded by Reid, Stewart, Hamilton, and Mansel—all opposed to Berkeley; but yet the two former maintain we must believe in Substance, though they cannot

tell us what we are thus committing ourselves to believe in. Mansel more truly says we have no idea of Substance apart from Consciousness (*Prolegomena Logica*, p. 141); but he does not see the great significance of what he thus admits, as there is no possible escape to Mansel from Berkeleyanism after this is granted. For if we have no idea of Substance apart from Consciousness, he would scarcely affirm we have an idea of any other entity apart from Consciousness—unless in part the Ego itself, or the Deity, both which, with him and Berkeley, are Spirits related to each other and to Consciousness as its cause, yet not exhausted in the conscious manifestations.

The reason Philosophers believed in Matter, in addition to having a supposed reference in their minds to some such thing, was that it seemed a convenient hypothesis to hold together the Primary qualities of bodies (which never were suspected before Berkeley to exist like the Secondary, in the mind merely); it also seemed to account for the Secondary qualities which were acknowledged to exist only as sensations in us, the effect of this efficacious and still inert substance—here lay the contradiction; and it further seemed to secure the permanent existence of things in the absence of sentient beings to perceive them, which is supposed an insuperable difficulty for Idealism. Now Berkeley's argument against this idea of Matter is decisive. It is not given by any

of the external Senses, for all they show us are sensible qualities—in Berkeley's language, perceptions or Ideas, in Kant's *Phenomena of Sense*; it is not given by the Intellect, which is utterly unable to frame any such notion as Material Substance, though it can frame one of a Spiritual Substance, which is given in Consciousness, as Mansel admits, and even Locke, though vacillating (compare Book IV., chap. ix., § 3, and Book II., chap. xxiii., §. 5). It is a fiction, a false creation which, when closely pressed, turns out to be a non-entity. We must put Spirit in its place. As different from Spirit it is nothing, because unknowable. What it could be, cannot be translated to Sense or Intellect, and such idea then is for men simply zero. Further it is contradictory in itself, besides having no evidence for its existence. It is active, and yet by admission passive; it is a sensible thing, and yet it exists apart from all possibility of Sensation. Berkeley concludes, then, there is no such thing, because there is no evidence for it—we have no true notion, no imagination of it; and even the spurious notion is contradictory. Even yet granting it to exist, it would be wholly useless as a hypothesis to explain anything. An insentient thing could not perform such a miracle as to determine orderly and related sensations in me, and similar ones in all men's minds. This is creation, and to produce them not only for the perception of millions of men, but also of millions of the lower ani-

mals is impossible, unless we suppose the power delegated to blind matter to be directly exercised by God.

The disproof of Matter I hold to be decisive, and the substitution of Spirit in its place, an intelligible explanation, but yet, unless this be understood to be more than a Conscious Spirit like ours, it will not account for all the real difficulties which the so various views of Mr. Spencer, of Hegel, and of Schopenhauer all conspire to raise in this theory. True, Berkeley reasons from the only power which he already knows to be possessed of efficient causality, the *Ego* or Spirit, to one similar, though greatly superior; and in doing so is the more inductive reasoner; but against carrying the inductive argument beyond the field of experience and verification, it may seem as if there is an objection, though in doing so Berkeley stands not alone, for it is also Butler's method of arguing about the constitution and government of the world, in his great work, 'The Analogy of Religion,' where he thinks it just to reason from things known to others like them, "from that part of the divine government over intelligent creatures which comes under our view, to that larger and more general government over them which is beyond it." At all events, Berkeley destroyed Matter as an explanation, and the substitution of Spirit, as efficient cause, was a great step in advance, though we may not accept his reasoning

about the nature of that Spirit as decisive. But I here dissent from the view of Mill, who says he has not proved the existence of this Power; I consider he has, and differ from Berkeley only in thinking that he reasons too narrowly about its nature, which I agree with nearly all thinkers in believing to be more than we can fully measure. Berkeley's whole argument may be put thus briefly:—When I look at or touch an object, as a tree, a perception occurs, independent of my will, of which I am conscious—What is the cause? Matter cannot be, I am not, therefore another Spirit, infinite and causal exists. This is his proof of God's existence. And his disproof of Matter can be given as briefly. Matter does not exist because there is no evidence for it, besides it is a contradictory and suicidal conception, even useless as a hypothesis, for we can explain all better without it. His disproof of Matter then is final, and is accepted even by those who yet try to oppose his Idealism, as by Hamilton and Mansel, who, though admitting they have no evidence for matter, yet think they have for a world existing independent of all mind—an External World totally apart from perception. They do not see that this is really bringing back matter, after rejecting it. We must now take up this point.

§ 19. *Belief in an External World.*—Now, all men did decidedly believe in an External World, though, when they came to think, they could not say whether or no they had an idea of Matter se-

parate from the sensible qualities of bodies. And to explain this belief makes the main difficulty for Berkeley, as in his conception of an External World lay his chief originality and greatness beyond any before him, even Malebranche, who never approached to Berkeley's great principle, that Matter being banished as useless, the External World is built up for us of our sensations, or perceptions, and equally for the lower animals of theirs, and even for the Deity of his perceptions. Whatever be the cause of the perceptions, the External Universe is for us made up of them. The External Universe is our knowledge of it, no matter what is the source of that Knowledge. The great Metaphysical question of Efficient Causation may be really eliminated, without affecting the other question (as we see in Hume and Mill, who have not only eliminated, but disbelieved this causation). The other question, both Scientific and Metaphysical, and which Berkeley was the first to conceive clearly, was this—could not the External World and every fact relating to it be explained by supposing only the existence of sensations and a subject to perceive them? And it is here that Berkeley is truly original, as here he stands opposed to all Realism, whether it be Natural, or Representative, or Platonic.

It was much easier to disprove the existence of Material Substance than to explain away men's belief in an External World. For this rests

on a different ground from the belief in matter. Men have not, as in the case of the belief in matter, to examine their thoughts to see if they have any clear idea of Substance, but only to look around them, and pronounce if they believe in the existence of external objects. And if they do look, it seems men are agreed that there are External objects, and an External World, apart from any examination into their notion of Matter. So that it appears as if the arguments which disprove material Substance as an entity, *per se*, do not tell against the existence of an External World.

And even Philosophers who give up the belief in Matter, like Mansel, still maintain strongly the existence of an External World. And those who do not go so far as Mansel, but admit that we cannot know, but merely believe in the incognisable existence of Matter, like Hamilton, Reid, and Stewart (that is, believe in they know not what, which may therefore be anything), seem to be loth to give up the belief in Matter, because they think the belief in an External World supposes its existence, and they are quite positive about the existence of the External World, whatever doubt they might have regarding Matter. Now, in agreeing with Berkeley that the External World is made up of our sensations, and can in every, the minutest particle of our experience of it, be explained without postulating anything but sensations and a certain order in their occurrence, I

own with Mill that we should explain why men believe in something transcending all sensations, which exists if they were all dead. With Berkeley (not Mill) this something is the Cause of the sensations, or God, whom we cannot think non-existent. And on Berkeley's principles too, men are quite right to believe in the existence of an External World, but what sort of an External World is *the* question. I believe with all men in an External World, but that External World is made up of sensations, and would dissolve like a dream with the dissolution of sentient beings. What else that can be named save sensations, could it be made of? If all eyes are gone, is not the world of sight dissolved? If ears, the world of sound? If organised bodies, the world of tactual and muscular feelings? Is not the world of sense disappearing under this series of suppositions rapidly? We will suppose all the doors stopped, and I now ask a Realist what remains of the External World? The suppression of each sense dissolves a fraction of the External Universe, the dissolution of all dissolves all. If any remains, I ask to be informed by any Realist, what it is? And I have taxed my imagination to the utmost myself to find; perhaps he can tell me.

In answer to this challenge, I can only find Hamilton, Mansel, Reid, Stewart, and all Natural Realists making an appeal to men's belief in an External World. Hamilton says, Consciousness testi-

fies to it ; Mansel says, all men believe in it. (Metaphysics, p. 339.) Now, Berkeley also believes in an External World, so that this does not meet his argument. It evades the question. For Berkeley maintains that the External World is made up of sensations which cannot exist apart from a mind. There are two points here. First, our conception is made up wholly of sensations, actual or guaranteed ; and second, these could not exist apart from a mind. Berkeley's theory tries to explain the external World by a reference to sensations only, and surely these only exist in a Mind, and cannot be apart from it. The theory of Realism thinks sensations not sufficient, but cannot tell us what there is besides. If there be aught, what is it that is not sensational ? If they say there is a Cause—so says Berkeley—but the Cause is God. But leaving out this question of production, Berkeley says the existence of the External World is sensations, and these cannot survive sentient beings. Hamilton and his School affirm, or seem to affirm, that it is not made up of sensations, and that the External World would remain after we and all men and all sentient beings, were gone. This is the difference between the two. Both believe in an External World ; the question between them is, how to explain it. Here appears the difference. The Idealist tries to explain it by a conception of Sensations (with laws of succession and co-existence), and a subject ; the Realist

by something more than Sensations and laws; but they cannot tell what the additional something is, and they constantly affirm that things may exist, though there be no sentient beings, and apparently things just as they are now. Now, I affirm—first, that what is above Sensations, and a subject, they cannot tell; and second, that *our* phenomenal world dies with us, and *any and every* phenomenal world perishes with every sentient being.

§. 20. *Hamilton's Refutation of Berkeley.*—We are now in a position to estimate the worth of the theory which Hamilton opposes to Berkeley's Idealism. How confused his notions of Idealism were we have shown before (sec. 15). And when the system he confronts is confusedly conceived we may expect the usual result—the fallacy of irrelevant conclusion. That this is so, in the case of Hamilton and Mansel (no less than Brown, Reid, and Stewart, who affirmed, that if Berkeley was right no one should care to avoid running his head against a post), I shall try to show.

Hamilton's argument against Idealism, and in favour of Natural Realism, is, that we must depend on the veracity of Consciousness, which testifies in the same act of External Perception to an Ego and a Non-Ego as equally given. His words are, "The Ego and Non-Ego—Mind and Matter, are not only given together, but in absolute co-equality. The one does not precede, the other does not follow, and

in their mutual relation each is equally dependent and equally independent. Such is the fact, as given in and by Consciousness." (Lectures Vol. I., p. 292.) This chapter is full of repetitions of this statement in different words, which is all he has got to offer as a refutation of Berkeley. Here he tries to show Berkeley's opinions are not true. In the Discussions he merely states his opinions were not new. The truth of this remark in the case of Berkeley, and the relevancy of it to any Philosophy, we have considered. We are now to examine his attempt at refutation of Berkeley. In the chapter in question he quotes from Berkeley, to show that "Berkeley admits that the things immediately perceived are not representative objects, but the external realities themselves." And it is most true that with Berkeley the things perceived were the external realities; but these were also internal—that is, they were sensations, which could not be external in this sense, namely, of existing apart from, or independent of, a Mind. Hamilton will have proved something to the point, if he can show them external in this latter sense, of being capable of existing apart from a Mind, and yet being the same as they are for our Mind.

Hamilton is constantly affirming that it is impossible to doubt the fact of Consciousness, as testifying that the Ego and Non-Ego are both given together in the act of External Perception, and he

thinks that Berkeley doubts it. He is quite mistaken. Berkeley affirms as emphatically as either Hamilton or Kant does, that on his system it is impossible to doubt the External World.¹

Indeed, Berkeley here anticipated Kant, who has the very argument of Hamilton. This would be no objection to Hamilton, supposing him to have taken his view from Kant, if he made as good use of it as Kant; but Hamilton only spoils it in his hands by using it against Berkeley, who already had the merit of announcing it, while Kant uses it against Des Cartes with good effect. And Berkeley undoubtedly claimed it as his merit that scepticism of an External World was impossible in his system a fact clearly pointed out by Professor Fraser in his *Life of Berkeley* (p. 390). The words of Kant, so like Hamilton's, are, "External things, there-

¹ Thus he says in the *Commonplace Book*: "Malebranche in this illustration differs widely from me. He doubts of the existence of bodies, I doubt not in the least of this.

"I am more for reality than any other Philosopher. They make a thousand doubts, and know not certainly but we may be deceived. I assert the direct contrary.

"I do not fall in with the Sceptics in that I make bodies to exist certainly, which they doubt of."

Again, in the *Principles of Human Knowledge*: "That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which Philosophers call matter, or corporeal substance."

fore, exist just as much as I myself do, and both upon the immediate evidence of my self-consciousness." Also, "With regard to the reality of external objects, I have just as little need of inference as with regard to the reality of the objects of my internal sense (my thoughts), for they are both nothing but representations—the *immediate perception* (Consciousness) of which is likewise a sufficient proof of their reality." The whole passage is remarkable (see Kant's "Critical Philosophy," Mahaffy's Trans., p. 245), and worth comparing with Hamilton's assertions throughout Lecture XVI., Vol. I.; indeed the very phrases of Hamilton occur, and as Kant came first, the suspicion which would surely have occurred to Hamilton in the case of another, here strongly suggests that he borrowed from Kant; but if he did, the argument is useless in his hands against Berkeley, who admits it, and anticipated it (though there can scarce be a question as to the originality of so independent a thinker as Kant).

Now, Berkeley is agreed with Hamilton on the doctrine of an Immediate Perception of an External World, and Berkeley was the first to hold it.¹ But here the agreement to a great extent ends, as Berkeley has a complete and consistent explanation of this External World, and by simple materials; while Hamilton is content to apply important cate-

¹ See also Fraser's "Life of Berkeley," p. 383.

gories to it, which, as I hold, he cannot, or did not, tell us the meaning of. For Berkeley undertakes by Sensations, and a Subject, to explain the Externality, Reality, Causality, and Substantiality ascribed to the Material universe. Hamilton explains none of them. And this is the problem. With Berkeley Causality is the invariable succession, Substantiality is an associated group, of sensations. As regards the Externality of bodies to our bodies, Berkeley explains it from the sensations we should expend in reaching them, tactual or locomotive. At first the eye alone could not tell us of distance, though even if it could, it would be still by variety of visual Sensations, and the distance thus given would be emptied of our present meaning of distance. Now, Hamilton accepts Berkeley's theory of acquired Perceptions, and thus, too, his explanation of Externality as acquired, and as filled up in its meaning by sensations successively experienced. And as to Reality, with Berkeley, it means the reality of a sensation through external sense, which it is as impossible to doubt as a feeling of pain. With Hamilton there is no explanation of Reality, but, as he elsewhere speaks of Reality as reality of the phenomena, or "presentations of our faculties," and not of "existences beyond the sphere of immediate knowledge," we must conclude that this Reality is simply Berkeley's sensible reality. Berkeley has explained his reality, and

by his principle of sensations. Hamilton has not explained this reality; while he thinks there is yet another Reality behind, the Cause, too, of the phenomenal one, and very possibly resembling it, or, at least, "corresponding" to it. Here are three unexplained categories made use of. Further, to say the one is the cause of the other, is Representationism, with which he has such bitter war. It is both Kant and Brown. But Natural Realism professes to oppose both. The passage referred to is the following, where he says of Perception:—"To arrogate to it the power of immediately informing us of external things, which are only the *causes of the objects we immediately perceive*, is either positively erroneous, or a confusion of language" (Lectures, Vol. II., pp. 153, 154). And that his doctrine is Representationism which owes much to Kant, is further shown in the following passage, in which the Kantian doctrine of Representationism is set forth, and a most cardinal point in the critical Philosophy misapprehended:—"All that we know of the objects is through the presentations of our faculties; but whether these *present the objects as they are in themselves*, we can never ascertain." If all we know of objects is through presentations of our faculties, this is the Representative theory of Kant, with the word *represent* changed into *present*; while Kant's representation does not imply likeness, but Hamilton's presentation either implies likeness,

or his word 'correspond' has no explained meaning, when he affirms a correspondence between the presentations and the things-in-themselves. With Kant the manifestations, or, as he calls them, representations of the Noumena, were by no means to be supposed to resemble them. The presentations of Hamilton, or phenomena as Kant also calls them, were only representations in the sense of being the manifestations of things-in-themselves, which latter never appeared in space or time. But they were not like them, if that is Hamilton's meaning of 'correspond'; and if he only means analogous, even then Kant would demur. For no predicate, as likeness, or analogy, applies to Noumena; no predicate at all, but existence, though Kant cannot avoid applying cause also to them, since he affirms things *per se* are at the root of phenomenon. Kant indeed can scarcely avoid applying to the Noumena all these essential predicates and categories, which Hegel afterwards applies to the Absolute; but there is one he could not apply, and that is likeness or analogy to phenomena; as well say all my emotions and volitions, which with Hamilton are phenomena, were like or corresponded to something hidden in the soul, which is a Noumenon with both him and Kant. Hamilton's disciple Mansel uses a less ambiguous word 'agree' and also clearly shows it was Kant's views that dictated the passage last quoted, as Mansel, in endorsing Hamilton's error, expressly mentions Kant's name. (*Prolegomena*, p. 82.)

Hamilton's Natural Realism, then, is Kantism ; but in his hands it is no theory to oppose to Berkeley's Idealism, for he does not take it in its entirety when it might be opposed to Berkeley, though even then it would be only a less consistent system of Idealism opposed to Berkeley's. It is also Brown's Cosmothetic Idealism, as affirming the object perceived to be caused by an existence beyond, and seemingly analogous—which again spoils Cosmothetic Idealism. And the patchwork structure and impotent nature of the whole philosophy is further remarkably shown in Hamilton's view of Space—a vital point in any system. In his anxiety to escape from the Idealism into which he imagined his acceptance of Kant's view of Space would precipitate his system, the singular device occurred to him of regarding Space both as a Form of Sensibility and also as a reality ; not an empiric reality, in Kant's sense, or a reality relative merely to Sensations, as with Berkeley ; but an ontologic reality, for none else remains. And this result follows,—that Space, which as a form of Sensibility is exhaustive of Space as we know it, and leaves no Space which we can have experience of unincorporated, must yet have behind it, and yet impossible to be reached, another and a real space—that is, that under or behind every cubic foot of phenomenal space (the only space we know,) there is another and a real cubic foot of space. Is this real space, different from the formal, or is it like it ? where does it find room, for a

cubic foot of any space can only occupy, we would imagine, a cubic foot? Does not the formal exclude or shut out the real, and leave it no possibility of existing anywhere? Perhaps the real space being thus pushed out of formal space, finds existence only in the bosom of the other entity—time?

The fact is, there is much more than his Law of Parcimony against Hamilton here. That space can be both formal and real, unless the two coincide—and then we should like to know whether it is formal or real—is as absurd as to suppose behind every phenomenal ear-ache a different and a real ear-ache, behind every rainbow another real rainbow, behind every rustling of an insect's wing another real rustling. The phenomenal space is the real and only space with both Kant and Berkeley, and even other thinkers who chose to apply the word real to this same space, were yet never guilty of the gross absurdity of supposing it of *two* different natures at the same time. If the two natures are different the one excludes the other; if co-incident, then there is only one—the phenomenal space.

Again, Hamilton says, the Ego and non-Ego are equally dependent and equally independent. Does this mean, as it seems, that the non-Ego could exist apart from mind? Undoubtedly, from many passages he thinks (and Professor Frazer so understands him), that the external world, which yet he says is phenomenal (e. g., he says it is not the real

sun, but only a "complement of rays," which we perceive), would exist as now it exists if all sentient beings were withdrawn. Well, if phenomena *can* have existence apart from mind, the phenomenal world might. But he can hardly accept Kant's word without his meaning, and that is an intuited sensation which needs a sentient being to perceive it. Hamilton may only mean that the phenomenal world dissolves, but there is left a resembling real world standing in its room, which is Platonism. But we must equally object to this real world, as it can only exist, after all, even in our imagination, by being supposed relative to some faculty of perception or knowledge; i. e., this real world is still phenomenal and dissolves with the dissolution of sentient beings, to whom it is relative even in imagination, or rather, it never existed, unless on the unprovable supposition of a useless re-duplication for no conceivable purpose of the entire phenomenal world. In conclusion, Berkeley has not been refuted, for Natural Realism accepts Berkeley's great conception, that the world presented to us, and which is undoubtable, is the Phenomenal World. And all its appeals afterwards to consciousness testifying to an external world, independent, in equipoise, &c., if they are not idle are unprovable, or unexplained, so that we do not really know what Hamilton wishes us to believe.

And now we may summarise the contrasts between the Idealism of Berkeley and the Realism of

Hamilton. Hamilton applies important categories of Existence, Reality, Externality, and Causality, without explaining them. Berkeley explains them. Hamilton has an absurd reduplication of space, and apparently of everything else ; Berkeley, with Sensations alone (and a subject) will build up the external universe and explain it,—which universe dissolves as a dream with all sentient beings. And Berkeley's Theory is an original conception for simplifying Philosophy, and the first attempt on an immense scale to apply Hamilton's Law of Parcimony, while Hamilton, instead of applying his own law, actually violates it.

Finally, Berkeley's system had an organic life, and was pregnant with fruit for the future of Philosophy, while Natural Realism has no inner principle of vitality or unity, but is a compound of Platonism, Kantism, Berkeleianism, and Brown's Cosmothetic Idealism, and is, (reminding us of Locke's general idea of a triangle,) "all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect which cannot exist." And now if one had to choose between the simple system of Berkeley and this philosophy of Hamilton, who could hesitate to decide in favour of Berkeley's, on the grounds of originality, internal consistency, and fruitfulness, when compared with this borrowed, confusedly-conceived and sterile system—this Natural Realism, which is an unnatural combination of heterogeneous and contradictory contributions—a Philosophy of "shreds and patches" ?

§ 21. *Mansel's Refutation of Berkeley.* I have examined what the master has to offer in opposition to Berkeley, and shown how little it can really oppose to Idealism which can be proved. The violent attitude of antithesis assumed here as in the similar case of Brown is partly the effect of confusion in not seeing clearly either Berkeley's Theory, or Brown's—the latter, too, more philosophical than his own—and partly results from his "lust of originality," of which Dr. Stirling speaks, and which scarcely ever could allow any other thinker to have any merit in this way. So thoroughly had this vice of blood eaten into his nature, that even when giving credit to a really great genius, like Kant, and after taking his "Law of the Conditioned," like his doctrine of the "Duality of the Fact of Consciousness," and his view of Space directly from Kant, or from obvious suggestions in his system, he assumes a superiority over Kant by suggesting that if he had only gone a little further, he might have anticipated him (Hamilton), and he then turns and *refutes* Kant, because he did not,¹

¹ Discussions, pp. 14-18.—The famous article in the *Edinburgh Review*, for 1829. See also p. 73, where there is decisive evidence he had read Kant's refutation of Des Cartes' Idealism, as he quotes Kant's words "*only possible demonstration of the reality of an External World.*" This, with the words quoted in the text from Mr. Mahaffy's translation, show quite clearly that Kant, and not Reid, was the source of Natural Realism. *The very phrases of Kant are used.* We might conjecture why he was anxious to give Reid the credit. He was then able to show that if

while in the same place engaged in refuting Schelling, Hegel, and Cousin.

This is carrying the passion for refutation and "lust of originality" a little too far. To borrow without acknowledging, to apply wrongly and then turn and refute our author because he does not *anticipate* our own absurdities, is really an original way both of claiming credit for originality and, at the same time, of modestly raising ourselves in a rather implied than asserted way over one whom we at the same time admit to be a genius and "possessed of marvellous acuteness."—(Discussions, p. 93.)

I now come to Mansel's criticism of Berkeley, and here I may be more brief, as much said in answer to Hamilton applies to the disciple. There are, how-

Reid does deserve some, he does not deserve nearly so much credit as himself. He, in fact, spends many pages in showing Reid was confused in holding the doctrine; and so indeed he must have been; but he never hints that the doctrine is stated with remarkable clearness in the great Critic he has the presumption to refute (after borrowing from him), because he did not go on to his own logical self-annihilation. All his metaphysics is from Kant,—his Law of the Conditioned, from the antinomies, his Natural Realism, Relativity of Knowledge, and Doctrine of Space from sources indicated above—and then he simply spoils all these views really great in Kant's hands. Kant's doctrines are so altered (to seem original) that he might fail to recognise his own offspring, though with Hamilton, to be just, only part of the change was intentional, the rest was the result of natural but presumptuous "powerlessness

ever, some points of difference in his refutation of Berkeley, to which I turn my attention.

First, Mansel admits (like Hamilton) Berkeley's Theory of Vision; he next admits that Berkeley was entitled to doubt, though not to deny, the existence of Matter; he also to a great extent accepts Berkeley's Nominalism without seeing it was inseparably connected in Berkeley's mind with his Idealism, both flowing immediately from one principle, viz., that nothing can exist apart from being perceived—neither an abstract idea apart from the particular perception in which it is actualised, nor the external world apart from some perception either of a finite creature or of God. Also Mansel accepts Kant's view of Space, and thus will have much greater difficulty in keeping from Idealism of some sort than

of mind," to use his own phrase. As held by Kant, the doctrines form a really great, but inconsistent, structure of thought, and though only a negative one, as great as any reared up to his time, by the human mind. As held by Hamilton, we have seen how impotent they are; we shall see shortly how they work in the hands of Mansel, who is, if we may so apply Shakespeare's words, another "Cutpurse of the Empire," who "from a shelf the precious diadem stole, and put it in his pocket."

In the Lectures (Vol. i., p. 404), Hamilton refers to the *Second Edition* of Kant's Critique as containing the proof of an External world, but not to the *first edition* which has his own Theory. Why? Had he really not seen the first edition, or was his theory of Immediate Perception too plainly set forth in it?

Hamilton. However, he accepts Natural Realism too, and thinks to overturn Berkeley on new grounds. The first point to note in his criticism is, that he says Berkeley was wrong in denying Matter, though right in doubting it. But Berkeley was surely right in denying what there is not the faintest evidence for, either in presentation of sense, or, when examined closely, in suggestion of thought. Those who think there is more than sensations, he refers to the only other existence he knows of, viz., spirit. But he is as much entitled to deny what, according to Mansel himself, is not given, as we now have to deny there are fifty other different entities existing in the empty air around us. I deny the existence of spirits there, until either I or others whose testimony I trust have some experience of them. As Mansel himself says (taking the principle from Kant), questions concerning real existence are sent to the tribunal of Experience (*Prolegomena*, p. 285). Unless in some way Matter (or any entity) is experienced, i. e., connected with some faculty of knowledge, we may deny it, as, on like grounds, all men deny, or treat as non-existent, the existence of innumerable other possible entities, till they are evidenced to us in some way. We may also deny it for the further reason, that being self-contradictory, it cannot exist.

Mansel also accepts what Berkeley has before made a part of his system, that the Ego is given in consciousness, and further agrees with Berkeley that

substance has never been given apart from conscious intelligence (Prolegomena, p. 141). If so, why suppose any other substance? Especially as he elsewhere grants that the whole world of External Nature is inert and unoriginative, save as intelligence is introduced beneath it (p. 162). He there ascribes the uniformity of Nature to the absence of that element (in Nature) "which alone we can think of as originating a change, Intelligence." I would prefer to say with Berkeley that uniformity is owing to the constant efficient causation of the Divine Intelligence; or to say with Hegel, that the thought which makes and is the universe cannot change in the world of nature without resulting in chaos, or in the world of man without producing confusion of reason (or confusion of thought in the individual, and want of mutual understanding in the species). Chaos in the cosmos would correspond to madness in man, and both are impossible, save as exceptions, without annihilation of the universe.

Mansel (p. 145) thinks that Berkeley's *tertium quid* will be simplified to Fichte's mental modification, and that the result that nothing exists except when perceived is repugnant to common sense. Now, without taking exception to his introduction of the unthinking into the tribunal reserved for Philosophical thought, I would make two remarks on this statement—first, that Berkeley never held that ideas were entities distinct from the mind; for Berkeley was too clear a

thinker not to see, that after destroying one entity, Matter supposed to be outside Mind, and another, the Abstract Idea, supposed to be inside Mind, he could not, without exposing his system to attack, admit an entity distinct alike from Mind and Matter.¹ He admits two entities, Sensations and the Ego, but one is an appearance or manifestation of the other, in some cases self-determined, in others as in external perception, produced by the Deity, but perceived by the Ego. Secondly, I would note on this passage (*Prolegomena*, 145) that it does not follow that nothing exists save when perceived; for Berkeley grants the existence of a subject with mental laws, and by these, as Mr. Mill and Professor

¹ Professor Webb has shown the error of Mansel and Hamilton on this point, in an able article in the *North British Review*. In this chapter I have chiefly directed my attention to attacks on Berkeley which I have nowhere seen answered, and to misconceptions of him by distinguished critics not before pointed out, so far as I have observed.

If Mansel does not countenance the nondescript *tertium quid* which is *neither* mind nor matter, he appears to me to admit a similar one, as he thinks the phenomena perceived may be *both* mind and matter. See *Philosophy of the Conditioned*, p. 82, where he says, "A phenomenon may be material as well as mental." Is not this thing with a mediating nature between mind and matter, something like a return to Cudworth's Plastic Medium? With Kant and Berkeley the phenomenon is mental through its apprehension, and only in its production can be independent of my limited Ego.

Fraser show, we can prove the existence of other minds and their sensations in past or future, as well as show grounds to expect our own future sensations, and, by memory, to believe in our past ones; and so we have a guaranteed existence for things when not actually perceived. This is not indeed actual existence in one sense, but it is in another. In one sense actual existence reaches no further than the sensations or thought actually at the moment felt, like the Sensitive Existence of Locke, which, he says, reaches no farther than the present instance. In another sense, and this lies in Berkeley's principles too, actual Existence would include what we are led by mental laws to believe regarding sensations not actually felt, but which have been, or might be experienced by ourselves, others, or the Deity. Berkeley is easily defended from this attack, and I refer to Professor Fraser's *Life of Berkeley*, chap. x., and Mr. Mill's *Exam. of Ham.*, ch. xi., for fuller answers to this as well as other objections to Berkeley.

Let us now see what Mansel has to say to prove positively an External World different from Berkeley's, after granting we have no evidence for Matter, and after granting Space to be a form of the Sensibility. Either admission, one would imagine, leaves him very little to say for an independent and phenomenal External World. In fact, there is not the slightest doubt that either condemns him to Idealism. That the concession that we have no idea of matter does, we

have seen before (p. 135). And Kant's Empiric Reality, if we suppose Mansel to embrace it from his Kantian principles, differs from Berkeley's Idealism in two points only; the first that Space is, with Berkeley, made up of sensations or phenomena, while with Kant it is a form of phenomena, and antecedent to them; but though a form of phenomena, it is also a form of Reason, which brings the doctrine to Idealism. For Phenomena occur in us as intuited sensations, and Reason, of which space is a pure form, is ours, so that the true result of Kant is, as both Fichte and Fischer make it, Idealism. Kant, indeed, recognises an element which we do not consciously make, but receive; but so likewise does Berkeley. And this brings us to the second point of difference between them. The non-egoistical element in Kant, which we cannot control, comes from the things *per se*, while with Berkeley it is referrible to Divine agency. And if Kant (because there is something we cannot control) says he is a Realist, Berkeley might style himself one also. But Berkeley calls his system Idealism, because the external or by us uncontrollable element is Spirit, and in this he agrees with Hegel, who logically developed Kant's principles to absolute Idealism. But Mansel does not profess to follow Kant all the way to Transcendental Idealism, still less will he go to Absolute Idealism; he intends to keep by his other master, Hamilton, and leaves Kant's Empiric Realism for Natural Realism, as he

thinks, because he has already abjured Representationism in all forms, and Kant holds one. He is not aware, apparently, that Natural Realism is taken from Kant, and that all of it which has any reality and is not self-destructive enters into Kant's Realism.

However, in spite of these inconsistencies, he still attempts to get at an External World, and fancies he has got one in some way different from Berkeley's External World, which is made up of Sensations and a cause, and would dissolve with them. He thinks to refute Berkeley's view by proving the existence of a picture on the retina in the case of External Perception. This "extension of the nervous organism" he supposes may lead to an External World in relation to that organism. His words are—"Admit with Berkeley that the real things are the very things which I see, and feel, and perceive, by my senses, but deny his other main position, that the Mind perceives only its own ideas.¹ We may thus open the way for the direct recognition in Consciousness—first, of our own organism as extended, and secondly, of an External World in

¹ There is a misapprehension of Berkeley in the words "own ideas," as the following shows: "The things perceived by me are known by the understanding and produced by the will of an infinite Spirit." (Fraser's Ed., Vol. i., p. 308.) Thus the ideas are not the mind's own. The Dublin Review, July, 1872, p. 138, *Note*, repeats Mansel's fallacy.

relation to that organism." His whole argument is contained in these two sentences, and is repeated in the 'Metaphysics' (note, p. 86). His attempt to evade Berkeley's argument in the 'Metaphysics,' is by calling Sensations "neither affections of Mind alone, nor of Matter alone, but of an animated organism, i.e. of Mind and Matter together." We thought the existence of Matter was doubtful with him. Then how is an animated organism both Mind and Matter? But let this pass for the present, and let Mansel call the Sensations by whatever name he pleases, Matter if he choose, (with Berkeley and Kant they are Mental), still it was of these sensations, however named, that Berkeley spoke when he affirmed they were the elements out of which our External World was made, and because he said so, and affirmed that these Sensations were sufficient, he was called an Idealist. It seems Mansel would change Berkeley's name, but not his doctrine, because he chooses to describe this Sensation of Berkeley and Phenomenon of Kant in a different way. But that he should fancy this is opposing Berkeley, or recovering the supposed lost External World, is surprising. The External World is with Mansel just the same as with Berkeley; and when he says above we can deny that the Mind perceives only its own ideas (or Sensations as Berkeley calls them), it appears he only meant to say that these ideas or Sensations were not

Mental, because they were affections of the organism, and so in his opinion both Material and Mental. But this Material may be *called* Mental by Berkeleians, because it could not exist apart from Mind; and to make it a real, and not a verbal difference, Mansel must show that the idea (or Sensation or Phenomenon), let it be called Material, can exist wholly detached from Mind. If he can do this, and further show *how* this Phenomenon can so exist, he will have successfully opposed Berkeley, and have vindicated the claim of Natural Realism to be also Plato's Realism, having now quite diverged from its source in Kant's Realism. With Berkeley ideas could not be without a creature to perceive them (unless God choose to perceive them), and the whole Phenomenal External Universe would perish utterly if all sentient beings were annihilated. This is the real difference between the two theories. To suppose the existence of things after the annihilation of all finite beings, is to suppose some intelligence perceives them, and the only intelligence left is the Deity; but Mansel does not think (as Berkeley does) that God perceives in any way as we do, and if not, then their existence, as we know it, is gone, or is the same as non-existence. So that by no effort of imagination can we get beyond, or escape from, Berkeley's principle, that things cannot exist apart from Mind, and by no imagination can we throw anything into the mean-

ing of either their actual or imagined existence, but these same Sensations, or Ideas, or Phenomena; and Mansel may, if he choose, call them Material.

But to examine a little more this picture on the retina,¹ if this is what we really see in all cases, can we get from this to an External World, different from Berkeley's? For the retinal picture, or affection of the organism, is in precisely the same predicament (let it be never so subtly, or wherever or however placed), as the affections of the nervous organism in the case of any other sense, and only exists in and by the perception of it. It is as zero to a man just dead, when the percipient power, as Butler calls it, is withdrawn. The Realist may say, but it is there in the eye of a man just dead, for any one who chooses to go and examine it. I answer, the picture then is only known as per-

¹ Mr. Monck has argued with scientific knowledge and psychological subtilty that it is the picture on the retina we really see (*Essay on Space and Vision*), but he must stand on his merit in proving this point; for the reasons above I cannot allow it would be inconsistent with Berkeley, who grants a spacial Reality outside us; but this Space is made up of Sensations, its Reality is that of the Sensations, and outside or External is an acquired perception, made up of Sensations too, and those of touch primarily, as Mr. Monck allows. I think, indeed, if we never get beyond a picture which we perpetually carry about with ourselves, this tells far more strongly for Idealism than any other view would. See also Supplemental Notes, A.

ceived by this looker-on—though according to this view, the picture the looker-on would perceive would not be the dead man's, but a smaller one in his own eye. Yet this, in the eye of the looker-on only exists because there is percipient power, and no ingenuity can describe its existence apart from percipient power, or, in Berkeley's language, the affection cannot exist apart from Mind. This affection may be called mental, but this is not at all necessary to Berkeley's argument, but only that by whatever name he called it, it can only exist for us in the true sense by the perception of it, actual (or guaranteed).^{*} Mansel grants "the whole nervous organism as such exists only as it is perceived, and is perceived only as affected. Destroy or alter the faculty of sense, and the organism of sight, as it is perceived in Sensation, exists no more, or exists in a different manner." This is undoubted; but if so, how there can be any argument afterwards against Berkeley, I am at a loss to imagine. And if the screen on which the pictures fall is not only altered but gone by annihilation of all eyes, the World of Light is gone. And in like manner, if not only is "Nature at one entrance quite shut out,"

^{*} Speaking of the two existences, *Spirits* and *ideas*, (Principles, 89,) Berkeley says, "The former are active indivisible substances; the latter are inert, fleeting, dependent beings, which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual substances."

but if the other doors are closed, is not the World of Reality in our sense of it destroyed? What is left to the Realist I cannot even fancy, though it seems he can; with Berkeley the one Reality remains—the only Reality which at any time exists beside us and our ideas—the Deity, the proximate efficient cause of the idea, and the more remote efficient cause of ourselves.

§ 22. *Other Critics of Berkeley.* We will very briefly reply to some other Critics of Berkeley; not that the objectors are less eminent than Hamilton or Mansel; some of them are both deeper and clearer thinkers, as Mr. Herbert Spencer and Dr. Stirling; but their arguments are brief and more to the point than those before examined, and so admit of a more concise answer. Others again, though able thinkers in other respects, are so utterly away from the point of Berkeley's argument that they may be very summarily dealt with.

It has always appeared strange to me, and only explicable on the supposition that the metaphysical instinct, like the poetical, musical, or mathematical, is a special gift, that three such men as Swift, Voltaire, and Dr. Johnson, were totally unable to imagine what was the drift of Berkeley's argument. It does, indeed, need an imagination and a power of abstraction quite different from the poetical, which these men all possessed, but then the greatest poets all possess this other kind of imagination also, as

is shown in high degree by Shakespeare, Shelley, and Mr. Tennyson; and men of vigorous and thoughtful intellects, like the three first mentioned, we would expect to apprehend an argument adduced to their senses and intellects. Yet Dr. Johnson's refutation of Berkeley consisted in kicking a stone to reassure any doubter of the existence of Matter. Swift's view of Berkeley's doctrine is illustrated by the story of his keeping Berkeley in the rain at the door of his house, since, on Berkeley's principles, it did not matter whether there was a door in the way or not; and Voltaire's, by his inference from Berkeley, that ten thousand cannon balls and ten thousand dead men were ten thousand ideas.

But, though it is conceivable that three men of creative intellect might not be Metaphysicians, what are we to say regarding Reid, Beattie, Stewart, and Dr. M'Cosh, professed Metaphysicians? For these all imagined, on Berkeley's principles we should not care to avoid a post, and might be unconcerned at walking into a kennel. As regards Reid, the deepest of them, see *Inquiry*, ch. iv., § 10. There needs no answer to any of these refutations of Berkeley by Common Sense, and I ask but one question by way of comment—What was the depth of the Metaphysics which could so answer a thinker admittedly subtile like Berkeley?

Mr. Lewes's refutation of Berkeley is brief. He accepts Berkeley's view that "all our knowledge of

objects consists in our ideas." Also, that we can never, by "any freak of thought, imagine an object *apart from the conditions under which we know it.*" But he adds, "we cannot admit that all existence is limited by our knowledge, on the ground that when we would conceive anything existing, we are forced to conceive it in accordance with the laws of our conceptive faculties" (*History of Philosophy, Idealism*, pp. 301-303). Now, the first two quotations distinctly admit Berkeley's Idealism. The third does not fairly represent Berkeley, for he does not think, as Hegel does, that existence is limited by our knowledge. It is quite consistent with Berkeley, but inconsistent with Hegel, to admit existence transcending all our knowledge; for with Berkeley there is the infinite nature of God to make other Existence, but whatever be the Existence it is only for *some* perceptive power. It is quite consistent with Berkeley to suppose inhabitants in the planets with two senses only, or with fifty senses. So that Existence, the world of Phenomena, in both would be quite different from ours, but yet to both their external world would be made up of their knowledge of it, to Berkeley by perception, to Hegel (if he believed in any such inhabited planet,) by thought. Mr. Lewes seems to me to be trying at the same moment to destroy the different systems of Idealism of Berkeley and Hegel. But they must be dealt with singly if he wish to overthrow either. He says fur-

ther, “ *We believe in the existence of an external world, quite independent of a percipient.*” Here Mr. Lewes is a Realist, and here we must, in answer, be brief and decisive. The answer of Berkeley is, there is no existence totally independent of a percipient, and it lies on Mr. Lewes to describe to us, in language which has a meaning, what this existence is or could be. The withdrawal of all perceptive power from the universe is simply the hypothesis of the total dissolution not only of Perception but also of Thought, for Thought is now dependent on perception for its present materials, as far at least as an external world is concerned; and then the supposition of the world of Existence is the supposition of a world of colour and sound, all men being blind and deaf. It is an Existence so predicateless as to be non-Existence. Mr. Lewes, then, has made no point against Berkeley, though he is a much more intelligent critic of him than he is of Hegel.¹

¹ Professor Maguire, with whose views I am happy to find myself generally in agreement in this Essay, and whose accurate knowledge of Berkeley and clear comprehension of Idealism make any suggestion coming from him of value, has pointed out to me another error of Mr. Lewes. It lies in the following passages from the *Hist. of Philosophy*, Vol. II., p. 302. Mr. Lewes says, “Perception is the identity of the Ego and Non-Ego—the relation of two terms, the *tertium quid* of two united forces; as water is the identity of oxygen and hydrogen. The Ego can never have any knowledge of the Non-Ego in which it (the Ego) is not indissolubly bound up; as oxygen can never unite with

Dr. Stirling makes an attempt to refute Berkeley which I cannot think a very successful one, after granting that in his own and Hegel's opinion "Sensation and Ideas in a subject constitute the Universe." This is just the result and sum of Berkeley's Philo-

hydrogen to form water, without merging itself and the hydrogen in a *tertium quid*. Let us suppose the oxygen to be a process of consciousness, *i. e.* a feeling of changes. It would attribute the change *not* to hydrogen, which is necessarily hidden from it, *but to water*, the only form under which hydrogen is known to it. In its consciousness it would find the state named water, which would be very unlike its previous state; and it would suppose that this state, so unlike the previous one, was a representation of that which caused it." These last two sentences imply one of two things, either that the state, water, a *tertium quid*, is like something unknown, which caused it; or that the new state of consciousness (which can only be known as a new sensation) would be naturally regarded as a representation of that which caused it, which Mr. Lewes also says is the water, the *tertium quid*. Now, a *tertium quid* cannot be like an unknown cause. And Berkeley's argument against representationism answers the other view. For "an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure." (Principles, § 8.) By idea Berkeley means sensation, and a sensation can never, save by an *idolum tribus*, strange but apparently very deep (so common is it), be supposed to resemble anything else, neither Matter, the supposed hidden cause of the sensation, as believed in before Berkeley, nor a *tertium quid*, which, by hypothesis, as well as by Mr. Lewes' illustration of the water, is entirely unlike both Mind and Matter. Mr. Lewes may escape from this by making the sensation identical with the perception, and thus itself the *tertium*

sophy too. As a description, not going into the essential features of difference beneath, this will cover both systems of Idealism. Now, Dr. Stirling's

quid, but, if so, he falls into another difficulty, for then the sensation must cause itself.

Besides, the illustration is entirely fallacious ; if the water be the whole of consciousness, we cannot analyse it into anything which is not water or consciousness. If we could, it would be the same as saying we can be conscious of what is not an object of consciousness, an obvious contradiction. All appeals to mechanical analogues must ever be idle, for these phenomena are but portions of consciousness, and accordingly cannot explain the remaining portion, which is not presented as chemical or mechanical. Mr. Lewes, p. 303, also considers "The assumption of external objects, independent of our sensations," more consonant with universal belief than Berkeley's hypothesis. Mr. Lewes, who has altered this sentence in his three Editions, does not show how, on his supposition, "external" and "independent" have any meaning—two important categories, involving in themselves the whole unsolved question. Save on Berkeley's principles, these categories have no meaning, and the question of the independent existence of an external world no determinate or intelligible answer.

Mr. Lewes in the same place seems to show another misconception of Berkeley. He says the non-Ego may exist "in relation to other beings, under quite different conditions." Granted ; but we are to remember the non-Ego with Berkeley is the Deity, and in whatever way the non-Ego is related to other beings it must still show itself phenomenally to them, or else we talk without meaning. The existence of the non-Ego is zero until it translates itself in some way to their apprehending faculty. The translation is all that they can reach, and it is still phenomenal, or relative to perception, with Berkeley.

argument against Berkeley seems to me inconsistent with this, which he considers the truth in Hegel. He says (Schwegler, p. 419), "I can only perceive an outer world by perceiving it; am I to suppose an outer object for ever denied me, then, by the very medium and means by which alone it can be given me?" And, "given a mind and given an outer object, the latter can be known to the former only through perception." I answer to this, if there *be* an outer object, it can only be known phenomenally; true, but then it is not the outer which is really so known with Berkeley (any more than with Kant or Hegel); it is the inner,¹ the phenomenal; and since we can reach nothing but the inner, the phenomenal, and since, even if there be an outer, it is impossible we could reach it, and if there be not an outer (except with Berkeley, be it remembered, the Deity), *we*

¹ To know what *outer* and *inner* really mean with Berkeley would clear up much confusion prevailing about his system, and would destroy at a stroke much adverse criticism. To say bodies are *in* the mind then, does not relate to locality, but means that they cannot exist apart from, or totally dissevered from, the mind's apprehension of them. (Prin. 2, 48, H. and P. iii. Fraser, vol. i. p. 346.) Every outer, if there were any such, must be inner to be known, and could not be an outer in the sense of being independent of all mind. There might be an outer in one sense, i. e. a power different from my Spirit, and this is the only outer which Dr. Stirling can possibly believe in on Hegel's principles. This outer is Reason, but it is also an inner, even more than in Berkeley's system.

shall never know the difference; then we are justified in applying Occam's razor. As in the case of Mr. Lewes, we ask to be told in some language with a meaning, what the outer is. I am aware Dr. Stirling has an answer which Mr. Lewes cannot have. He will say—he must say—the outer is Thought or Reason, and it is known by a faculty superior to Perception; and to this I reply with Berkeley, this outer (and in part inner too), is Spirit, the Deity; and it is apprehended by a faculty superior to perception, which rises to the high conception of a Spirit similar to itself, as its source and cause. The only possible outer with Dr. Stirling is Thought or Reason, and with Berkeley the Divine Mind; so that there can be really no difference but a verbal one between Dr. Stirling and Berkeley as to the existence of an external world.

Dr. Stirling's estimate of Berkeley's position in Philosophy is far too low. He repeats his criticism on Berkeley (Fortnightly Review, October, 1872), and condenses his Idealism into the single syllogism, "*Without is sensation, but sensation is within, therefore without is within.*" To this I must reply, that this is a very unfair way of characterizing the great conception first formed by Berkeley, which I prefer to put thus: That Sensations in us are the sufficient materials to explain all the facts of External Nature, including this very notion of outer; as they are also sufficient sources from which the mind (the subject),

in spider style, has woven the web of External Nature, and which web, strictly relative to the mind's present being, would perish with the perishing of its present forms and functions.¹

It is worth making a reply to another distin-

¹ It is desirable to place in opposition to Dr. Stirling's opinion of Berkeley in the *Fortnightly Review*, the two following recorded estimates of him, one by Mr. Mill, in the same serial, and one by Professor Fraser, in his edition of Berkeley's *Life and Writings*:—

“Of all who from the earliest times have applied the powers of their minds to metaphysical inquiries, he is the one of greatest philosophical genius; though amongst these are included Plato, Hobbs, Locke, Hartley, and Hume; Des Cartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Kant. For greatly as all these have helped the progress of philosophy, and important as are the contributions of several of them to its positive truths, of no one of them can it be said, as of Berkeley, that we owe to him three first-rate philosophical discoveries, each sufficient to have constituted a revolution in Psychology, and which, by their combination, have determined the whole course of philosophical speculation.” (*Fortnightly Review*, Nov., 1871, pp. 505-6.)

“Berkeley's Philosophy is not critical in its execution or in its original conception. But it will yet clear itself from misconceptions, and its author will take his place as the most subtle thinker of the eighteenth century.” (*Life of Berkeley*, p. 415.)

A very high opinion of Berkeley's Philosophy was also held by Professor Ferrier, himself a subtle and accomplished thinker, and these three estimates, by such diverse, but competent critics, must be held of great weight against any counter-view, especially when endorsed by avowed opponents of Idealism like Mansel and Mr. Lewes.

guished critic, Mr. Spencer. He argues that Berkeley's hypothesis is a logical suicide, as the ultimate test of every speculation is, he says, broken by Idealism. That ultimate test of every truth is with him the inconceivability of the negative, and he thinks that we cannot conceive the non-existence of an External World. I cannot conceive, in the sense of picturing myself in perfectly empty space, or at least I could not do so for very long, as some notion of external things will enter; and I cannot conceive myself as being out of space; but I can perfectly conceive (in the sense of believe in) the non-existence of an External World. I can conceive it on Kantian principles, if space, which is a form of my sensibility, were not so; or on Berkeley's, if space, which equally with bodies is compounded of sensations received from external senses, were not shown by these sensations, or by some totally different ones. I can conceive one of Leibnitz's monads with a spiritual principle, but no extension, having no idea of space or distance through tactual or visual sensations (as it has no extended surface), but only by feeling of locomotive effort expended; and if so, its idea of an External World and of Space would not differ from its internal world, since *feeling of effort* could come equally from attempt to surmount an intellectual difficulty such as the solution of a Mathematical Problem. I can thus conceive readily the non-existence of an External World as now known,

but not the idea of something external to me, in the sense of independent of, and having power over me. And Mr. Spencer, from his Theory of Development, I think, can himself conceive an external world wholly different from our present one. In fact, in Mr. Spencer's system, more than in most, the phenomenal and relative character of the External World to our minds is apparent. For in process of development from the star-fish, whose External World is sensations of redness, to the man, to whom it is a congeries of associated sensations of divers senses, there is a continuously changing phenomenal world. The external world is a series of dissolving views in ascending order, presented in succession to each type of animals up to man, who may consider it, according to the poetic mood, either as the "sterile promontory" of Hamlet, or a most magnificent scenic panorama, "apparelled in celestial light;" or, from the scientific and practical view, as a workshop where space or distance is being annihilated by the discovery of new agencies and translating forces, phenomenally shown to men; but in every case, this world of ours is relative to the man's mental structure, and, like every relative, must perish with one of its terms. And if, as Mr. Spencer must admit, the world would be thus a series of dissolving views, we can conceive each and all of them non-existent.

§ 23. *Scepticism.*—*The opinion that Berkeley's*

system results in Scepticism implies a misunderstanding both of it and of Scepticism. I shall pass over other criticisms of Berkeley, (though it would be easy to reply to any of them from the principles of Idealism,) since they have been either answered before by others, as by Mr. Mill and Professor Fraser, or are not of sufficient importance as objections.¹

I shall consider but one more objection to Berkeley, especially as it makes his system eventuate in Scepticism, the exact reverse of his intentions. Hume affirms that the writings of Berkeley "form the best lessons of Scepticism which are to be found amongst the ancient or modern Philosophers, because they admit of no answer, and produce no conviction." (Hume's Essays, Vol. ii., p. 585.) The answer to this is, that half the proposition is true,

¹ As an instance of the former, we may refer to Professor Fraser's reply to Ueberweg's original objection that Berkeley was guilty of *petitio principii*, in which reply this fallacy is retorted on the Realist. Indeed, the case is stronger against the Realist, as there is further a violation of the Law of Contradiction involved in their conception of Matter. As another instance, we might take the *Quarterly Review's* objection, that a "Stalagmite" in a cave refutes Berkeley. The answer to this is, that Berkeley recognises a subject as well as sensations; that by this subject we can prove other subjects exist; and that this subject has mental laws which enable it to conceive past and future sensations of its own or other minds, although not actually experienced. From the nature of the mind, we can get assured of sensations which we or others may have, or have had in past time. This is obviously in-

they admit no answer ; but the second half is not true, for they do produce conviction, and have produced it in the minds of many, and would in the minds of all, if Berkeley were really understood.

Hamilton's objection that Berkeley's system eventuates in Scepticism is different, and we have considered it before. I have shown that equally with himself Berkeley considers it impossible to doubt the testimony of consciousness to an immediate perception of an External World, and more, that Berkeley knows of what sensation-stuff this External World is made, while Hamilton apparently does not. That we could not doubt an External World on his views is precisely the merit Berkeley claims ; but it was, like Kant's, a phenomenal world, and not real in the sense of having anything like its present meaning, if

volved in Berkeley's principles, but because he did not bring this point out, he has been subject to such very easy refutations as the *Quarterly's*. If Berkeley be right, it thinks the gold coin locked in the safe of a Bank cannot exist, as there is no one to perceive it when locked up ; although, without pressing the answer here given, it is forgotten in the objection that there is always *one* mind to perceive them, namely, God's.

The objection is directed from a grade of intelligence a little above that which prompted the objection of "running against a post," of the Reids and Beatties, as this was from a perceptibly higher level of imagination than Dr. Johnson's silent refutation, by kicking a stone or knocking his stick against the ground, to re-assure all men of faltering faith in matter, that it was unmistakably there.

mind were withdrawn. There is a different error, which Hamilton shares with Mr. Abbott, as to the *nature* of Scepticism. Mr. Abbott thinks, if we accept Berkeley's Theory of Vision, Scepticism is the result. Hamilton thinks, if we accept his view of an External World, Scepticism is the result.

But before examining the error as to Scepticism here adverted to, let me say that I have already shown against Hamilton that Berkeley did not doubt in the one case which Hamilton considers so fatal; and let me add that Mr. Abbott's "Sight and Touch," an able Psychological work, has been answered (see Fraser's Life of Berkeley, pp. 405-6), so far as it was intended to refute Berkeley's Theory of Vision by proving distance a revelation of the eye, instead of an acquired perception; but, so far as it may be intended by its author as a refutation of Berkeley's Idealism (and he is not explicit upon this point), it has not been replied to, and it may be well to consider it, though briefly, if it have such pretensions. First, then, as pointed out before (Note, p. 91), Idealism is quite unconcerned how the question be decided, which is between Berkeley on the one side and Mr. Bailey and Mr. Abbott on the other, for in either case distance or thickness of space is only made known by variety of sensations, which cannot exist with any meaning, if the sentient being which reads them is non-existent. I believe that the meaning thrown into Externality is better explained by—rather pro-

perly explained only by—Berkeley's theory of acquired perceptions; but the discussion of this question I leave in the able hands of Professor Fraser and Mr. Mill, to take up some points they have not considered. Idealism, then, can accept either solution of this question, as to how distance is given, either Mr. Abbott's or the opposite; though Mr. Abbott seems to think the fortune of Idealism is bound up with it in such wise that Idealism falls with the Theory of Vision. He also styles Idealism a dogmatic system. It is just dogmatic as far as any system is which tries to establish itself by reason, even though it may fail to satisfy some able persons who do see its meaning, as well as it must certainly fail to convince the greater number of otherwise able persons who unaccountably cannot see it.

But Mr. Abbott is not only wrong about the nature of Idealism as a system of thought, in supposing it a dogmatic system, and wrong in supposing its fate interwoven with Berkeley's theory of Vision, so that one falls with the other; he is wrong in his view of the nature of Scepticism, and he shares this error with Hamilton. He says—"The theory assailed is, in fact, the stronghold of Scepticism; for if Consciousness is once proved to be delusive, there is an end to all appeals to its authority—doubt must reign supreme." (Preface "Sight and Touch.") This is the same as Hamilton's "*Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*," and involves the same alarming

state of things as Hamilton's declaration that the "root of our nature would be a lie," if we once doubt a supposed fact of Consciousness.

The true answer to both is, that if "doubt must reign supreme," or "the root of our nature be a lie," unless we accept their views, it makes not the slightest difference. If Consciousness lies all over, it is of no particular consequence, save in those few cases where she has been found out (like the case in question), and even there the discovery of the cheat disarms it of any more mischief. If Consciousness gives a false report all round, as it has not been clearly convicted by Reason, save in a few instances, we are none the worse for its attempts to cheat. Like other suspected criminals, it is to be regarded honest till proved a liar; if not so proved we may be easy about the matter. For the general suspicion is the same as no suspicion; this it is which makes it a suicidal charge to bring against Consciousness. The suspicion of all being doubtful would destroy the definite special doubts; while these can now be explained without bringing the charge of delusion against Nature. They may be explained, first, by showing, as with Berkeley, that the utterances of Consciousness were not so always. Secondly, and better, by showing that there is a superior faculty called Reason, whose business it is to doubt and suspect every testimony but its own. And thirdly, that these detected deceits, if they are to be so called,

become harmless when discovered, and as universal doubt is impossible, these cases where we have doubted, and with reason, may be, and are fairly to be considered as nice problems, proposed by Nature as a condition of bringing to the keenest point the speculative spirit in man. For these doubts, let it be particularly noted, only occur to the keener intellects of advanced nations—never to children or to savages—never even to the mass of mankind.

But more particularly as regards this supposed state of supreme doubt, I say it makes not the slightest difference, if under the all-embracing delusions and doubts, some things are relatively true, or are incapable of doubt phenomenally, and this Hamilton and Mr. Abbott must allow. Thus a twinge of toothache is a mode of Consciousness, which, if present to any one, cannot be doubted, or if doubted, it is of no consequence, as the supposed doubter has merely forgotten the proper meaning of doubt. Such doubt is no doubt, and paradoxical as it seems, Universal Scepticism, if possible, equals no Scepticism at all; it kills together with itself, or renders meaningless, the only Scepticism we know of, or that really concerns us. Thus the notion is suicidal and the master-sceptic, Hume,¹ notes this in his *Sceptical Essays*, while Stewart, Hamilton, and apparently Mr. Abbott, contemplate a state of

¹ See Hume's *Essays*, Vol. ii., pp. 149, 155.

things, where "doubt must (or might) reign supreme."

Universal Scepticism is a non-entity then ; but a supposed general delusion, in one sense, is not ; only if not found out, it is true, and real, till it is. Thus a general delusion is the same as no delusion ; as a prolonged dream from which we never awoke would be the true and real life, and as a madness which equally affected all men would be no madness at all. To say Consciousness generally deludes, in *one sense* is true ; and is but to say what poets have suspected and Philosophers have thought. Thus a great poet as well as thinker, but no sceptic, has said—

" We are such stuff

As dreams are made on, and our little life

Is rounded with a sleep."

And Leibnitz, a great Philosopher, but nothing of a Pyrrhonist, has asked this question, which has flashed across many persons : "*Quid vero si tota haec brevis vita non nisi longum quoddam somnium esset nosque moriendo evigilaremus ?*"

A further consideration of Scepticism must be postponed for the present. I will only say, in conclusion of this Essay, that there is quite as great misconception and more complete confusion on the whole matter than reigns even in regard to Idealism. Thus Philosophical Scepticism is confounded with Religious Scepticism, though complete Philosophi-

cal Sceptics have been dogmatic theologians. Then there are different kinds of Philosophical Scepticism, as that of Kant and Hume, one of which is opposed to the other. Universal Scepticism too, which is a non-entity, is confounded with the philosophical conception of Plato, Kant, Shakespeare, Leibnitz, and Berkeley; that the world might be one of appearance or delusion, in the sense that it might change to something quite different in future, as indeed is also the belief of the common sense of the world, though not of the Common Sense of the Scotch Philosophers. Even Scepticism, as a state of mind, is not clearly understood—I mean as a Psychological state, and not now as a Philosophical system, for Mr. Mill affirms people may be in the predicament that they are “not quite certain that they are uncertain,” or in other words, that a man may doubt that he doubts; and if so, he may doubt that he doubts that he doubts, &c., to infinity—a singularly perplexing Psychological state—really a Psychological nonentity or impossibility. Again, many people fancy it is possible to have a state of mind in which we believe without any doubt what we have either no or insufficient evidence for; a state of mind regarding which Berkeley taught men the memorable lesson (as Mr. Mill says), of the need of having evidence for what we do believe, when he denied the Existence of Matter on this very ground, of want of all evidence, except what was contradictory. The immense importance of the

whole subject of Scepticism, whether regarded as a Philosophical system, as a Psychological state, or in its bearing upon our Logical assent, is such that I can only here indicate it, without making any further attempt at present to go into the subject, as this Essay has already been extended beyond its originally projected limits, as a defence of Berkeley's position against its assailants.

SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES.

NOTE A.—*Berkeley's Meaning of Object.*

Dr. Mac Ivor, like others, denies this conclusion (p. 165), that we see the picture on the retina (Religious Progress, note, p. 359,) but in combating the conclusion of Mansel, who is easily shown to be inconsistent in holding this theory, he has not provided for the acute arguments of Mr. Monck in his Essay on Space and Vision.

There is also an attack made on Berkeley in the same work, which it concerns me to give an answer to. It is asserted, p. 359, that "we do not see our eyes or any part of them; simply for want of eyes, *i. e.*, other eyes 'to see them with.' Their fine mechanisms and operations are truly 'objects,' but they are never 'the objects' (this is Berkeley's constant fallacy) of our own sight-perception. They are just the objects which we do not see, and never shall." Undoubtedly, and the remark is as old as Cicero, and to be found in Locke, who opens his Essay, Book ii., with the words, "The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see, and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself;" but though so old and so true, I am not at all prepared to believe that it is a constant fallacy of Berkeley to overlook it, and to consider the eye as the object which the

eye perceives. What is the object of my sight-perception with Berkeley is a visual sensation felt by me. The object of tactual perception is a different sort of sensation felt by me : and so, *in all cases the object is a sensation*. Berkeley's own words will shortly settle this point. Thus Philonous says, "I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things"—idea with Berkeley is convertible with appearance, or sensation, or phenomenon—"since those immediate objects of perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves.

"Hylas.—Things ! you may pretend what you please ; but it is certain you leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside of which only strikes the senses.

"Philonous.—What you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to me the very things themselves. We both therefore agree in this, that we perceive only sensible forms ; but herein we differ ; you will have them to be empty appearances ; I real beings. In short, you do not trust your senses. I do."

But perhaps the following is more decisive against Dr. Mac Ivor :—"To explain how the mind or soul of man simply sees is one thing, and belongs to Philosophy. To consider particles as moving in certain lines, rays of light refracted or reflected, or crossing, or including angles, is quite another thing, and appertaineth to Geometry. To account for the sense of vision by the mechanism of the eye is a third thing, which appertaineth to Anatomy and experiments. These two latter speculations are of use in practice. . . . But the former theory is that which makes us understand the true nature of vision, considered as a faculty of the soul." (Theory of Vision Explained and Vindicated ; Fraser's Ed., Vol. i. p. 389.) To which Professor Fraser adds in a note : "According to Berkeley, the Theory of Vision involves merely the two elements of *immediate perception* (of the proper objects or sensations of each sense) : and *suggestion* in imagination of what had previously been perceived simultaneously in another of the senses." See also Secs. 9, 10, 11, pp. 376-7 ; also, Principles, 90.

These extracts show that Berkeley's object was an appearance, or sensation, and also afford an answer to Dr. Mac Ivor's Natural Realism, as contained in the following passage: "What we do see are those external, more or less distinct, luminous or illuminated objects, which, being correlated with our eyes, do positively affect them, draw out their powers into exercise, and cause us at once to see and to see *them*. Similarly, we hear external, more or less distant, vibrating objects, we do not hear our ears, either in rest or action; we taste sapid objects, we do not taste our palate; we feel tangible objects, we do not feel the papillæ of our skin, or any other of the fine mechanicals of touch."

Now, here what we see is an external object, as said before by Hamilton, and the answer to Hamilton will equally apply to this view. But we will give an independent answer. The external object seen is with Berkeley a Sensation, and Dr. Mac Ivor must admit that it is through a sensation of sight we get whatever knowledge we have of the object of sight. He must admit that only by means of sensations do we reach the external object. And it lies on him to show what objects are over and above the sensations by which they make themselves known to us. Associated Sensations make objects with Berkeley, and all beyond Sensations is their efficient cause, or God. Apparently, with Dr. Mac Ivor, something more than sensations constitutes the object, but he has not yet told us what; while he has told us, in the extract above, what the Realists of Berkeley's day believed, that the cause of our sensations is this external object, of which yet he has given us no analysis or explanation. But to give us an analysis—to tell us the meaning of 'external object' is precisely the problem for Philosophy; to decline to answer it is to decline to Philosophise, while dogmatically to affirm we yet must believe in external objects, is to imperatively order us to believe in we know not what, and Dr. Mac Ivor has not told us. We are to believe in "external objects," though each word represents an unknown quantity—though to explain what either means deep

philosophers have written volumes. Now, which is more Philosophical, Berkeley's Idealism or this kind of Natural Realism?

Berkeley's theory does not care how the question of Physiology and Psychology is settled, but insists on this, that whatever secret processes are shown by science as going on, and whatever be finally the Psychological means or mode by which we reach or communicate with what are called external objects, that these objects are in the last resort analysable into sensations, through which alone they can be known, and all beyond sensations is their cause, which is God. Thus, if the object be an orange lying before me, whether it is a picture or not on the retina, the object of sight-perception, is surely a sensation which I get through the eye, and am conscious of, while a blind man is not; and the object of perception if I put out my hand and feel it, is a sensation which I am conscious of, the conscious sensation is the important point, no matter what science settles as to the physical concomitants, and the same holds through all our other senses. In all cases the object of perception is a sensation which cannot exist apart from mind; the total object is a group of sensations, and what these sensations are, as given by eye or touch, I and all men very well know, though what science says of them we may not know. Now, Idealism is concerned with the sensation, as all men are conscious of it, without caring about the conclusions of science. Its argument so understood is absolute, and stretches forward for thousands of years, consistent with any conclusions of science, as, before science had advanced at all, it might indeed have been constructed by an intelligent thinker, thousands of years ago; and, in fact, according to some, actually was reached amongst the ancient Hindoos. (p. 375, Fraser's *Life of Berkeley*.)

NOTE B.—*Mathematical Necessity.*

With Berkeley space is resolvable into sensations successively experienced, and thus into sensations together with time; while time is relative swiftness of sensations, not as with Mr. Mill

and Kant, ultimate and irreducible, nor as with Hegel is it sunk in the gulf of the absolute, which is spaceless and timeless.

It is thought by some, by Kant in particular, that if space be sensations, we cannot account for Mathematical Necessity, which, they say, is a Psychological fact. And Mr. Mill, who accepts the view of Berkeley as to space, comes to the conclusion that the supposed superior necessity of Mathematics to Physics is a mere illusion. Now, I dissent from both views; I think that necessity of Mathematics is not affected by accepting Berkeley's views of space; and here I differ from Kant. I believe in the fullest necessity of Mathematics, on principles admitted by Berkeley, which Mr. Mill does not accept, and this appears to be a grave defect in Mr. Mill's Metaphysical system.

To make space sensational, or a phenomenal manifestation, does not prevent its being, as Kant says, a condition of external objects, of phenomena which are resolvable into sensations too. For with Kant one set of sensations (empiric space) is an invariable and necessary condition of another set of sensations (body), such that one must be supposed to exist first, to admit the other's existence. And I believe with Kant, that we cannot avoid placing body in space, though Mr. Mill thinks we cannot dis sever the two conceptions, merely because they have been inseparably and infinitely associated in experience, and this never reversed. But though I agree with Kant that space is *a priori*, in the sense of being necessarily pre-supposed to lodge phenomenal bodies in, I do not agree that if space be analysable into sensations, like the fact or concept tree, that then Mathematical judgments would be contingent. For they are apprehended by a superior faculty, Reason, though the rough notes, which furnish occasion for Reason's rules being laid down imperatively, are suggested first in space, *i. e.* the phenomenal and approximate circle and square are first shown in the phenomenal space.

A chief point of difference between Kant and Berkeley is, that with Kant space is a form of the sensibility. With Berkeley it

is sensations, like bodies, but is necessary to the existence of bodies, as we know them, *i. e.*, the set of sensations called bodies cannot be thought of or perceived but as in space. They all fill up space, or occupy it so that we have one set of varied sensations or bodies, all requiring another set of sensations to be their logical antecedent. We cannot imagine a body without granting it to fill space, which is a necessary law of Reason in thinking of bodies, just as the Law of Contradiction is. Mansel also says (*Prolegomena*, p. 107), we must think bodies occupy space; but this does not prove space to be (as he imagines it) a form of sensibility, in any sense different from Berkeley's view of space, for Berkeley also admits that space is necessarily thought as antecedent to bodies, or as necessary to contain them. Berkeley has nothing to say against this view of space, which is reconcilable with his own, and to make space such, does not give any more necessity to Mathematics than in Berkeley's view. For, even if space be a necessary form, it is learned by experience, and is itself phenomenal, though it holds all other phenomena; and its figures are phenomenal, as with Berkeley; also they are all imperfect, for there is no perfect circle or perfectly straight line with Kant any more than with Berkeley. And as only the imperfect line and circle meet us, therefore, whether space be a form or not, though I believe it is a form in the sense explained above, it will not make the necessity of Mathematical judgments a whit the more. The necessity is given by, and alone comes from the dictum of Reason, and can be as well given on Berkeley's as on Kant's view, because Reason is the superior faculty, and sees that what appears is only an approximation to the ideal, which is framed solely by itself. Reason *sees* no straight line given in the world of sense-experience by mere sensation (which is but a lower degree of itself), but she *knows* one shaped by and for herself. It is, no doubt, the sensational and imperfect one which gives the hint or suggestion, which rouses her own activity to frame the rational and perfect one, impossible of derivation from any source but the faculty of Reason. The ideas or con-

ceptions of the perfect circle and line, and also the axiomatic judgments regarding them, undoubtedly exist in our minds, the question is, how they come there? They cannot come from blind chance, it is evident; they cannot come from the mere sensitive facts, such as we meet with in sense experience, for they transcend all this experience; yet something—some intelligent source—suggests the perfect idea, and the necessary judgment. What, then, is the source, what is the faculty? Mr. Mill has no answer to the question. The true answer is, as with Plato and Hegel, the Reason.

Mr. Mill supposes there might be a world where the judgments of Mathematics would not hold—where two straight lines would not enclose a space, and where $2 + 2 = 5$. (Exam. of Hamilton, p. 85.) The supposition, besides being inconsistent with principles advocated in his Logic, where he bases arithmetical judgments on the definitions of the numbers, is simply the supposition of a world in which Reason is annihilated, where chaos not only reigns in Nature, but chaos, or total confusion, reigns in thought—virtually where the universe of thought has ceased to be. It is impossible even to conceive or imagine such a state of things. It involves the negation and paralysis of all thought—even to make suppositions becomes impossible. “World without thought,” Berkeley says, “is *nec quid, nec quantum, nec quale*,” and, “’tis wondrous to contemplate the world emptied of intelligences.” Now, it is such a world as this Mr. Mill’s supposition involves. With Hegel assuredly no such region exists, where two straight lines would enclose a space, or $2 + 2 = 5$. The supposition involves the annihilation of Reason, such as it reveals itself in men, and this involves a stupefaction, even in our suppositions, as to what would be possible.

This is one very weak spot in Mr. Mill’s Sensationalism. But there is another. He has not told us to what faculty we owe the conceptions of the perfect line and circle, as well as the judgments regarding them: to which conceptions and judgments all our sense experience is only approximately corres-

pondent. The true answer is, that the ideal lines and circles are peculiar to the world of Reason, and the necessary judgments are necessary properties, and relations of these ideas (not now in the Berkeleian sense, but the Hegelian sense of *idea*.) The judgments are true in this territory of Reason, and they are suggested by this faculty of Reason. Mr. Mill has wrongly described the faculty which gives us these truths, and does not acknowledge any truths transcending sense, although he must see that these judgments are not ever strictly true in the world of sense-facts. Thus, his Idealism is maimed and imperfect, in merging under the Laws of Association, or entirely leaving out of consideration the faculty which suggests these truths, not given in or by sensation. For the so-called examples of the axioms of Geometry (to speak now only of them) are really non-existent in the world of sense, are non-existent in the world of space, and are only true and existent in the world of Reason,—true, to use the commoner language, for the Intellect. Mill is chargeable with neglecting the superior faculty; but Berkeley at least implicitly recognises it,¹ in employing it first to conceive and then to prove the existence, and in part the nature, of God—a conception which transcends all sense-experience, and is only possible to Reason.

It seems to me, too, that even to make space a form of the sensibility, as with Kant, is not a sufficient basis for Mathematical necessity, as Mansel thinks it is (*Prolegomena*, chap. iv.), for even if space be so regarded, it still only permits us to see the imperfect, the phenomenal figures of space. To see the per-

¹ Also explicitly in the following passage from the "Theory of Vision vindicated and explained": "The objects of sense being things immediately perceived are otherwise called *ideas*. The cause of these ideas is not the object of sense—not being itself perceived, but only inferred by Reason from its effects—to wit, these objects or ideas which are perceived by sense. From our ideas of sense, the inference of reason is good to Power, Cause, Agent. Hence it follows that the Power or Cause of ideas is not an object of sense but of reason."

fect ones in space is not possible, for if we look around for ever at the figures presented to us, even if we construct them for ourselves on paper (or even in the imagination, where we picture an imagined space), we only encounter the imperfect figures. To think the perfect requires a prompting—a suggestion of Reason—and it is unrealisable in any space; and unsuggested by any sense. Mere sense cannot give them, which is possessed by dogs as well as by savages, while both are yet alike destitute of the conceptions; and space cannot show them, as it only permits the imperfect and phenomenal to appear. To think that Mathematical judgments, and the necessity we ascribe to them, are given by an accumulation of sense experience, is the error of Mill; to think that making space a form of sensibility is sufficient ground for their necessity, is certainly the mistake of Mansel, and I think that also of Kant. For, even if space be a form of all phenomena, as it only permits phenomenal figures to appear, and these are all merely rough approximations to ideal figures, unless a faculty suggests the truths and also decides on their necessity, to say, as Mansel does (*Prolegomena*, p. 111), that “any attributes which are once presented to me as properties of a given portion of space, the same must necessarily be thought as existing in all space and at all times,” is no explanation whatever. Indeed it is the reverse, for the “properties of a given portion of space,” whatever they may be, are phenomenal, and could not furnish examples at all of the axioms of Geometry, which relate to something different from any such experience. If it was ever true in any space that two right lines did not enclose a space, it will be for ever true of two precisely similar lines, but only of them, and that is not sufficient basis for the general axiom regarding all pairs of straight lines. Further, they were not strictly straight lines at all, no matter in what space they were met with, and so, to prove what is true of these is true of all precisely similar, while insufficient to give generality, would yet be little to the purpose, even if it did give generality, as I contend the axioms of Geometry do not relate

to these lines met in space at all. They are not, as Mansel thinks them, properties of space, of empiric space, at all; and therefore I cannot think Mansel has proved anything whatever about their necessity.

The ideal line, and circle, and square, and all the great structures of thought reared upon these conceptions, including Analytic Geometry, the Differential Calculus, and all the most advanced applications of Mathematical methods to the facts of the physical world, are as impossible to that faculty of sense (though Mill seems to think it sufficient) as the conception of the character of Falstaff, or conception of the Elliptic Motion of the Planets: and the necessity which lies at the base of the whole edifice is one imperatively imposed by Reason upon these initial conceptions, which are unrealised, as Mansel thinks, in any space. The necessity is as irrevocable as the nature of thought, by which and for which the conceptions and judgments exist; and the necessity can only cease with thought's destruction. Thus, then, Mathematical necessity is not dependent on making space a form of the sensibility; as the perfect circle is not given *by* sensibility nor *in* space at all, but is a suggestion unrealised in any space which exists—not even in imagined space. It only exists in a territory quite out of space, in the region of Reason, which is the source and guarantee of its existence and the mathematical necessity grounded upon it.

I wish to insist on the point in this long note, as it is generally supposed that only from Kant's view of space can the necessity of Mathematics be explained, and Berkeley holds a different view of space from Kant. I believe a Berkeleian can join to Berkeley's view of space which is resolvable into sensations, the Hegelian principle, that there are truths given by Reason. And though Mr. Mill, a professed Berkeleian, does not do so, which I consider a great defect in his Metaphysics, others who accept Berkeley's system need be under no such difficulty. Also, I believe Mansel has entirely failed to give, on Kantian principles, Mathematics its necessary ground. The entire chapter (iv.)

is a model of confusion, which one can hardly avoid thinking the maker did not perceive. At the same time, Mansel is right in his stricture on Leibnitz, who made all mathematical judgments analytical, for this is not true of geometrical judgments, but it is true of arithmetical ones. For when the notions up to 5 have been acquired, it is impossible not to see that $5 = 2 + 3$. No doubt, intuition was required before the notions were acquired, but afterwards it lies in the definitions of the number 5 (which supposes we have passed, and have a meaning for 2 and 3, that it is equal to the sum of 2 and 3). Intuition was needed, as in every other case where a concept has been framed, and only so far can the judgments of arithmetic be considered truths of intuition. Mr. Mill then, who agrees with Hegel, I consider right as to the nature of the Arithmetical, wrong as to the nature of Geometrical judgments; and Mansel wrong as regards both. But even in the case of Arithmetical ones, Mr. Mill surely forgets the opinions laid down in his *Logic* (vol. ii., chap. xxiv.), when in his *Exam. of Hamilton*, he supposes it possible there could be a world where $2 + 2 = 5$. If the truths of Arithmetic are based on definitions, there must be one world where the Law of Contradiction no longer obtains, while it is the ground of his chief charge against Hegel, and a charge from which he can be defended, that he violates the authority of this law.

It may be said that in one place Mr. Mill speaks of facts, in the other of definitions; but no definitions can ever conflict with the facts which suggest them, and to which only they relate, for if they conflict they are no longer definitions relating to such facts, but to other one. Thus, no definition of 5 could ever apply to four objects, so long as the Laws of Identity and Contradiction maintain their validity.

THE END.



